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Abstract 
 
 This thesis contributes to the literature on duties of global justice by 
critically examining the Rawlsian internationalist account of duties of 
development assistance. Internationalists argue that two distinct spheres 
of justice exist: The domestic sphere, where demanding, often egalitarian 
duties, are owed between citizens, and the global sphere where much less 
demanding duties are owed to non-citizens. Among those, however, is an 
obligation to help the world’s poorest countries, called burdened societies, 
develop. This thesis argues that even if we accept the internationalist 
framework as a whole, this duty of development is more demanding than 
its proponents assume. It does so by, first, examining the normative 
assumptions behind the duty, namely how basic human rights are 
understood, at what point countries cease to be burdened, and what role 
national self-respect and self-reliance play. Second, it questions the role 
that domestic government institutions play in determining whether or not 
a country develops. And third, it examines the effect that the history of 
past injustices, colonial or otherwise, towards the least developed 
countries has on our present-day duties. In making this argument the 
thesis does not attempt to provide a single authoritative version of 
internationalism, but instead acknowledges the breadth of views within 
the literature. 
 Although primarily a work of normative political philosophy, this 
work places a great emphasis on empirical work to illustrate and inform 
my argument. This takes two forms. First, it undertakes an extensive 
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review of the development economics literature about the likely positive 
and negative effects of outside assistance in least developed countries. And 
second, to test the claim that quality of domestic institutions is the 
overarching determinant of development, it conducts a statistical analysis 
of 102 countries using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fs/QCA). 
 In doing so, the thesis justifies a thicker and more encompassing 
duty of development which is nonetheless compatible with internationalist 
account of global justice. As such, it also provides an outline of how rich, 
developed states can and ought to act in the present. 
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Introduction 
 
0.1 Introduction 
 
 900 million people still live in poverty today. That number has 
dropped quite a lot from 50 or even 25 years ago, when 37% of the world’s 
population was extremely poor.1 Although this monumental decline in 
poverty is a hugely positive step, and one that should be celebrated, the 
development has largely taken place in Asia and South America, fuelled by 
the rapid growth of China, Vietnam and (to a lesser extent) India. But 
elsewhere, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, the same development seems 
to be lacking. There have been vast improvements in some parts, but on 
the whole development has been much slower in these countries than in 
their Asian counterparts. 42.6% of Africans remain poor.2 
 Perhaps it is just a matter of time before the remaining abjectly poor 
parts of the world catch up. Perhaps global market capitalism will 
eventually take everyone out of poverty, and what has happened in large 
parts of Asia in recent decades will eventually happen in the rest of the 
world, including sub-Saharan Africa. But there are reasons to be sceptical 
of that claim. If the same global market forces that have caused Asia to rise 
have failed to do the same for Africa, why should we believe that they will 
do so in the future? It seems more likely that different problems beset 
                                                   
1 World Bank, “Overview,” Poverty, 2015, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview. By “today” I mean the most 
recent numbers available, from 2012. 
2 Ibid. 
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these countries for whom free market capitalism has seemed to be more 
snake oil than cure. Maybe a different response is needed to get to that last 
remaining 900 million poor people in the world. 
 This thesis is about what that response should be. What are the 
duties of the wealthiest countries in the world to help those who live in 
impoverished societies? How far out of our way are we expected to go in 
fulfilling our duties of global justice? How are these duties limited by 
empirical constraints and clashing duties of justice to a country’s own 
citizens? If these questions can be answered clearly and coherently, we will 
have a much better idea of what the world’s richest countries ought to do. 
 
0.2 The central question of the thesis 
 
 The political map of the world is characterised by sovereign, 
independent states that control political affairs within their territories. 
Obviously, they do not wield supreme power – a long list of treaties 
constrain governments’ legal and legitimate courses of action, especially 
when it comes to human rights and military non-aggression. The 
consequences of not following established norms of legitimacy can be quite 
severe. Some countries, moreover, have voluntarily signed away parts of 
their sovereignty to supranational organisations such as the European 
Union, or engaged in bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements. 
Almost all are members of the United Nations and most have joined 
international organisations such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund or the World Health Organization. 
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 Nonetheless, a substantial and powerful argument can be made that 
the political structure of the world is in itself a form of injustice – that by 
drawing sharp lines on a map that separate one country from the rest, we 
prevent people from being able to take part in political decisions that 
legitimately concern them, and stop them from moving around freely as is 
their right. We also encourage politicians to think of all politics as national 
politics even when the decisions have global consequences, and in the 
process prevent countries from working together to solve problems that 
are global in nature, and therefore must be solved globally. Moreover, 
cosmopolitans argue, in a world divided into sovereign states people are 
encouraged to think of themselves first and foremost as members of a 
particular, arbitrary, political community instead of seeing themselves as a 
part of humanity. This, in turn, makes people in the richest parts of the 
world unable to accept the necessary changes to the global system in order 
to establish a just world order. This does not necessarily mean that some 
sort of global governance structure, either in the form of a global state or 
other kinds of interlocking and overlapping spheres of governance, must 
be implemented. That is indeed the view of some cosmopolitans. But 
others accept the role of the state for practical or normative reasons, while 
nonetheless arguing that they ought to be reformed to live up to the 
principle of treating each individual as belonging within the same sphere 
of justice. 3 
                                                   
3 I discuss these objections, in the context of Rawls, in Chapter 1. For good examples of 
this line of thought, see Luis Cabrera, Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan 
Case for the World State (London: Routledge, 2004) as an example of the former, and 
Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Lea Ypi, 
“Statist Cosmopolitanism,” Journal of Political Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2008): 48–71 as 
examples of the latter line of thinking. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Introduction 
13 of 373 
 On the other hand internationalists, also sometimes referred to as 
statists,4 argue that the global structure of the world, while not necessarily 
just as things stand, nonetheless has the potential to be just without the 
fundamental changes that some cosmopolitans envisage. To them, states 
are a legitimate part of the system, and we have good reasons to want 
states to continue to make up the most important part of the international 
sphere. States, they say, are the framework by which people’s rights are 
guaranteed, and their ability to live and give meaning to their life can be 
realised. For that same reason, it is right that citizens of a state should be 
bound together by much closer ties than those which bind together 
humanity as a whole. Citizens owe each other a duty of justice that is much 
more demanding than those owed to non-citizens, precisely because it is 
through the shared legal, cultural and normative framework of the state 
that they are able to live their lives as free and autonomous individuals. 
 That does not mean that no duties are owed to foreigners, however. 
But they are, in broad strokes, limited to duties to prevent absolute 
poverty, and to ensure basic human rights. They are therefore much less 
demanding than both those owed to compatriots, and those for which 
cosmopolitans argue. 
 This is a fascinating debate, and while there are strong arguments in 
favour of either standpoint – though I do lean more towards one than the 
other – this thesis does not take sides in that argument. Instead, I 
                                                   
4 I prefer the term “internationalist” to “statist” for two reasons. First, although to many 
the terms are interchangeable, statist is sometimes used to refer to people who believe 
that no duties of justice whatsoever exist outside the state, as opposed to 
internationalists who believe there are some global duties of justice. And second, in 
popular parlance the term statist is sometimes used as a quasi-derogatory term for 
someone who thinks that only his or her state’s interests are relevant. 
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approach the subject from a different angle. I keep the central argument of 
the internationalist account of global justice as read, and instead ask what 
that means for the duty of development specifically. Therefore, the central 
research question motivating this thesis is: If we assume that duties 
towards non-compatriots are limited in broadly the way internationalists 
argue, what does the duty of development actually entail? 
 This approach might seem unnecessarily conservative to some. 
Surely, to answer the question of what duties exist within a particular 
framework, we must first zoom out and ask if the framework itself is just. 
By asking what is just within a framework without questioning it first, are 
we not begging the question? Here I would therefore refer to what John 
Rawls calls “realistic utopia”,5 the idea that our moral enquiries should be 
informed by empirical reality and be applicable directly to the world we 
live in, including the current political reality of the international system. 
What the proposals outlined here crucially do not require are, first that a 
cosmopolitan value set supersede national sympathies.6 And second, that 
the efforts of different countries be coordinated at a basic level. Nor do the 
efforts of individual countries to live up to their duties of global justice 
depend substantially on whether others do the same. The kinds of 
compliance and coordination issues that often plague solutions to global 
problems,7 are therefore not the same foundational stumbling block as 
they are, for instance, when it comes to establishing global institutions. 
                                                   
5 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 7. 
6 Matt Sleat, “The Value of Global Justice: Realism and Moralism,” Journal of 
International Political Theory 12, no. 2 (2016): 175. 
7 Laura Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 
7, no. 9 (2012): 654–64. 
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 Moreover, you might reasonably ask, is anything that requires the 
consent of the powerful really realistic? And of so, is it not better to 
advocate for a conception of justice whereby the powerful are constrained 
in their actions? But if the standards by which something is to be judged 
realistic or feasible is whether it is even remotely likely to happen in the 
near future, we might as well just pack up and do something other than 
political philosophy. Change can and does happen, but it is often both slow 
and unpredictable. The realism of this project should instead be 
understood as not requiring the fundamental structural changes some 
cosmopolitans demand. In order to discharge an internationalist duty of 
justice (both as it is currently understood by many internationalists, and 
as I argue it should be understood), it is necessary to change the outlook of 
the leaders of rich, powerful countries. They have to sign up to committing 
to spending more on foreign development and investment, and to 
conducting a more collaborative and cooperative foreign policy. These may 
be very big asks indeed. But a willingness on the part of key actors to 
change seems to me an essential precondition for any change to happen. 
  Whatever the normative value of cosmopolitanism over 
internationalism might be, it therefore seems to me that the 
internationalist duty maps more closely to what the world actually looks 
like. This is especially true given the normative importance that most 
people place on the state as a political entity.8 For that reason alone, there 
is value to keeping that particular feature static. A discussion about what is 
owed to burdened societies on the internationalist account therefore 
                                                   
8 Ypi, “Statist Cosmopolitanism,” 54. 
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translates more easily into a claim about what governments should do 
now, especially compared with non-statist cosmopolitan accounts of 
justice. 
 As it happens, I argue throughout this thesis that, even if we accept 
the basic internationalist framework, the duties towards burdened 
societies are, in fact, more demanding than internationalists themselves 
claim. Of course, most of the developed world’s attitude towards the global 
poor is pitiful even by the limited internationalist standards. But I contend 
that even if states were to fulfil the responsibilities laid out in the existing 
internationalist literature they would still only be part of the way to 
treating non-compatriots in least developed countries justly. 
 As I will make clear through the thesis, internationalism is a 
broader church than the brief introduction given here is able to convey. 
Just like cosmopolitanism, internationalism comes in many forms, some of 
which emphasise the state’s duties of global justice more strongly than 
others. Indeed, an internationalist is not defined by a belief that a 
particular set of rights and duties are shared by a group of people, either 
domestically or internationally. Rather, what ultimately separates 
internationalism from cosmopolitanism, in all their various forms, is the 
belief that the citizen and non-citizen operate in separate and distinct 
spheres of justice. In this thesis, therefore, I do not pretend to present a 
definitive account of what internationalism is. Rather, I engage with a 
number of different authors who, as will become clear, approach the 
question of what is owed to non-citizens from very different angles and 
often disagree with each other. In making my case I engage with the views 
that tend to be more challenging, or more interesting to question, which in 
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many cases tend to be the ones where the contrast between the 
internationalist view and my own is starkest. 
 This thesis is first and foremost a normative piece of work, but it is 
one with a heavy empirical bent. The facts on the ground matter to our 
philosophical convictions, especially when it comes to the question of what 
duties are owed to people living under conditions of extreme hardship. The 
normative argument is, as far as possible, built on solid empirical 
foundations. This is particularly clear in my discussion of what kinds of 
development it is actually possible for an outside agent to affect – the 
institutional thesis. The institutional thesis claims that good institutions 
are the key determinant of development. Because these are extremely hard 
to influence from the outside, the argument goes, our responsibility to act 
is therefore diminished accordingly. Rather than conduct an extensive 
literature review I instead conduct an analysis using fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA). As I explain in the methodology chapter, I 
do this not only to provide a more thorough argument but also to highlight 
that empirical questions can be effectively and competently grappled with 
even by people, like myself, from a different background and with limited 
prior knowledge of the methods involved.9 
 My argument is aimed at citizens, politicians and opinion makers 
operating in or coming from the rich, developed Western world. I am one 
of them. Born into a middle class family in one of the richest and most 
equal societies in the world, I have enjoyed all the benefits that come with 
                                                   
9 The thesis’s heavy reliance on empirics is hardly revolutionary in the field, however. 
Rawls’s empirical digging in The Law of Peoples, is rarely more than surface-deep, and 
Michael Blake professes not to engage with it all. But others, most notably Mathias Risse 
whose work the fs/QCA analysis is primarily a retort to, uses empirical studies 
extensively to inform and bolster his argument, to great effect. 
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citizenship of the West. Apart from two stints in Tanzania and Nepal, 
volunteering for ActionAid (a quintessentially middle class thing to do), I 
am steeped through and through in a Western liberal mode of life. I make 
no deliberate attempt in this thesis to reflect on my own role as a 
researcher of that particular background, though I do discuss and aim to 
call into question the assumption of universality that, as we will see, 
underpins key parts of the internationalist argument. 
 
0.3 Structure and chapter outline 
 
 The argument in this thesis can roughly be divided into three parts. 
The first part, comprising Chapters 3 and 4, are predominantly normative 
in nature. They ask how and why the internationalist duty of development 
is limited in the way it is. The second part, made up of Chapters 5 and 6, is 
predominantly empirical. It challenges assumptions about what causes 
development, and how much we, as outsiders, can do to make the kinds of 
changes necessary for a country to develop. The third and final part 
consists of Chapter 7, which asks what role historical injustices should play 
in determining how demanding the duty of development should be. 
 Chapter 1 begins by providing the necessary context for the 
argument. It situates the argument in the Rawlsian tradition and lays out 
its origins from A Theory of Justice through to The Law of Peoples and 
beyond. It also introduces the institutional thesis, which will become 
highly relevant in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 Chapter 2 discusses the methodology of the thesis, locating the 
argument in the Rawlsian analytical philosophical tradition, and 
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underscoring the emphasis on real-life examples to guide our moral 
reasoning. It also presents and justifies the use of fs/QCA as the analytical 
method used in Chapter 5. 
 Chapter 3 opens the central argument by asking what the maximum 
moral extent of the duty of development is. Internationalists claim that the 
duty only covers human rights and basic needs, but what do these two 
things actually mean? I argue that they must mean the inclusion of at least 
three additional rights: A standard of living adequate for a person’s health 
and well-being, the right to an education, and the right only to be 
subjected to laws that ensure the rights and freedoms of everyone. I also 
consider two additional grounds for a duty of development. These are, 
first, common ownership of the Earth, which I find are implausibly 
narrow. And second, rights derived from a liberal world order do, like the 
internationalist approach to human rights, result in a narrow conception 
of rights. However, it does stand out in one respect: There is a right to live 
in a democratic state, which I find plausible in principle, even if insisting 
on its implementation may be risky. Finally, I argue that to secure a right 
in perpetuity is a more demanding duty than to secure a right here and 
now, and the duty of development must be sensitive to this fact. 
 Chapter 4 continues the discussion of the duty of development’s 
normative limits, asking what happens when global duties conflict with 
other ones. Internationalists assume that the two never clash, but I argue 
that this rests on a misconception that a country is either completely 
burdened, or completely well-ordered. They do not acknowledge the 
possibility that a country may straddle both categories. But in fact, many 
countries do fall somewhere in-between, and this throws up important 
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questions. Another misconception concerns the need to preserve the self-
respect and self-determination of the target country. Although self-respect 
is clearly important it is not a uniform measure, and Western conceptions 
of the value of self-determination are not universal. We should therefore 
not assume that all countries will value their self-respect in the same way. 
 Chapter 5 returns to the institutional thesis, and argues that it is 
misguided. While it is indeed true that institutions play an essential role in 
determining development, they do so in a very different way than the 
thesis suggests. Rather than institutions being correlated with 
development, they are in fact a necessary precondition for it, although they 
are not sufficient preconditions in themselves. This means that while the 
duty of development is indeed severely curtailed in countries with poor 
institutions – because there is very little we can do to help other than 
through immediate poverty relief – it would be wrong to assume that 
countries are poor because they have bad institutions. In many cases, 
therefore, the institutional thesis does not apply, and does not diminish 
the duty of assistance. 
 Chapter 6 continues the argument by looking more broadly at what 
wealthy countries can do to aid poorer ones. It finds that while there are 
many problems with development assistance, the harshest critics are 
misguided when they argue that it is of no use. In fact, development 
assistance has been proven to have a small but significant effect, and there 
are some cases (though by no means all) where scaling up aid levels is 
likely to bring about good outcomes. As an example, I suggest that Ghana 
is one of those cases, and suggest some concrete ways that increased aid 
flows to Ghana could bear fruit. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Introduction 
21 of 373 
 Finally, Chapter 7 returns to the normative, and asks what the 
significance of the world’s history of colonial violence and subjugation is.  I 
argue that the global order is unjust due to its colonial origins, and that 
there is a duty to atone for it. I then discuss a contradiction in Rawls’s 
argument, that his theory is simultaneously idealistic and applicable to the 
world as it is now. But peoples in the original position, who are aware of 
the history of colonialism, would not allow the principles Rawls suggests to 
go into effect without first addressing that history. One possibility is that 
they would settle on a temporary extended duty to bring the world up to a 
level starting point before the regular principles would take effect. I defend 
this solution as valid whether you believe that the global order is 
characterised by a liberal or a libertarian conception of justice. Finally, I 
discuss a duty of imperial repair, posited by Richard Miller, and argue that 
while the scope of the duty is plausible, the range is too narrow. Given the 
intractable nature of the legality, legitimacy and practice of colonialism it 
does not make sense to assign the duty of imperial repair exclusively to the 
former colonial master. Instead, it must be a shared duty that is owed by 
all wealthy countries against all former colonies. 
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Chapter 1 – Literature Review 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 This thesis is a contribution to the debate between internationalism 
and cosmopolitanism about what kinds of duties peoples owe to non-
compatriots, specifically the duties that are owed to the world’s least 
developed countries, or burdened societies. In doing so, I keep the basic 
framework of internationalism in place for the sake of the argument, 
instead asking: If internationalists are right that the duties of a society 
towards non-members are limited in the way they claim, and that the 
domestic and the international really do constitute two separate spheres of 
justice, where does that leave duties towards the world’s poorest? It will be 
my contention throughout the thesis that those duties are, in fact, more 
demanding than internationalists tend to assume. 
 But before I can begin that task, it is first necessary to establish 
where the internationalist argument originates, in order to fully 
understand its force. This chapter is therefore organised as follows. First, 
in Section 1.2, I outline the basic tenets of A Theory of Justice and discuss 
the limited attention Rawls gives to the international sphere in this work. I 
further explore how many prominent critics, including Brian Barry, 
Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge elaborate on the international dimension, 
arguing that Rawls, properly understood, must be a cosmopolitan. 
 Section 1.3 then outlines the central tenets of The Law of Peoples, 
Rawls’s international theory which disappointed cosmopolitan critics by 
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defending a limited conception of global duties. It also explores important 
criticisms of Rawlsian internationalism. Section 1.4, by contrast, gives the 
stage to influential defences of Rawls’s theory which, they argue, is both 
richer and less conservative than its critics imagine. 
 Next, in Section 1.5 I move the focus away from Rawls directly, and 
explore in detail several other internationalist approaches, especially those 
of Michael Blake, Matthias Risse, Thomas Nagel, David Miller and Richard 
Miller among others. They argue that only the state gives rise to the kinds 
of egalitarian justice that cosmopolitans believe apply to all of humanity. 
 Finally, in Section 1.6 I outline specifically what duties we owe 
towards developing countries. Internationalists argue that while duties to 
least developed countries do exist as a matter of justice, they are 
nonetheless limited by a fixed cut-off point. In addition, we have reasons 
to be concerned with toleration and prudence, which makes the duty 
harder to fulfil. It is therefore less demanding in practice than in theory. 
One such concern is the institutional thesis, the idea that what really 
determines whether a country develops is the quality of its institutions. 
This section therefore provides a broad overview of the internationalist 
arguments that the thesis will examine in the coming chapters. Section 1.7 
concludes. 
 
1.2 Rawls and A Theory of Justice 
 
 When John Rawls published A Theory of Justice in 1973, he limited 
his theory to an idealised domestic society in which people share a 
common conception of the good. He left speculations about the nature of 
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international justice to a minimum, not addressing it to any substantial 
degree until the paper, and later monograph, both entitled The Law of 
Peoples. While in the few times he pointed to the global sphere, his view 
seemed reasonably close to what was later presented in The Law of 
Peoples,1 the sheer scarcity of an international dimension to his earlier 
work left it unclear where Rawls stood on the subject, and how it fitted 
with his domestic structure. The intervening years therefore saw plenty of 
speculation about the consequences of Rawls’s framework for the 
international sphere, and not least what Rawls himself thought about 
global justice. 
 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls set out to create a theory that 
“generalises and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory 
of the social contract found, say, in Locke, Rousseau or Kant,”2 eliminating 
from the equation any assumptions about real or imagined historical 
events, such as the “state of nature”. Instead, he asks us to imagine a state 
of nature which is purely hypothetical, the “original position”. In it, the 
representatives of individuals are situated behind a “veil of ignorance”3 in 
which they are aware of basic features of the world they will inhabit but 
know nothing about their own circumstances, since this would enable 
them to choose policies that favour themselves. This includes their place in 
society, social status, natural talents and abilities, intelligence and 
strength, or their particular conception of the good.4 In preventing them 
from favouring themselves in their decisions, since they have no way of 
                                                   
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 331–332. 
2 Ibid., 10. 
3 Ibid., 118–123. 
4 Ibid., 11. 
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knowing which institutions or conceptions of justice will do so, the 
procedure therefore guarantees that the representatives will choose fair 
principles of justice. Particularly, Rawls argues, their deliberation will lead 
to the following principles being agreed to: 
 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar scheme of liberties for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to 
everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all.5 
 
 These principles follow naturally from the restrictions placed on the 
individuals in the original position. Since they do not know what their 
position in society will be, they will be concerned with making the worst 
off in society as well off as possible. Consequently they settle on a highly 
egalitarian conception of justice, the “difference principle”, or “maximin”, 
which maximises the welfare of the worst-off members of society. They 
allow only those inequalities that contribute towards this goal, for instance 
by creating incentives for hard work and innovation.6 
 A Theory of Justice was met not only with widespread praise, but 
also with affirmations both from admirers and critics of the sheer force of 
its arguments and lasting impact. “I believe that, as time goes on,” writes 
                                                   
5 Ibid., 53. 
6 Ibid., 65–73. 
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Brian Barry, “A Theory of Justice will stand out with increasing clarity as 
by far the most significant contribution to political philosophy in this [the 
20th] century.”7  Robert Nozick notes that “[p]olitical philosophers now 
must either work within Rawls’s theory or explain why not.”8 While the 
reception has been overwhelmingly positive, some criticisms have been 
particularly influential. From a libertarian perspective Nozick objects that 
any redistributive principle of justice is in itself unjust, since it invariably 
involves taking property away from its rightful owners. Hence the justice 
of a distribution of goods must be a function of the myriad steps by which 
it came about, and cannot depend on the end-result of that process.9 The 
communitarian critique offered up most prominently by Michael Sandel 
contends that what Rawls asks us to do, namely to imagine persons with 
no knowledge of their own individual circumstances, preferences and 
relationships, is impossible. The resulting person behind the veil of 
ignorance is neither an agent of construction nor of choice, as Rawls 
claims, but “less liberated than disempowered,” and “left at sea in the 
circumstances it was thought to command.”10 Further, to Michael Walzer 
legitimate social criticism cannot emanate from a hypothetical state of 
nature devoid of any cultural particulars, but must always be grounded in 
real and present persons with specific traditions and cultures.11 
 But another objection, that the original position could, and should, 
be extended to encompass the whole globe, has been a feature of critiques 
                                                   
7 Brian Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” Ethics 105, no. 4 (1995): 915. 
8 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1974), 183. 
9 Ibid., 151–152. See also Chapter 7 of the book. 
10 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 178. 
11 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 1983), 79–82. 
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of Rawls since the beginning. In Barry’s version the argument goes as 
follows: Rawls mistakenly assumes that in the original position 
communities already exist, but the representatives are merely unaware of 
their features. However, they must also know the basic features of the 
world we live in, namely that some communities will be rich while others 
will be poor. But if they do not know which one they are in, the same 
principles by which they adopt the maximin principle within communities 
will lead them to demand that their deliberation include everyone in the 
world. They will not want their own conditions to be determined by the 
luck-of-the-draw of which community they end up living in.12 But Rawls is 
adamant that egalitarian justice takes place between persons bound 
together by mutual and reciprocal schemes of cooperation of the kind that 
only apply internally within societies.13 Why, then, should we expect the 
representatives behind the veil of ignorance not to restrict their discussion 
to fellow members of this scheme? Because, counters Charles Beitz, this 
line of argument is based on an empirical misunderstanding about the 
international sphere. Rawls seems to think of communities as self-
sufficient. While such a world may be a theoretical possibility, however, it 
has very little in common with our current world order in which global 
interaction, and in many cases interdependence, is beyond doubt.14 Many 
others have made similar arguments, with the emphasis normally placed 
either on the first objection, that the representatives in the original 
                                                   
12 Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 128–
133. 
13 Rawls, TJ, 40. This is not simply not one of the principles given to the representatives in the 
international original position; it is something they themselves would insist on.  
14 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), 143–153. Also, Part Three (125-176) in general. 
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position would object to only considering their own society; or the second, 
that global interaction renders the sharp separation between the domestic 
and the international untenable.15 
 Interestingly, A Theory of Justice seems to simultaneously support 
the role and shape of the original position for an international conception 
of justice that Barry and Beitz endorse, and the one Rawls eventually 
adopts definitively. This is probably down to the fact that Rawls paid so 
little attention to the issue that for his purposes the discrepancy mattered 
little to the argument. 16  At one point he presents the global original 
position as one made up of persons from various societies, deliberating 
from behind a veil of ignorance that leaves them unaware of their own 
place within their society, but also of the specific features of it. At another 
point he thinks of them as representatives of states, concerned with 
furthering their own rational interests as defined by principles of justice 
that have already been agreed upon domestically.17 The latter, as we will 
see shortly, differs in two important regards from The Law of Peoples; 
here the representatives are states and thus presumably more Westphalian 
than peoples, and they are guided by rationality rather than 
reasonableness. Nonetheless it is clearly closest to the version that Rawls 
eventually settles on. 
                                                   
15 See, for instance, Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1989); Andrew Kuper, “Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond the Law of Peoples to a 
Cosmopolitan Law of Persons,” Political Theory 28, no. 5 (2000): 640–74; Luis Cabrera, 
“Toleration and Tyranny in Rawls’s ‘Law of Peoples,’” Polity 34, no. 2 (2001): 163–79; Kok-
Chor Tan, “Liberal Toleration in Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Ethics 108, no. 2 (1998): 276–95; 
Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 
10, no. 1 (2002): 95–123. 
16 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 242.The section from which the following quotes are taken appear 
in a section that is not mainly about international justice, further underlining the relative 
unimportance of the issue in A Theory of Justice. 
17 Rawls, TJ, 331–332. See also Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 242–243. 
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 To Thomas Pogge, a global redistributive principle follows logically 
from either reading. Either the individual persons in the original position 
are concerned with securing the most extensive package of basic social 
goods possible, regardless of which society they will end up in, or else the 
representatives of states will be concerned with securing the best basic 
goods for their least well-off members. Whatever principle for 
international justice they decide on, they will want to assess their choice in 
light of each option’s ability to minimise violations of the first principle of 
justice. It is therefore “astonishing that Rawls takes this global session to 
result in the affirmation of the ‘familiar’ principles of international law.”18 
The parties in the original position, whether individuals or states, will have 
reasons to reject this proposal in favour of wider-reaching principles that 
ensure that equal liberties are maintained in the face of the forces of 
international trade, where inequalities between states are not allowed to 
reach a level that threatens their commitment to treaties, and with a 
proper mechanism for adjudicating and enforcing treaties. Without these, 
even an initially stable global order is vulnerable to non-compliance, 
compromising its durability.19 
 In most ways Pogge’s suggestion falls closely in line with earlier 
arguments in favour of a globalised original position made up of 
representatives of individuals, but with one crucial difference. Rather than 
being an extension of the domestic one, the global version is the original 
original position. Here the question of states, or indeed any form of 
national subdivisions, is not a given, but is open for deliberation. This, 
                                                   
18 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 243–244. 
19 Ibid., 244–245. 
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Pogge argues, creates a more principled, harmonious and coherent theory 
than the two-step process Rawls endorses.20 After all, how is it possible for 
peoples to even determine how they want their own societies to be 
organised without knowing what the world as a whole looks like? Once the 
newly constituted peoples have met and hashed out the rules for the global 
order, they will surely want to go back and re-negotiate the domestic 
principles in light of the new information they have gained. 
 
1.3 The Law of Peoples gets a harsh welcome 
 
 The Law of Peoples continues the social contract approach set out 
by A Theory of Justice, and once again the representatives meet behind the 
veil of ignorance, this time to determine principles for international 
cooperation. This second original position retains many of the features of 
the first one: Once again they are unaware of their own key characteristics, 
such as “the size of the territory, or the population, or the relative strength 
of the people whose fundamental interests they represent, [...] the extent 
of their natural resources, or the level of their economic development, or 
other such information.”21 Other features, however, are distinctly different. 
The representatives know that they represent liberal peoples, and that 
whatever else may be true about them they are capable of constituting 
themselves as such. Moreover, they know that one of their key interests 
                                                   
20 Ibid., 246–249. 
21 Rawls, LP, 32–33. 
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will be to preserve their self-respect as a people, and they will be fully 
prepared to grant this to others as well.22 
 The principles they decide on will seem familiar to those who follow 
international politics, since they share a striking resemblance with the 
principles that underpin international cooperation under the terms set out 
in the UN Charter.23 They are: 
 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and 
independence are to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that 
bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have a right of self-defence but no right to instigate 
war for reasons other than self-defence. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the 
conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under 
unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or 
decent political and social regime.24 
 
                                                   
22 Ibid., 33–34. 
23 UN General Assembly, “Charter of the United Nations,” 1945, 
http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/. 
24 Rawls, LP, 37. 
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 In the original position for domestic society, the representatives get 
to determine the principles of justice through free deliberation. But here, 
they “simply reflect on the advantages of these principles of equality 
among peoples and see no reason to depart from them or to propose 
alternatives.”25 The options therefore seem to be set in advance. By whom? 
That is not immediately clear. 
 The second major innovation in The Law of Peoples compared with 
A Theory of Justice is that this time the original position is not made up of 
the representatives of individual persons, but those of peoples. Peoples or, 
more accurately, liberal peoples are distinct from states by virtue of three 
basic features, none of which are prerequisite to a Westphalian conception 
of statehood. First, they have a “reasonably just constitutional democratic 
government that serves their fundamental interests.” Second, citizens 
must be united by “common sympathies”, and finally, they must have a 
“moral nature.” 26  Two further distinctions are important, namely that 
peoples lack traditional, absolute, Westphalian sovereignty, and are 
motivated by reasonableness instead of rationality.27 Interestingly, Rawls 
appears to think that his rejection of Westphalian statism is the real point 
of contention in his theory, devoting a whole section (§2) to the question of 
why peoples and not states are represented in the original position. The 
question of peoples instead of individuals (which, as we will see shortly, 
has drawn heavy fire from critics) is settled by a single paragraph stating 
that his “account of the Law of Peoples conceives of liberal democratic 
                                                   
25 Ibid., 41. 
26 Ibid., 23. 
27 Ibid., 23–27. 
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peoples (and decent peoples) as the actors in the Society of Peoples, just as 
citizens are the actors in domestic society.”28 End of story. 
 The initial original position takes place between the representatives 
of liberal societies. The inclusion of decent peoples is then achieved 
through a second version of the original position populated only by decent 
peoples, who will deliberate and acknowledge the same eight principles 
liberal peoples acknowledge. 29  Why would liberal peoples invite non-
liberal peoples into the fold? Because the principle of toleration, 
intrinsically valuable to liberals, means recognising these societies as 
equal. An international order in which only liberal peoples were accepted 
would not show proper respect for other acceptable forms of society. It 
would therefore, says Rawls, be illiberal to refuse non-liberal societies 
entry into the society of peoples.30 
 Given the force of objections to Rawls’s scheme for international 
justice coupled with the relative paucity of detail in his original work, it 
had largely been expected that he would come to see his initial position as 
an oversight and come out in favour of the global original position. Many 
were therefore deeply disappointed by Rawls’s rejection of global 
egalitarian distributive justice, and his refusal to endorse a global original 
position made up of individuals. Commenting on earlier drafts of Rawls’s 
thoughts on international justice, in which he advocates the principles for 
international cooperation that later appear in The Law of Peoples, Pogge 
admits that he is “at a loss to explain Rawls’s quick endorsement of a 
                                                   
28 Ibid., 23. 
29 Ibid., 62–70. 
30 Ibid., 59. 
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bygone status quo.” 31  In Rawls’s highly progressive endorsement of 
egalitarian distributive principles for domestic society, his earlier work did 
after all only “leave aside here the problem of justice between nations” and 
opened with the assumption of closed societies “as a first approximation” 
to be expanded upon “as further inquiry requires.” 32  Presumably this 
would not have required a reworking of the basic principles upon which 
our conception of justice is founded, or he would have said so explicitly. 
Kok-Chor Tan, similarly, finds it “disappointing that in his articulation of a 
law of peoples, Rawls affirms his rejection of an egalitarian international 
theory.”33 
 Why is Rawls’s rejection of international egalitarianism so 
problematic? Caney finds several objections to Rawls’s theory, which many 
others raise as well. First, strongly echoing the pre-Law of Peoples 
extrapolation of Rawlsian international theory from A Theory of Justice, 
he asks why we should care about what peoples would agree to instead of 
what individuals would.34 This, says Caney, would permit several policies 
that individuals in the original position would never consent to, including 
denial of voting rights, forcible relocation of minorities, or racial 
discrimination.35 
 Second, Caney charges Rawls with operating within too rigid a 
theoretical framework, consisting of only two types of well-ordered 
peoples with no room for distinguishing between peoples that display 
                                                   
31 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 246. 
32 John Rawls in ‘The Basic Structure as Subject’, quoted in Ibid., 240. 
33 Kok-Chor Tan, “Reasonable Disagreement and Distributive Justice,” The Journal of Value 
Inquiry 35, no. 4 (2001): 495. 
34 Caney, “Cosmopolitanism and LP,” 100. 
35 Ibid., 101–102. 
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some but not all features of liberalness, or some but not all features of 
well-orderedness.36 The society of peoples must therefore either accept as 
members peoples who do not fully live up to the requirements for 
consideration, or condemn as benevolent absolutisms or even outlaw 
states those that fail in one or a few aspects, but generally secure most 
rights for their citizens. 
 Caney further asks if reasonable disagreement is even possible, 
given that citizens in decent societies are not guaranteed freedom of 
expression and of the press; why Rawls allows behaviour by decent peoples 
that would be unacceptable coming from domestic minorities; and whether 
his concern for toleration goes too far in limiting what peoples can do or 
say to each other.37 
 Pogge contends that an original position with representatives of 
states rather than peoples carries an inherent logical contradiction, since 
on the one hand they are behind the veil of ignorance where they are 
unaware of the circumstances of their own society and their place within 
the society of nations, yet at the same time they represent states who make 
rational choices to protect their own interests. Since both cannot 
simultaneously be true, Rawls leans more towards the latter.38 Here we see 
a tension between peoples as representatives of the individuals within each 
society, and as actors in their own right. As Andrew Kuper points out, it is 
not enough that the interests of peoples be considered internally within 
each domestic society. This is, first, because Rawls’s conception of 
                                                   
36 Ibid., 105. 
37 Ibid., 105–112. 
38 Thomas Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 23, no. 3 
(1994): 205–206. 
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societies as closed and self-contained is an unsupportable idealisation with 
little relevance to the real world. And second, because a rational agreement 
between two parties representing sets of individual interests is not 
necessarily going to be similar to a rational agreement between the 
individuals themselves.39 Hence it is perhaps not surprising that Rawls’s 
wide definition of toleration would require liberal peoples to tolerate child 
labour, denial of freedom of association, discrimination against minorities, 
and discriminatory employment practices.40 
 But why, then, would Rawlsian peoples not subscribe to a more 
fervent international defence of human rights? And, given that they do not, 
why would they want to defend some human rights internationally at all? 
Here Rawls seems to argue that intervention is permissible in certain cases 
because states that violate human rights are “aggressive and dangerous,” 
and that “all peoples are safer if such states change, or are forced to 
change, their ways.”41 But, objects Beitz, there is not necessarily any reason 
why states that violate their own citizens’ human rights would be expected 
to be aggressive to other states. And further, even if this was the case you 
might question whether a statistical likelihood of this being the case would 
in itself be enough to justify any particular intervention. More to the point, 
however, the moral status of human rights must surely stand above a 
strategic interest in global stability.42 
Moreover, are the first original position in A Theory of Justice and 
the international version in The Law of Peoples really analogous in the 
                                                   
39 Kuper, “Rawlsian Global Justice,” 645–646. 
40 Caney, “Cosmopolitanism and LP,” 102. 
41 Rawls, LP, 81. 
42 Charles R. Beitz, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Ethics 110, no. 4 (2000): 684–685. 
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way Rawls claims? The idea behind the first original position is that the 
just principles for ordering domestic society are those that would be 
agreed to under specific considerations, meaning under the veil of 
ignorance. The representatives are free to choose between any conception 
of justice they wish, although Rawls says that they would in fact choose a 
particular conception of justice.43 It is therefore possible to object to his 
theory on two fronts. You can disagree with the framework of the original 
position and the veil of ignorance, or you can accept those, but nonetheless 
contend that the representatives would, in fact, have chosen differently 
from what Rawls suggests. The Law of Peoples, however, is decidedly 
disanalogous in that you may raise the first objection but the second is 
moot.44 
 
1.4 Others come to Rawls’s defence 
 
 Although Rawls’s international theory has attracted quite a measure 
of negative reviews, it has had its proponents as well. Though they may not 
be as numerous, they have nonetheless increased in numbers since the 
book was first published. The reason for the late turn partly seems to be, 
first, that it is a remarkably short book for the amount of ground it seeks to 
                                                   
43 Rawls, TJ, 52–53. 
44 It is worth noticing that Sandel offers a very different, and potentially important, 
interpretation. The domestic original position, he argues, is set up so that any agreement 
reached is fair. This is commonly interpreted to mean that no matter what the representatives 
agree to, it will be fair given the circumstances under which it has been agreed. But on a more 
restrictive reading it seems the original position is set up precisely so that only the right 
principles can be agreed to (Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 126–128). The 
deliberation behind the veil of ignorance, then, is not so much about determining the right 
principles of justice through a process of deliberation, but of acknowledging independently 
existing principles (132). Consequently, the difference in the scope of choice between the 
domestic and international original position is not as great as it would first seem. Both are left 
only to choose between variations of pre-existing principles. 
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cover. It therefore almost inevitably short-changes its readers for details. 
And second, it is not a standalone project but a continuation of earlier 
works, which may only be fully understood in the right context.45 Once 
these things are accounted for, its proponents argue, The Law of Peoples 
stands as a much more complete philosophy than its critics give it credit 
for. 
 What, then, is the proper reading of The Law of Peoples that 
enables us to reappraise it as a more powerful and coherent argument? 
Leif Wenar argues that Rawls’s fundamental concern is not with justice, 
but with legitimacy. The domestic political order gives rise to concerns for 
justice, which in a liberal society are satisfied by principles similar to those 
defended in A Theory of Justice. Legitimacy, however, is a much lower 
barrier, and one that is cleared by the eight principles for international 
cooperation. Beyond the basic universal criteria for legitimacy, legitimate 
coercion can only take place in accordance with principles that each 
individual society finds acceptable. In a liberal society there is only one 
source of generally acceptable ideas for ordering society, namely its public 
political culture. This yields the familiar principles of domestic justice.46 
But in the international sphere the range of acceptable principles for 
ordering society is much greater, meaning the same criterion of justice 
that applies domestically to liberal societies cannot be brought to bear 
here. Rawls must draw on the existing global political culture, in which the 
                                                   
45 Rex Martin and David A. Reidy, “Introduction: Reading Rawls’s the Law of Peoples,” in 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, ed. Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 6–7. 
46 Leif Wenar, “Why Rawls Is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian,” in Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A 
Realistic Utopia?, ed. Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 
2006), 100–102. 
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range of principles that will be considered acceptable to all (even if some 
will think they are insufficient) will be quite limited. Hence the focus on 
legitimacy instead of justice.47 
 A second clarification of Rawls’s theory concerns how he 
understands the interests of peoples as opposed to individuals in the 
domestic original position. Persons have fundamentally different interests 
from peoples, yielding different principles. Persons are primarily 
concerned with income and wealth, while peoples care about their 
territorial integrity, safety of their citizens, maintaining just institutions, 
and protecting and affirming their self-respect as peoples.48 Because the 
parties in the international original position have no interest in wealth 
accumulation they are not unavoidably embedded in a cooperative network 
with one another in the way domestic individuals are, meaning they are 
free to reject principles of international cooperation if they wish.49 This 
significantly lowers the demands of a just global order. The fact that most 
states today tend to focus on national wealth accumulation and capital 
growth, claims Reidy, is beside the point. “The fundamental interests of 
peoples is not something determined through an empirical survey.”50 It is, 
then, seemingly a question to be answered through abstract reasoning, 
grasped from the deepest realms of the mind. 
 But in arguing that peoples’ fundamental interests are not about 
wealth accumulation, Reidy specifically denies that empirical evidence 
should play a part in our moral reasoning. It does in fact seem that every 
                                                   
47 Ibid., 102–104. 
48 Ibid., 105. 
49 David A. Reidy, “A Just Global Economy: In Defense of Rawls,” The Journal of Ethics 11 
(2007): 211.  
50 Ibid., 210. 
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liberal democracy is heavily focused on wealth accumulation. You may 
argue, as Reidy does, that by concluding on this basis that it is a 
fundamental interest, we would succumb to modern capitalist values.51 But 
the nation-state, the idealised basis of much internationalist thought, is 
only marginally older than capitalism, and the former is treated as 
intrinsically valuable according to Rawls. In addition, the values of 
capitalism do seem more or less intractably bound up with the values of 
liberal democracy. And finally, given the near-ubiquity of this empirically 
observed desire for increasing wealth, it would seem that the burden of 
proof is on those who would want to argue that it is not a fundamental 
interest of liberal democracies. As Beitz points out, this interpretation 
rests on some objectionable assumptions in Rawls’s theory. Even if we 
accept that peoples are predominantly concerned with maintaining their 
own institutions and assuring independence, it would only be reasonable 
for them not to be concerned with wealth beyond a certain minimum if 
they believed that they would not be able to secure the justice of their 
institutions better if they were wealthier. Moreover, the assumption that 
the stigma and loss of individual self-respect that comes with relative 
deprivation is less acute when individuals compare themselves to non-
compatriots, seems equally unfounded.52 
 How you interpret a lot of Rawls’s law of peoples comes down to 
whether peoples or individuals are represented in the original position, 
and what the consequences are. Samuel Freeman argues that the question 
is a non-starter, because whereas the principles chosen in the domestic 
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original position regulate interaction between individuals, those in the 
international original position determine the principles by which states 
interact. Rawls is not concerned with how individuals in the world 
interact, but how states, as independent bodies, do so. 53  It therefore 
follows logically that the representatives must be the peoples that do the 
interacting, and moreover (and for the same reasons) that individuals 
must be the relevant voices domestically. 
 But to others it is a genuine choice on the part of Rawls. Moreover, 
the consequences for this particular construction on the whole theory are 
immense. The motivation for the representatives to favour certain policies 
over others changes drastically depending on what fundamental interests 
the individuals have, and the range of possible outcomes available for 
them once they step out from behind the veil of ignorance. For that reason 
the inclusion of peoples rather than individuals is one that requires a 
strong defence. Some internationalists insist that they do, in fact, put the 
interests of individuals first in their theory.54 But if that is the case, it 
seems the onus is on them to prove that making peoples the focus of the 
original position is the best way of doing that. 
But you do not need to argue that the results would be the same to 
believe the inclusion of peoples is nonetheless justified. To Reidy, Rawls 
“makes agents in the international original position represent peoples 
because in the real world we live in [...] liberal democratic peoples exist. 
[...] And a world of only liberal democratic peoples is a world within which 
all individual persons receive (domestic) justice. International 
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cooperation, then, both in the real world we live in and in a world within 
which all individual persons receive (domestic) justice, presupposes 
independent and largely autonomous political-legal systems.”55 Of course, 
it is true that liberal peoples exist (if we are willing to accept some fairly 
idealised accounts of modern democracies as sufficiently close 
approximations), as do decent peoples (with similar caveats). But this is a 
long way from saying that the world contains only these countries. Even if 
it were true that in a world of only liberal or decent peoples everyone 
would receive domestic justice, why make this the standard by which to 
evaluate principles of justice in a world in which this clearly is not the 
case? This not only pertains to burdened societies and outlaw states which, 
rightly or wrongly, stand outside the original position, but also, as several 
cosmopolitans have pointed out,56 to those societies that are more liberal 
or decent than not, neither falling completely within or entirely outside of 
peoples worthy of being included in the law of peoples. 
Mitchell Avila acknowledges that this is partly a question of realism, 
since there is no prospect of the world becoming fully liberal within any 
reasonable timeframe, if indeed ever. 57  Nonetheless there are solid 
reasons, nested in liberal thought, for why they must be included. He 
invites us to imagine a diaspora of a decent people within a liberal society. 
Given that they live in a liberal country their hierarchical society is 
politically unreasonable, yet liberals will give them the same rights as any 
other group, only paying special attention to particularly important rights 
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(say, the rights of women or access to education). The same goes for the 
international sphere. While the law of peoples pays special attention to 
principles that are especially important, liberal peoples must expect no 
more of decent hierarchical peoples than they would of the diaspora within 
their borders.58 
 Nonetheless, some would object that even if it were individuals in 
the global original position, Rawls’s conclusions would still be defensible. 
Richard Miller mounts one of the most direct defences of Rawls in this 
way, arguing that even if the global original position were in fact made up 
of persons, like cosmopolitans believe it should, those behind the veil of 
ignorance would insist on a sharp distinction between citizens and others, 
and would give strong priority to their own. 59  Individuals with the 
knowledge that different spheres of special relationships exist – family, 
friendships, cultures, nations – would want to defend these relationships 
as meaningful in their own right, even without knowing their own place 
within their community or which community they belong to. “Advancing 
her fundamental interests in collective self-reliance and civic friendship, 
someone choosing political principles in the global original position would 
insist on priority for concern among compatriots, even when foreigners’ 
opportunities and expectations are less and would be of primary concern if 
they were compatriots.”60 
 Wenar says, perhaps more plausibly, that a theory of global politics 
whose primary principles refer to individuals rather than communities is 
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impossible. The reasoning follows from Kant’s assertion that a global 
government will inevitably end either in anarchy or in tyranny. It therefore 
follows that there must be territorial powers with means of defending 
themselves, and if they exist no list of basic rights and liberties can exist 
that fails to make reference to the individual persons’ territorial affiliation 
and resulting rights and responsibilities. 61  The question, then, is a 
speculative one, in two ways. First, is Kant’s assertion that a stable and 
liberal world government is impossible correct? That is of course 
impossible to say for certain, but on balance it seems to me that it is. And 
second, why does it follow that the rights and responsibilities must 
necessarily be vested with the state? Both these questions, as well as the 
one about whether citizens’ overarching concern for their compatriots is 
intrinsic rather than a function of the state system itself, are some of the 
key questions that divide cosmopolitans and internationalists. It is hardly 
surprising that critics and defenders of The Law of Peoples should come 
down on different sides. 
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1.5 Other forms of Rawlsian internationalism 
 
 Rawls’s domestic theory started with the simplifying assumption of 
a single, liberal democratic society that was closed, meaning persons only 
entered by birth and left by death.62 This left two issues unanswered: First, 
what rights do immigrants in liberal democratic societies have? And 
second, by what right is the scope of egalitarian justice limited to the single 
community? The first is interesting enough, but outside the scope of this 
thesis. The other was left more or less unanswered in Rawls’s international 
theory. As the above discussion has shown, this is widely regarded as a 
weak spot in the argument, one that has been justified via additional 
assumptions about the theory that Rawls himself fails to make explicit. 
This section looks at answers to this question that does not rely on the 
particular structure and argument of The Law of Peoples while ultimately 
reaching the same conclusion, that we have special, much more 
demanding responsibilities towards our compatriots than towards non-
compatriots. 
 Broadly speaking, the unique relationship we have with fellow 
citizens, which is morally significant in a way that gives rise to especially 
stringent duties towards each other, can be justified in two different ways. 
The first, asserted by David Miller and Richard Miller among others, 
contends that the kinds of relationships we have with fellow co-nationals 
are intrinsically valuable on a personal level. The second, proponents of 
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which include Thomas Nagel, Andrea Sangiovanni, Michael Blake and 
Mathias Risse, holds that the ways the state binds its citizens in a system 
of enforced mutual cooperation means it must justify itself to its citizens in 
ways that do not apply outside the state. 
 David Miller argues that some relationships have an intrinsic value 
that is powerful enough to create special obligations at the national level, 
applying only to those within the relationship and not to humanity at 
large. Although the state also has instrumental value – protecting its 
citizens, upholding laws, and so on – it is its intrinsic value which, as with 
friendship and family, bind its members together, that create the special 
responsibilities citizens have towards one another. Just as we have special 
obligations towards our family and friends through the personally valuable 
bonds between us, we have special obligations towards co-citizens. This 
creates inequality between compatriots and foreigners, but just as we allow 
and encourage favourable treatment of family members over others, this 
inequality should not be discouraged so long as it does not come at the 
expense of non-compatriots.63 Richard Miller, further, argues that it is the 
individual citizen’s personal loyalty to the shared project of the national 
community that makes the state normatively significant. Because this 
personal loyalty is intrinsically valuable, any just global order that aims to 
be truly impartial must allow each individual to pay special attention to 
the prosperity of their own society.64 The strength of these arguments 
largely depends on how apt you believe the comparison between the state 
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and the family are, and whether you accept that personal loyalty is itself 
valuable, without needing any other justification.65 On the face of it, the 
family analogy seems far-fetched. Not only are modern states much larger 
than even the largest families, they also rarely display anything near the 
same level of homogeneity that a family does, often containing multiple 
ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural differences which challenge the 
assumption of intrinsic loyalty. Of course, that only challenges one specific 
aspect of the analogy, namely the idea that it is the feeling of personal 
loyalties that is significant. In another, perhaps more plausible, aspect of 
the analogy, what matters is that, like family, they have been thrust upon 
you without giving you any say in the matter. Yet you are intractably 
bound to them. But Caney points out that the analogy ultimately still 
breaks down because, while the ties that bind families together may be 
strong, they are not enforceable. 66  A theory that justifies strong, 
enforceable national priority must therefore be able to explain where that 
power comes from. 
 What about the other theory, that it is structure of the state itself  
and the demands it puts on its members that create the need for 
egalitarian distributive justice domestically, irrespective of individuals’ 
personal loyalties? Both Nagel and Blake hold that egalitarian distributive 
justice is necessary in the domestic sphere to justify the coercive nature of 
the state, with small but significant differences. As far as Nagel is 
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concerned the state derives its special need for justification from its non-
voluntariness. “Without being given a choice, we are assigned a role in the 
collective life of a particular society. The society makes us responsible for 
its acts, which are taken in our name and on which, in a democracy, we 
may even have some influence; and it holds us responsible for obeying its 
laws and conforming to its norms, thereby supporting the institutions 
through which advantages and disadvantages are created and 
distributed.”67 Within the context of a societal structure it is unreasonable 
to expect citizens to take part in a collective enterprise that gives rise to 
significant arbitrary inequalities. The fact that membership of this society 
is itself arbitrary, then, does not create any special responsibilities towards 
those born outside of it. Rather, it is the fact that “we are both putative 
joint authors of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms, 
i.e., expected to accept their authority even when the collective decision 
diverges from our personal preferences [...] that creates the special 
presumption against arbitrary inequalities” within the state in which 
individuals arbitrarily find themselves.68 
 It is therefore the possibility of coercion and the fact of a collective 
imposed structure on individuals that create the special obligation of 
equality. Blake, by contrast, focuses on actual coercion, or the threat of 
coercion. The state, through the threat of punishing individual 
transgressors against its laws, actively limits people’s freedoms. And 
contract laws, property enforcement and taxation are all coercive as well, 
                                                   
67 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 2 
(2005): 128–129. 
68 Ibid. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 1 – Literature Review 
49 of 373 
transferring legal rights from one party to another and threatening 
potential non-compliers with legal action and imprisonment. The act of 
upholding the law, then, is “an act of implicit violence,”69 which requires 
special justification. Why is this not required internationally, when the 
international structure is also coercive? Because only the state is 
simultaneously coercive and required for individuals to live full and 
autonomous lives. Like Rawls, Blake sees involvement in the international 
sphere as optional. So rather than try to justify the coercion that takes 
place there, we should aim to eliminate it instead, even if this might 
require drastic (if largely unspecified) changes to the current system.70 
 But is coercion, or the threat of coercion, really what makes the 
state normatively significant? Could similar duties of reciprocity apply 
without the coercive element of the state? Sangiovanni argues that 
coercion is not necessary. He invites us to imagine a society in which the 
state’s law enforcement has collapsed for whatever reason. This situation 
continues for several years, but although crime increases and laws are 
broken more frequently, society still functions as it did before – it collects 
taxes, pays out benefits, and draws up contracts. These cannot be 
enforced, but are generally complied with. In this case the fact that the 
citizens continue to maintain order out of a common sense of solidarity is 
enough to require the same justification a normal, coercive state would.71 
You might object that in this case the state would no longer be non-
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voluntary. But this is only true, contends Sangiovanni, on a particular, and 
unreasonable, reading of the word “voluntary” in which anything that is 
not coercively enforced is voluntary. But in Sangiovanni’s view only things 
to which we have a reasonable alternative that is not excessively 
burdensome are truly voluntary. Only the richest members of our 
imaginary society would in fact be able to leave, as that would mean opting 
out of the benefits the society provides.72 
 This version of non-voluntariness seems somewhat inadequate, 
however. You might reasonably ask whether the relationship between the 
global rich and poor is not also non-voluntary, given that the poor often 
have no choice but to accept trade relations on the rich’s premises. 
Sangiovanni’s response is that only the kind of reciprocity that takes place 
within the state gives rise to egalitarian distributive justice, irrespective of 
the threat of coercion. As long as he is happy to acknowledge that other 
institutions than the state, such as the European Union, could in principle 
create similar demands, there seems to be nothing contradictory in the 
theory. As it happens, he is, although he maintains they do not at 
present.73 But for someone who wants to establish not only that egalitarian 
justice only exists domestically, but that the state alone can give rise to 
such principles, reciprocity seems insufficient by itself. 
 Risse therefore suggests that while these three principles – 
reciprocity, non-voluntariness, and coercion – each constitute an 
important piece of the puzzle, they are by themselves insufficient to 
explain what is special about the state. Coercion is not unique to the state, 
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but if non-voluntariness were eliminated the state’s coercion would still 
require special justification. And if reciprocity no longer applied, the state 
must still be justified so long as leaving it is not a realistic option for most 
people.74 
 Instead, he proposes a principle he calls “graded internationalism”, 
as opposed to “ungraded internationalism” which holds that certain 
principles of justice either hold, or do not hold, within a specific context. 
Graded internationalism draws on the principles explained above, arguing 
that any combination of each may hold in different circumstances, to 
varying degrees. An institution may be non-voluntary and reciprocal, but 
not coercive, or it may be coercive and reciprocal but voluntary, and so on. 
Each of these circumstances may hold with varying degrees of strength, 
each creating particular sets of rights and responsibilities with varying 
levels of demandingness. Although it is only within the state that all three 
hold to a high enough degree to require egalitarian principles, it does not 
follow that no demands of justice can arise elsewhere. As an example, 
Risse asks us to consider the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is 
coercive since it regulates some property regimes and can impose 
sanctions for non-compliance, is non-voluntary because for many poorer 
members staying out is not a viable option, and is reciprocal because it 
aims to foster trade relations. All three conditions are present, then, albeit 
in much less profound and pervasive forms than within the state. To argue 
that because it is not a state the WTO does not give rise to any principles of 
                                                   
74 Mathias Risse, On Global Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 45–47. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 1 – Literature Review 
52 of 373 
justice is therefore, in Risse’s view, implausible.75 The upshot is that at 
present the global institutions that exist are not pervasive or coercive 
enough to warrant strong bonds of obligations between their members. 
But he does not rule out that they may do so in future, even if we seem to 
be far away from that point still. If and when that happens, there is 
nothing in principle to stop the members from making greater justice 
claims against each other. But, to him, we are not there yet.76 
 
1.6 Duties to burdened societies 
 
 So far, the question of what duties do in fact arise outside of the 
state, on the internationalist account of justice, has been overlooked. It is 
time to deal with them now. It will become clear that internationalists 
seem chiefly concerned with the ways in which responsibilities to non-
compatriots are limited, either in terms of their scope or their 
demandingness, than with how they can be fulfilled under the current 
global framework or the ways in which the international order needs to 
change in order to fulfil them. 
 Out of the eight principles for a law of peoples set out by Rawls only 
the final one offers any recognition that positive duties exist towards other 
countries, or to any nation not already in the society of peoples. All other 
principles are either guided by a laissez-faire ethic or concern for proper 
conduct in voluntary schemes and associations. To recap, the eighth 
principle reads: “Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under 
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unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political 
and social regime.” 77  These burdened societies are “not expansive or 
aggressive, [but] lack the political and cultural traditions, the human 
capital and know-how, and, often, the material and technological resources 
needed to be well-ordered.”78 
 The goal of the society of peoples is to eventually bring burdened 
societies into the fold by assisting them in their development. This, 
moreover is a duty rather than an act of charity.79 For reasons that will be 
elaborated on later in the thesis, this duty may be difficult to fulfil in 
practice. However, Rawls assures us that does not diminish the 
responsibilities that well-ordered peoples have towards burdened societies 
under the law of peoples.80 But are there actually any grounds within 
Rawls’s theory for making assistance to burdened societies a duty? Beitz 
argues that there is not. The binding international framework of the law of 
peoples only exists between societies for whom the need for such 
assistance could not arise in the first place, since they are already well-
ordered peoples. To his mind Rawls seems to rely almost exclusively on the 
idea that the representatives in the original position will want to 
eventually bring everyone into the society of peoples.81 But this cannot be 
the whole story, since benevolent absolutisms, those hierarchical societies 
that fail the test of decency by not having any means of consultation with 
their citizens, also stand outside the society of peoples. Yet there is no 
requirement to bring them into the fold. This despite the fact that it would 
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probably be a lot more straightforward to do so than for burdened 
societies, since they are essentially only a consultative structure away from 
being decent peoples. It seems more likely that Rawls would have us leave 
them alone so long as they do not violate human rights.82 Indeed, when 
discussing human rights abuses as a justification for intervening in outlaw 
states, he is mainly concerned with their outwards aggressiveness, which 
he claims is naturally correlated with human rights abuses.83 They pose a 
risk towards other states, and in the interest of preserving peace and 
stability in the international system, states are entitled to defend 
themselves against them. The reasoning, then, is instrumental, and well-
ordered peoples’ desire to bring outlaw states into the society of peoples is 
shaped primarily by self-interest.84 But no corresponding instrumental 
reason exists for wanting to include burdened societies.85 So it seems it 
cannot be true, or at least not straightforwardly true, that the goal is to 
bring everyone into the society of peoples. This alone, then, cannot justify 
framing the assistance to burdened societies as a duty. 
 Risse tries to address these concerns by offering up three specific 
reasons why the representatives in the original position would in fact 
endorse duties towards burdened societies. First, there are prudential 
concerns. Refugee streams and conflicts risk undermining international 
stability. Second, institutions are so important for development that the 
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representatives will demand at least this assistance, in order to ensure that 
every society is given a chance to develop into a well-ordered one. And 
third, we must ensure that everyone lives in a society in which it is possible 
to foster a capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of the good. 
Anything else would be inconsistent with our own conception of 
personhood.86 While the third argument seems the most convincing, it also 
seems more cosmopolitan than Risse might like to admit. The first is an 
instrumental reasoning, the flaws of which were spelled out above. The 
second, Risse admits, holds only if we assume that the original position’s 
representatives do not know whether they will be part of burdened or well-
ordered societies. 87  Presumably, if this is the case, the same risk-
averseness that gave rise to the difference principle in the domestic case 
applies here as well. But this is problematic, since in the law of peoples 
liberal peoples constitute their own original position, as separate from 
decent peoples, even though they end up affirming the same principles. So 
it seems to follow logically that, since they find themselves in the original 
position, the representatives know that they will be liberal peoples. Risse’s 
argument therefore seems to constitute a fairly significant jump away from 
Rawls’s own theory. 
These issues aside, however, it is quite telling that the discussion in 
The Law of Peoples immediately shifts to the ways in which it is limited, 
almost completely bypassing the ways in which this duty can be fulfilled. 
“It does not follow, however, that the only way, or the best way, to carry 
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out this duty of assistance is by following a principle of distributive justice 
to regulate economic and social inequalities among societies.” 88  This 
caveat gives way to the three “guidelines” for the duty of assistance, all of 
which, under the guise of offering some principles for fulfilling our 
responsibilities, are in fact more limiting than enabling. The first severs 
the link between wealth and well-orderedness, holding that well-ordered 
peoples need not be rich. There is therefore no need for global 
redistributive principles for justice to hold. The second places the 
overarching emphasis on political factors, in effect blaming the state of 
burdened societies on an inadequate social and political culture rather 
than a dearth of resources. This, accordingly, means that transfers of 
resources and funds will not be sufficient in itself. The final guideline 
establishes a limit for when the duty of assistance ends. Once a burdened 
society is well-ordered enough to become a member of the society of 
peoples, all assistance may end.89 In terms of prescriptive policies Rawls is 
a lot less clear. Protecting human rights and improving the status of 
women in society seem to be important steps, but this hardly amounts to a 
proper guideline.90 
 The lack of focus on this issue is nonetheless surprisingly common 
in the literature. As the following discussion will show, some writers will 
affirm the idea that we have some duty of assistance towards non-
compatriots – but as an aside, and without providing much context or 
clarification. Take, as a starting point, Nagel, who readily acknowledges 
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the problem at hand: “I assume there is some minimal concern we owe to 
fellow human beings threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition 
and early death from easily preventable diseases, as all these people in dire 
poverty are.”91 We have a moral responsibility to act in the face of such 
hardship which, it is made clear, stems in no small part from the fact that 
the burdens imposed by such a duty are statistically somewhat 
insignificant. This minimal humanitarian concern requires us not only to 
limit our pursuit of our own ends in ways that leave others free to do the 
same, but also to relieve the threats they face to their freedom, so long as 
no morally serious sacrifices take place at our end. Nonetheless, as far as 
the theoretical framework goes, this is as much as we can hope to get: “To 
specify it any less vaguely would require a full moral theory, which I will 
not even attempt to sketch here.”92 Perhaps this is why he takes great care 
to follow Hobbes in conceiving of justice as being contingent on the state 
context.93 
 Blake defends the normative significance of the state at great length, 
arguing that the coercive force applied against us by the state we belong to 
creates a special moral concern for inequality that has no equivalent in the 
international sphere. Although international structures can apply coercive 
force as well, membership is ultimately voluntary in a way that is not so for 
the state. Nor does it have the same pervasive influence on our lives. The two 
therefore do not require the same justification.94 While to Blake the changes to 
the current world order will be necessary, he nonetheless believes that there 
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are “several reasons why [his] theory of political morality does not commit us 
to the extreme forms of intervention imagined by its critics.”95 The reason why 
he rejects a more expansive theory of global justice is that, although 
“individuals are indeed the ultimate units of moral value, and they do indeed 
have rights against us for rectification of the injustice they face at home,”96 
there are strict limits to what may be done to help. First, there are prudential 
concerns, that in intervening we risk doing more harm than good. This applies 
both to military and economic intervention. This is partly borne out of the fact 
that conditions in the country we intervene in are more often than not so 
different that what works at home will not work there, but also that there may 
be a strong pushback against the intervention, both from the ruling classes 
and the citizens of the country. Finally, we as outsiders are likely to 
overestimate our knowledge about the situation we intervene in.97 But equally 
importantly, the liberal principle of toleration creates a strong incentive not to 
act. Institutions that may seem oppressive and immoral to outsiders may in 
fact be perceived as free and just by the people who live under them, who 
understand their cultural and historical context better.98 
To Richard Miller, what matters, in addition to concerns about 
toleration, is that those within a society have a sense of shared loyalty to a 
common project that is intrinsically valuable to them, which he calls “civic 
friendship”. They therefore ought to do what they can to help enable those 
in the poorest countries to develop a civic friendship of their own. This 
creates a basic duty of assistance. But that duty cannot come at the cost of 
                                                   
95 Michael Blake, Justice and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 50. 
96 Ibid., 50–51. 
97 Ibid., 52–59. 
98 Ibid., 59–67. 
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failing to help their own needy compatriots. That would be “of a piece with 
the view that someone properly values friendship in deserting a friend to 
befriend two friendless people.”99 The demands of global poverty, then, 
cannot override concerns for compatriots. But when are concerns for 
compatriots overridden? And more importantly, whose responsibility is it 
to make up for the negative consequences of international politics for the 
domestic poor? R. Miller asks us to imagine a trade deal between the 
United States on the one hand, and China and Mexico on the other. The 
deal will accelerate China and Mexico’s escape from poverty, while overall 
benefitting the United States as well. But it will hurt the American 
Midwest’s industry quite hard. They would therefore be justified in 
objecting to the trade deal.100 
Of course you might ask why, if the trade benefits the United States 
as a whole, even when accounting for the loss to the Midwest, the 
responsibility for shouldering the Midwest’s loss should still effectively fall 
upon the developing countries whose worst off citizens are still likely to be 
much worse off than the poorest Americans. The Midwest may be justified 
in objecting to the trade deal, but unless they hold their own government 
accountable for their loss they will surely be imposing too great a cost on 
those in the developing countries. The proper response therefore cannot be 
to cancel the trade deal, but for the American government to spend the 
extra income to compensate the Midwest through appropriate stimulus 
measures. In effect, changing circumstances are always going to benefit 
                                                   
99 Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 46. 
100 Ibid., 75. In fairness, this objection applies only to concerns about serious harm to a 
portion of the citizenry, not to concerns about diminished benefits from new 
arrangements. 
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some while leaving others worse off. The upshot of what Miller is 
suggesting is therefore to potentially render objectionable any kind of 
international agreements designed to help developing countries improve 
the lives of their poorest citizens by giving them better access to global 
trade markets and improve their competitiveness. The limits for the 
responsibilities of the global rich towards the global poor therefore seem 
to be set rather low. 
 David Miller may object to global egalitarianism but still concedes that 
“if our vision of a just world includes the idea that each nation should have a 
fair opportunity to pursue the particular goals that its members value most – 
the international equivalent of the domestic idea of toleration – then we are 
bound to be disturbed by inequalities on the current scale.”101 This sets the bar 
much lower than global egalitarianism, however, and D. Miller rejects the 
notion that equality of status between nations is important. The precondition 
for fair trade, rather, is the absence of serious injustice.102 
In general, then, the internationalist framework does not take 
responsibilities to the global poor to be as demanding as cosmopolitans 
believe they should be. They believe that the duty towards burdened 
societies is one of bringing them up to a minimally acceptable level, and 
that once this level has been achieved no further assistance is required. 
This contrasts with cosmopolitans who see relative distributions of global 
wealth as important. In this thesis I will not press the claim that duties are 
limited by such a cut-off point in the abstract. Rather, in Chapters 3 and 4 
in particular, I question the limits they have set out. 
                                                   
101 David Miller, “Against Global Egalitarianism,” The Journal of Ethics 9, no. 1–2 (2005): 75. 
102 Ibid., 75–79. 
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 Where Richard Miller does break from tradition is his treatment of 
duties of redress, on which he elaborates at great length, and which in 
specific circumstances have the potential to be more demanding than his 
internationalism would otherwise give grounds for. Moreover, only some 
duties to atone for past wrongs can be overwritten by domestic concerns 
for compatriots, which would normally take precedence. Other 
responsibilities include compensation for “imperial excess” and for 
destruction of life and property abroad, regardless of whether the 
destruction served a just cause or not.103 This could potentially constitute a 
significant additional duty on the world’s richest countries, given the 
history of large-scale imperial expansion and aggression over the past 
several centuries, which deserves an extensive discussion. I return to this 
argument in Chapter 7. I will ultimately argue that R. Miller’s framework, 
while expansive in its scope, does not go far enough in its reach. But it is 
nonetheless a crucial move towards a slightly more cosmopolitan-
flavoured argument.104 
 Perhaps the most important way duties of development are limited 
is in the role of public institutions in development. It is a general tenet of 
many internationalists that apart from alleviating absolute poverty, the 
most important responsibility towards the global poor is helping build 
viable institutions that enable them to become well-ordered. However, the 
argument goes, this is an extremely difficult thing to do, and may in fact be 
impossible in some circumstances. The duty of the developed world to 
                                                   
103 Miller, Globalizing Justice. In particular, see Chapters 5-7 of the book 
104 See, for instance, Thomas Pogge, “Real World Justice,” The Journal of Ethics 9, no. 1–
2 (2005): 47–49. As the above discussion has shown, most internationalists would not 
dispute the claim the global poor are being harmed, but fail to consider it any further.  
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 1 – Literature Review 
62 of 373 
assist developing countries is therefore severely mitigated, and may, 
depending on the circumstances, be much less demanding than it 
otherwise would have been. Rawls, discussing aid to “burdened societies”: 
 
A second guideline for thinking about how to carry out the 
duty of assistance is to realize that the political culture of a 
burdened society is all-important; and that, at the same time, 
there is no recipe, certainly no easy recipe, for well-ordered 
peoples to help a burdened society to change its political and 
social culture. I believe that the causes of wealth of a people 
and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in the 
religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the 
basic structure of their political and social institutions, as 
well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its 
members, all supported by their political virtues.105 
 
 This is, in essence, what Risse calls the “institutional thesis”, and is 
a common point of view among internationalists.106 
 
Institutional Thesis: Growth and prosperity depend on the 
quality of institutions, such as stable property rights, rule of 
law, bureaucratic capacity, appropriate regulatory structures 
                                                   
105 Rawls, LP, 108. 
106 In addition to Rawls and Risse, other internationalists who reference the institutional 
thesis approvingly include David Miller, “Collective Responsibility and International 
Inequality in The Law of Peoples,” in Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, ed. 
Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 194–195; 
Wenar, “Not a Cosmopolitan,” 96. 
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to curtail at least the worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive 
behavior, and graft, quality and independence of courts, but 
also cohesiveness of society, existence of trust and social 
cooperation, and thus overall quality of civil society.107 
 
 Risse mainly contrasts his view with the “geography thesis”, which 
says that prosperity is a question of features such as location, climate and 
natural resources. The effects of these are mainly channelled through the 
quality of institutions.108  
 Rawls is not a fan of the geography thesis either: 
 
I would further conjecture that there is no society anywhere 
in the world [...] with resources so scarce that it could not, 
were it reasonably and rationally organized and governed, 
become well-ordered. Historical examples seem to indicate 
that resource-poor countries may do very well (e.g., Japan), 
which resource-rich countries may have serious difficulties 
(e.g., Argentina). The crucial elements that make the 
difference are the political culture, the political virtues and 
civic society of the country, its members’ probity and 
industriousness, their capacity for innovation, and much 
else.109 
 
                                                   
107 Mathias Risse, “How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 33, no. 4 (2005): 355. His italics. 
108 Ibid., 356. 
109 Rawls, LP, 108. 
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 Coming chapters will argue that the influence of institutions is a lot 
less straightforward. Risse’s qualifier that other factors are only important 
insofar as they influence institutions is in fact highly significant, 
warranting a much more thorough discussion than the few lines he gives it. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 I challenge the assumption that, because institutions 
are so pervasive in their importance to development, there is relatively 
little that can actually be done to carry out the duty of development in 
many cases. First, I question the fundamental assumption of the 
institutional thesis in Chapter 5, and next, in Chapter 6, I outline how our 
ability to provide assistance and affect positive change may in many cases 
be quite significant. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter traced the development of Rawlsian internationalist 
theory from the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971 up until today, 
focusing especially on the ways the Rawlsian framework has been 
expanded to cover international justice, or been defended against attempts 
to do so. It situated The Law of Peoples in the internationalist versus 
cosmopolitan debate, and discussed the ways the theory has been criticised 
and defended since it came out. While critics charged it with being far too 
conservative and permissive of unacceptable practices, defenders argued 
that it was a much richer work than the critics assumed. In Section 1.5 I 
discussed internationalists’ reasons for affirming the normative 
importance of the state and limiting egalitarian duties of justice to the 
state, affirming a much more limited list of rights and duties 
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internationally. Section 1.6 then outlined the duty of development in broad 
terms, and introduced the institutional thesis, which will become 
particularly relevant in Chapter 5. 
 The literature thus still leaves several questions open. Specifically, 
having established that internationalists affirm that we have duties 
towards the developing world which are limited in specific ways on the one 
hand, yet are duties of justice on the other, it is still left up in the air what 
those duties specifically entail. The internationalists’ central claim is that 
the scope of global responsibilities is not only limited in terms of its 
theoretical boundaries, but also by the empirical claim that in the absence 
of a clear understanding of what is needed and how to implement the 
necessary actions, our ability to affect positive change is limited. With 
regards to the first part, the question is therefore how to move beyond 
basic philosophical statements to quantifiable measures of terms such as 
poverty, poverty reduction, and assistance in development that are in 
agreement with internationalist principles, and how to deal with 
competing claims for justice, both domestic and international. These 
questions will be tackled in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 With regards to the second part of the internationalists’ claim, 
concerning the empirical claim, the question is whether the assumption 
that our knowledge is limited is a reasonable one. This entails several basic 
considerations. What do we currently know about how developed nations 
are able to positively affect development, in the areas that are particularly 
important to the internationalist duty? Is the institutional thesis a 
reasonable one, or are the causes of growth and development more varied 
than its proponents assume? Moreover, what about our ability to provide 
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effective assistance in general, and avoiding the many pitfalls of 
development? That is the focus of Chapters 5 and 6, the first of which 
explores the institutional thesis, and the second of which looks at 
development assistance more generally. Finally, the last chapter returns to 
the question of historic injustice and explores its role in a theory of 
international justice. 
 Answering these questions will present the internationalist theory of 
global responsibilities much more clearly, enabling us to give it a more 
thorough evaluation. But I will argue throughout that these questions 
cannot be answered satisfactorily, and in a manner coherent and 
consistent with the internationalist theory in general, without 
acknowledging that the full extent of internationalist duties towards non-
compatriots in the developing world are greater, and potentially much 
more demanding on the part of the global rich, than its proponents 
currently assume. 
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Chapter 2 – Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 Having placed the argument of the thesis in its proper context in 
Chapter 1, some housekeeping is in order before the argument can begin 
properly. This chapter therefore sets out the methodology that underpins 
the thesis, both in general and with regard to the quantitative analysis to 
be done in Chapter 5, challenging the institutional thesis. 
 Section 2.2 situates the work in the Anglo-American analytical 
tradition, with its emphasis on the role of intuition and of reflective 
equilibrium. Moreover, the section discusses the role of empirical evidence 
in political philosophy, arguing that philosophers should pay close 
attention to facts and real-life examples over self-contained models and 
thought experiments. 
 The bulk of the chapter then defends my approach to quantitative 
analysis. First, in Section 2.3, I discuss the purpose and aims of 
quantitative analysis, justifying its inclusion in the thesis in part to 
highlight that philosophers need not solely defer to outside experts when it 
comes to empirics, and that there are significant methodological 
advantages to taking on the task yourself. Section 2.4 provides a brief 
introduction to the criticisms of the studies used to justify the institutional 
thesis, while 2.5 lays out fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fs/QCA), and describes its purpose and method in detail. Finally, Section 
2.6 lays out the method and logic behind the case and variable selection, 
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especially highlighting the crucial role that the researcher’s own discretion 
plays. Section 2.7 concludes. 
 
2.2 The Anglo-American tradition 
 
 It is clear from the lack of publications on the topic that there is no 
formal, clearly outlined and theorised method, structure and logic to the 
Rawlsian methodology in the Anglo-American tradition. Only a very small 
number of articles, chapters and books have been devoted to laying out, 
discussing and critiquing the methods that underpin most modern 
political philosophy.1 This methodology is characterised by the eschewal of 
formal logic, by appeal to intuition, and by “reflective equilibrium”. 
 Rawls says that a theory cannot be established using only abstract 
reasoning and first order principles: 
 
The analysis of moral concepts and the a priori, however 
traditionally understood, is too slender a basis. Moral theory 
must be free to use contingent assumptions and general facts 
as it pleases. There is no other way to give an account of our 
considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. This is the 
                                                   
1 Wayne Norman shows how this method underlines the contributions to most major 
publications, including Ethics, Philosophy & Public Affairs and Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, to name just a few. Wayne Norman, “‘Inevitable and Unacceptable?’ 
Methodological Rawlsianism in Anglo-American Political Philosophy,” Political Studies 
46, no. 2 (1998): 277. For more recent examples of contributions to Rawlsian 
methodology, see Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory”; Lea Ypi, “On the Confusion 
between Ideal and Non-Ideal in Recent Debates on Global Justice,” Political Studies 58, 
no. 3 (2010): 536–55. 
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conception of the subject adopted by most classical British 
writers through Sidgwick. I see no reason to depart from it.2 
 
 As moral thinkers, we have reached reflective equilibrium when we 
have settled on a coherent package of principles that we find helps us 
reach morally acceptable conclusions across a wide range of issues. Says 
Barry, discussing Rawls specifically: “We are to go to and fro, sometimes 
changing the description of the original position until it yields principles 
we are prepared to accept, and sometimes bringing our particular 
judgments into line with the principles we have derived.”3 Nonetheless, he 
argues, Rawls does not actually do this, at least not in A Theory of Justice, 
where he never appeals to intuition unguided by prior principles.4 
 To ask that reflective equilibrium provide an answer to all moral 
conundrums we might face would nonetheless be to set the bar too high. 
Nor, as Norman says, is it a question of settling on principles as soon as 
possible. Otherwise reflective equilibrium gives the upper hand to 
extremists or people pushing simplistic moral principles over those with 
more nuanced views.5 
 The Rawlsian method is a step up from, but equally unable to make 
do without, intuition. Barry sums up the intuitionist aspect of the 
methodology that underpins this thesis: 
 
                                                   
2 Rawls, TJ, 44–45. 
3 Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989), 281. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Norman, “‘Inevitable and Unacceptable?,’” 289. 
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We start from some principle that is assumed to be correct at 
any rate over a central range of cases, and then we try it out 
on other cases that are in some way more problematic. If we 
do not like the implications of the principle as originally 
stated when it is extended to these cases, we do not simply 
abandon it but seek to reformulate it so that it will 
accommodate the new judgments we are inclined to make.6 
 
 On its own, Will Kymlicka says, intuitionism is “an incoherent 
jumble of ideas and principles […] which is little more than a series of 
anecdotes based on particular intuitions about particular issues.”7 But 
what choice do we have? After all, Rawls’s original position can be shaped 
to yield all manner of principles, including the utilitarian ones he 
specifically argues against, depending on what assumptions are made 
about it. How do we know which principles to use? Here, Rawls can only 
ask us to consider what principles seem intuitively right, and model the 
original position in the corresponding way.8 
 To Rawls, the best starting point is to argue from commonly shared 
premises, but some of the criticism of his work on global justice comes 
down to disagreement about what these are. A key issue, then, is what 
Rawls and internationalists take to be the basic structure of society, and 
therefore the proper scope of justice. As Kymlicka points out, Rawls simply 
takes for granted a world of closed, independent, democratic states with 
                                                   
6 Barry, Theories of Justice, 283. 
7 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, second edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 53. 
8 Rawls, TJ, 18. 
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their own schemes of justice, and assumes that the goal of justice in the 
international sphere is simply to find out how these communities should 
interact.9 
 Nonetheless, this project derives its originality in part from sharing 
the state-based starting premise of Rawlsian internationalism whilst 
simultaneously criticising it. On the one hand, it is my goal to point out the 
shortcomings of the state-based approach, and especially of the sharp 
dichotomy between the domestic and the international. But, on the other, 
it is to offer up an internal critique of internationalism, one that proceeds 
from the tenets of the theory and argues that, given those tenets, the duties 
of states towards the global poor are different from what they are generally 
assumed to be. 
 In one sense, then, there is a contradiction inherent in this project 
that will need to be defended over the course of the thesis. But in another 
sense there is not, as the goal is to persuade, not to prove. Whether or not 
the basic tenets of internationalism are in fact true is a question which, 
though important, lies far beyond the scope of this project. But by holding 
those ideals fixed it is able to provide a different and, hopefully, more 
convincing argument aimed specifically at those who subscribe to them. 
 Much, as we will see throughout the thesis, relies on facts; about the 
state of the world, about the way that the developed and the developing 
world interact, and in what ways it is possible to affect change in 
developing countries. The argument, in short, is that the same underlying 
principles that internationalists currently affirm, coupled with a 
                                                   
9 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 254. 
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reassessment of empirical facts, should yield a different set of global 
responsibilities than the ones they currently subscribe to. The project more 
or less subscribes to Jerry Cohen’s view that normative principles are not 
grounded in facts but in underlying, fact-insensitive principles,10 though it 
is not something I will go into any further. 
 This thesis will therefore make heavy use of examples drawn from 
the real world, attempting to critique the moral arguments of others or to 
advance my own arguments using issues of the sort that currently impact 
those who live in developing countries and feel the effects of the current 
modus operandi of the international political and economic system. 
 This may seem a trivial point at first, but not when we consider how 
widespread the use of hypothetical examples is in the field; nor in light of 
the tendency of many Anglo-American political theorists to downplay the 
value of empirical studies in favour of a normative debate largely 
decoupled from facts about the world.11 This characterisation, of course, 
does not apply to all analytical philosophers, and some do indeed make 
extensive use of economic, historical, geographic and sociological 
literature to inform their philosophical work. Nonetheless, they are still far 
from as widespread as, in my opinion, they ought to be. Here I will name 
just a few prominent examples. Rawls, in discussing decent hierarchical 
peoples invokes the fictional country of Kazanistan, rather than any 
                                                   
10 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, no. 3 (2003): 
211–45. This view, Cohen argues, contrasts with Rawls’s position that first principles of 
justice are a response to facts about the human condition (235-236). It seems to me that 
Cohen wins the argument, but it makes little difference to Rawls’s overall theory. 
11 Thomas Schramme, “On the Relationship between Political Philosophy and Empirical 
Sciences,” Analyse & Kritik 30, no. 2 (2008): 614–615. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 2 – Methodology 
73 of 373 
country in the Muslim world he has in mind. 12  Nozick, similarly, 
extrapolates from stylised thought experiments to refute key points in 
Rawls’s argument. 13  And Blake uses the examples of two fictional 
countries, Borduria and Syldavia, to show how a country can reasonably 
reject claims of redistribution from another, poorer country, even if they 
are engaged in a trade relationship with each other.14 
 By their very nature, however, these arguments are not convincing. 
As Michael Freeden says, political thinking must relate directly to politics 
as it takes place in the real world. In particular, there is no escaping the 
way power relations play a role in all other aspects of interaction at any 
level.15 A level of abstraction is allowed, but stray too far from reality and 
you risk losing relevance outside of the narrow confines of political 
philosophy proper.16 Where does that leave the hypothetical examples? For 
instance, Rawls is explicit that his law of peoples does not presuppose that 
any decent hierarchical peoples actually exist, any more than truly liberal 
peoples do.17 But while many countries at least nominally hold up Rawls’s 
description of a liberal democracy as a goal to aspire to, it is less clear that 
this is the case for decent hierarchical peoples. By using a fictionalised 
example of a decent people rather than asking to what extent and in what 
                                                   
12 Rawls, LP, 75–78. 
13 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Examples include a thought experiment 
concerning the famous basketball player Wilt Chamberlain, designed to show that end-
distributional principles and personal liberty are at odds (161-163). Another concerns 
four men who want to marry the same woman, showing that whichever she chooses, the 
other three have no claim to compensation (269). This and other short thought 
experiments supposedly show that being affected by another person’s action does not 
give you a claim over that decision. 
14 Blake, “Distributive Justice,” 290–294. 
15 Michael Freeden, “What Should the ‘Political’ in Political Theory Explore?,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 13, no. 2 (2005): 115–116. 
16 Ibid., 120. 
17 Rawls, LP, 75. 
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ways current candidates live up to the ideal, he conveniently bypasses the 
question of whether such societies can even exist in the first place. In a 
similar way it may be true in and of itself that Blake’s logic holds true 
within the tight confines of his imagined universe. But it is not able to offer 
much guidance in the real world, where cross-border trade rarely, if ever, 
happens without the bugbears of power relations, messy shared histories, 
and the effects of third-party contingencies rearing their ugly heads. 
 To provide a clear and convincing argument, then, this sort of lazy 
shortcut will not do. As Barry says, we must try our convictions out on 
“problematic” cases, ones that push our intuitions out of their comfort 
zone, if we are to achieve a reasonably stable reflective equilibrium. The 
goal of this thesis, then, is to test the internationalist conception of global 
justice on the real world. When Kazanistan and Syldavia are replaced with, 
say, Kenya and Saudi Arabia, the threshold for what counts as a complete 
theory goes up. 
 
2.3 The purpose and aims of quantitative analysis 
 
 As I made clear in the introduction, one of the three core aims of 
this thesis is to refute the central claim of the institutional thesis, namely 
that the primary cause of development is the quality of institutions. But 
while this aim could perhaps have been achieved in an extended literature 
review, if less thoroughly and (I suspect) persuasively, my argument has a 
second, equally important purpose: To show that engaging actively with 
these issues on an empirical level lies comfortably within the remit of 
anyone who deals with them on a philosophical one. Political philosophers 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 2 – Methodology 
75 of 373 
need not solely defer to others’ expertise when it comes to empirical claims 
of what works in development. Doing so creates at least two important 
methodological issues. First, selection bias: How is a political philosopher 
supposed to know whether the argument she pursues is down to a rational 
weighing of the relative merits of each side, or if she is picking the 
argument that corresponds with her already held convictions? 18  And 
second, there is a risk that political philosophers make a mistake similar to 
that of many economists, namely to assume idealised conditions and 
proceed as if these conditions were actually representative of the real 
world.19 
 Take as an example Rawls’s own discussion of the institutional 
thesis. It is a very short section, the basis of the claim being laid out in a 
single page.20 The central tenet that “the political culture of a burdened 
society is all-important; and that, at the same time, there is no recipe, 
certainly no easy recipe, for well-ordered peoples to help a burdened 
society to change its political and social culture,” does not contain a single 
reference to any empirical evidence supporting it. Later on he argues that 
the importance of human rights is underscored by Amartya Sen’s Poverty 
and Famines.21 This is telling on two fronts. First, Sen is a renowned 
development economist, but also a highly respected philosopher who has 
commented extensively on Rawls’s work. Rawls would therefore quite 
                                                   
18 On the problem of selection bias in political science in general, see for instance Ian S. 
Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and 
the Problem of Selection Bias,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (1996): 
605–18. 
19 Avner de Shalit, “Political Philosophy and Empirical Political Science: From Foes to 
Friends?,” European Political Science 8, no. 1 (2009): 43. 
20 Rawls, LP, 108. 
21 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
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possibly have been familiar with the basic argument of Poverty and 
Famines without needing to delve into the development literature. And 
second, Sen and Rawls are, ultimately, arguing different things. Reading 
Sen’s monograph it seems that Rawls’s claim that his “insistence on 
human rights is supported by Amartya Sen’s work on famines” 22  is 
somewhat weak. Human rights do not feature in the subject index,23 and 
although his reflection that “[s]tarvation deaths can reflect legality with a 
vengeance”24 lends some support to the importance of institutions, his 
focus is elsewhere. The central argument is against an economic argument, 
food-availability decline (FAD), which suggests that the cause of famines is 
a slump in food production. Sen sets out to prove that famines can happen 
when food production is still high, and in this particular work his policy 
prescriptions only touch on human rights issues indirectly and 
sporadically. 
 Risse conducts a considerably more extensive literature review prior 
to defending his institutional thesis.25 Nonetheless, the methodology of 
this literature review definitely highlights some issues, including citing 
Landes’s The Wealth and Poverty of Nations as an argument in favour of 
the institutional thesis.26 Landes, in fact, argues that culture is essential.27 
Whether culture and institutions are in fact two sides of the same coin is a 
heated topic of debate. As Chapter 5 will make clear, this issue highlights 
one of the methodological problems with many studies of the effects of 
                                                   
22 Rawls, LP, 109. 
23 Sen, Poverty and Famines, 250–251. 
24 Ibid., 166. 
25 Risse, “What We Owe to the Global Poor,” 84–92. 
26 Ibid., 85, fn. 8. 
27 David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and 
Some So Poor (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998). 
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institutions. Further, some of the regression analyses cited, including 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson,28 have been heavily criticised for their 
lack of methodological thoroughness. 
 Based on this, Risse says that institutions “trump anything else.”29 
This, he points out, is a bold statement to make, especially considering its 
importance regarding the responsibilities of the developed world towards 
those countries suffering from poor institutional quality. Moreover, as the 
discussion of fs/QCA will make clear, it is a claim that is vulnerable to 
attacks from several fronts. 
 
2.4 The institutional thesis 
 
 While Chapter 5 will offer a much more comprehensive review of the 
institutional thesis – including the methodological and epistemological 
assumptions that underpin it, and criticisms of the theory – it is 
nonetheless worthwhile briefly sketching them here. 
 In recent years a host of authors have purported to show a link 
between the quality of institutions and the long-term growth rates of 
developing countries, much of which claims to demonstrate a clear 
empirical link between the two. They do not just stop here, though. Many 
argue further that once institutional quality is accounted for, all other 
factors, including geography and culture, cease to have any significant 
explanatory power. Good institutions, they say, are the primary reason 
                                                   
28 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review 91, 
no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401. 
29 Risse, “How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?,” 356. 
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countries develop.30 This literature is, for the most part, deeply mired in 
traditional econometrics, including regression analyses to control for the 
effects of independent variables on the outcome.31 
 But this approach, argues Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda, can be 
criticised on several fronts. First, certain variables are routinely omitted. 
These include geographic and historical differences, legal traditions and 
ethnic makeup, making the analysis biased towards the remaining factors. 
And second, they often fail to properly acknowledge the difficulties in 
dealing with causality. Do good institutions cause development, or does 
development cause good institutions? A variable-centred approach does 
not seem ideal for answering this question.32 
 Of course, “institutions” is a broad term, and the exact meaning of 
institutions in this context requires a little unpacking. As I will make clear 
in Chapter 5, it is possible to describe many diverse formal or informal 
arrangements, from the courts all the way down to social conventions 
governing handshakes, as belonging under the umbrella of institutions. Yet 
in my critique of the institutional thesis I rely on a narrow definition of 
institutions, one that includes only formal government structures. This 
requires some justification. 
 When Rawls suggests that resource-poor countries may, nonetheless 
become rich, it is due to the country’s “political culture, the political 
                                                   
30 For an excellent overview of the literature, see Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 
“Review Article: Good Governance, Institutions and Economic Development: Beyond the 
Conventional Wisdom,” British Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (2010): 195–224. 
31 Dani Rodrik, “Introduction: What Do We Learn from Country Narratives?,” in In 
Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives for Economic Growth, ed. Dani Rodrik 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 1. 
32 Dellepiane-Avellaneda, “Good Governance, Institutions and Economic Development,” 
201–202. 
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virtues and civic society of the country, its members’ probity and 
industriousness, and much else.”33 
 Rawls never wrote anything about institutions and their importance 
to development in any greater detail than what is found in The Law of 
Peoples. Rather, the task of creating an empirical and falsifiable 
hypothesis has later been taken up by Risse. He resolves the argument 
between different conceptions of institutions in favour of a narrow 
reading. To him, institutions mean 
 
stable property rights, the rule of law, bureaucratic capacity, 
the existence of appropriate regulatory structures to curtail 
fraud, anticompetitive behaviour, graft, and the quality and 
independence of courts, but also the cohesiveness of society, 
the existence of trusts and social cooperation, and thus the 
overall quality of civil society.34 
 
 While this list does indeed seem quite expansive, the entries become 
more vague once it moves outside of what formal government structures 
can provide. Moreover, to prove the importance of institutions he relies on 
a particular set of sources based on a narrow understanding of institutions 
as a set of formal constraints on government. To make his argument he 
relies in particular on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 35  and Dani 
                                                   
33 Rawls, LP, 108. 
34 Risse, On Global Justice, 66. 
35 See, for instance, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development,” 1396. This study aims to establish whether there is a 
relationship between health environment and growth. The authors find that there is not. 
They do so by comparing only two variables, per capita GDP and the prevalence of deaths 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 2 – Methodology 
80 of 373 
Rodrik who, as we will see in Chapter 5, understand institutions in such a 
way. It therefore seems to follow that the institutional thesis as Risse 
presents either should be understood to argue that institutions in the 
narrow sense are what matters, for the purposes of making empirical 
claims about what matters in development, or that the institutional thesis 
is largely meaningless as an empirical claim. I have taken the more 
generous former interpretation.  
 I have chosen the method sketched below to acknowledge the 
intractable nature of cases, where variables exist and operate within a 
specific context. It is, however, important to keep the limited goal of this 
exercise in mind. Many of the problems with traditional methods in 
economics outlined above are not a question of bad scholarship, but rather 
a necessary result of the limitations that the available methods place upon 
the researchers. Proving causality, for instance, is a huge undertaking, as it 
requires repeating the exercise across several points in time. In many 
cases, the researcher will be limited by availability of data, or the data not 
being comparable across time.36 It therefore is not my intention to prove 
any irrefutable points about what works in development. The point, 
simply, is to show that there are compelling reasons to doubt that the 
institutional thesis is correct. If institutional quality is not the only 
                                                                                                                                                 
brought about by yellow fever. According to one review the methodological issues with 
this study, the results of which have been reproduced in at least 20 peer-reviewed 
papers, include taking death rates from countries other than the ones they are supposed 
to represent, basing estimates on numbers too low to be statistically significant, and 
lacking sound justifications for their case selection. It also suggests that once these 
issues are properly controlled for, the correlation between settler mortality and 
development is no longer statistically significant. David Y. Albouy, “The Colonial Origins 
of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment,” American 
Economic Review 102, no. 6 (2012): 3059–76. 
36 Indeed, it was lack of available data that did for my original intention of repeating my 
fs/QCA study over several points in time. 
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significant factor that influences the ability of burdened societies to 
become well-ordered, but other things play an important role as well, this 
significantly changes the internationalist duty of development. This is 
especially true if those things carry fewer political risks than institution-
building does. 
 
2.5 The method – fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
 The method outlined here is by no means the only suitable one for 
assessing the institutional thesis. Nor do I claim that it is the most 
sophisticated method. As the literature review in Chapter 5 will make 
clear, plenty of excellent work is being done in development economics, 
using the traditional tools of their trade, to examine what works in 
development whilst acknowledging and taking into account the complex, 
multivariate nature of the issue. But recall that the goal is also to show that 
these questions are not outside the remit of political philosophers. 
Answering them for ourselves may, however, require different tools. 
 Economics, as a discipline, loves complex maths. Whether or not the 
use of complex and elaborate mathematical formulae contributes to our 
understanding of the world over and above the use of simpler models, and 
whether they help or hinder statistical soundness and accuracy, is a 
serious topic of debate within the field.37 But what is clear is that to a lay-
person many economics papers, whether they use maths as a tool for 
                                                   
37 See, for instance, Paul M. Romer, “Mathiness in the Theory of Economic Growth,” 
American Economic Review 105, no. 5 (2015): 89–93. Romer’s theory of Mathiness was 
a hot discussion point among economists active on social media, e.g. Paul Krugman, 
“Freshwater’s Wrong Turn (Wonkish),” blog, New York Times, (August 2, 2015), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/freshwaters-wrong-turn-wonkish/. 
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rigorous analysis or obfuscation, could just as well have been written in a 
foreign language. So full of numbers, brackets and Greek letters are they 
that many of us have resorted to reading the introduction and taking a stab 
at the research design before giving up and skipping straight to the 
findings and conclusion. 
 The method I am proposing, however, makes use of techniques that 
are already a staple of political philosophy, namely inferences from logic 
and the use of intuition. To gage the significance of institutions over other 
causal variables I use fs/QCA, a method developed in the 1980s by the 
American sociologist and political scientist Charles Ragin. Whilst relatively 
uncommon in traditional economics the method has found more favour in 
disciplines that deal with questions of development from a different angle, 
including politics and sociology. QCA is an explorative method based on 
Boolean algebra using logic and sets rather than regressions and 
independent variables, in order to capture the relationship between cases 
without losing sight of the complex interdependence of the variables 
involved. 38  Focusing on cases instead of variables, it asks if certain 
combinations of variables go together in ways that are consistent and 
logically significant. A broad list of factors are tested for simultaneously, 
including underlying, structural factors as well as more immediate factors. 
 Using QCA over more traditional methods, then, conveys some clear 
advantages. By treating variables within the context of their cases, it is 
                                                   
38 Charles C. Ragin, “The Logic of Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” International 
Review of Social History 43, no. supplement (1998): 106–107. 
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able to deal with complexity in a way that normally eludes regressions.39 
Another key issue is that traditional methods are, more often than not, 
designed with large-n studies in mind, which makes little sense in some 
fields where medium-n cases are more common.40 Moreover according to 
Ragin, it lies at a middle distance between qualitative and quantitative 
methods, recognising that “because almost all social science theory is 
verbal in nature, it, too, is fundamentally about sets and set relations.”41 A 
claim, like the one discussed in here and in Chapter 5, that there is a direct 
link between institutions and development and that therefore developed 
countries are those with strong institutions, is also a claim that the set of 
developed countries constitute a subset of countries with strong 
institutions. Claiming, further, that strong institutions are the only 
significant explanatory variable, means arguing that the set of countries 
with strong institutions both wholly contains and is wholly contained 
within the set of developed countries. 
 The claim would therefore be proven wrong under either of these 
two conditions: The existence of a subset of developed countries without 
strong institutions, proving that institutions are at best sufficient for 
causing development, but not essential. Or the existence of a subset of 
countries with strong institutions that are not developed, proving that 
institutions may be a necessary condition, but are not sufficient without 
factoring in additional explanatory variables. 
                                                   
39 David Byrne and Emma Uprichard, “Useful Complex Causality,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science, ed. Harold Kincaid (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 109. 
40 Charles C. Ragin, Redesigning Social Enquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 1. 
41 Ibid., 1–2. 
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 This study will use fs/QCA to overcome an important limitation on 
basic QCA for the purpose of the analysis, namely the sharp dichotomy 
between membership and non-membership of a particular set. In many 
situations it makes little sense to talk about cases simply being members 
or non-members of a set. Rather, cases are members to varying degrees, 
more in than out, or more out than in, but neither fully one nor the other. 
For instance, countries exist on different levels of development, and, as I 
argue in Chapter 4, our appropriate moral response will depend not only 
on whether they fall within the description of “burdened societies”, but the 
extent to which they do so. 
 Fs/QCA allows us to code cases as being partial members of a particular 
set or variable, ranging from 1.0 (full member) to 0.0 (not at all a member). 
For instance, a country’s degree of development could be categorised in 
intervals ranging from 1.0 (fully developed), 0.8 (mostly developed), and 0.6, 
0.4, 0.2 to 0.0 (fully undeveloped). It may be developed or undeveloped to 
varying degrees, and simply labelling a country as one or the other depending 
on whether it clears a particular threshold would not tell us a lot about its 
situation. Instead a case’s membership status within a set is more fine-grained. 
It would be a serious mistake, however, to label the highest scoring case 1.0, 
and the lowest 0.0. Instead, three points must be defined: The point of 
inclusion, where full membership sets in; the point of exclusion, where a case 
is definitely not a member of a set; and the point of maximum ambiguity, 
where the case is as much in as out of a set.42 
                                                   
42 Ibid., 33. 
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 Therefore all data in the fs/QCA analysis are calibrated. The highest 
possible score is always 1.0 and the lowest is always 0.0, and scores in-
between may either fall on a sliding scale or on certain markers, for instance 
0.2, 0.4, and so on. Crucially, 1.0 does not equal the highest score in the 
original data set, nor 0.0 the lowest. Rather, 1.0 represents the lowest point at 
which a case is fully in, and 0.0 the highest point at which it is fully out.43 In 
my study I use a six point scale in increments of 0.2. 
 In fs/QCA we check for relations between sets by asking whether the 
scores for a particular set are consistently higher or equal to, or 
consistently lower or equal to, the scores for the outcome set, which is the 
specific relation you want to test for. To check for the effect of multiple 
sets on an outcome, set intersection or set inversion is used, which can be 
thought of as negation or addition. When the hypothesis is that two (or 
more) conditions must necessarily be present for a set to have an impact 
on the outcome, set intersection replaces the aggregate of the scores in the 
sets with the lower of them. For instance, if one is 1.0 and the other is 0.6, 
the combined score is 0.6. Conversely, when the hypothesis is that only 
one of two (or more) conditions need to be present, set inversion does the 
opposite. Now, the aggregate of the scores is replaced with the higher of 
the two. So if one is 0.2 and the other is 0.8 they combine to 0.8.44 In this 
way it is possible to test for the effects of multiple variables at once. 
 A key difference of fs/QCA compared to regressions is that it 
separates the relation between an independent and outcome variable into 
necessity, sufficiency and coverage. In this study I test for necessity and 
                                                   
43 Ibid., 31. 
44 Ibid., 36–41. 
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coverage, which measures the extent to which the outcome can be 
explained solely by that variable. I do not test directly for sufficiency, 
however, as the coverage effectively measures sufficiency among those 
factors that have already been found to be necessary. Given that the 
institutional thesis posits necessity and sufficiency simultaneously, 
therefore, nothing would be gained from measuring sufficiency 
independently. Here I will go through the logic behind each of these steps, 
as well as the final one, the truth table. 
 Necessity is when the causal variable must be present in most or all 
cases in order for the outcome variable to show. In simple terms it means 
that if a causal variable is necessary, the outcome variable will never 
display a higher value than the causal one, as the causal variable in effect 
puts an upper limit on the outcome. The outcome value may be lower, as 
the causal variable does not guarantee the outcome. But the absence of the 
causal variable does in most cases guarantee the absence of the outcome. 
 We can calculate the necessity of a variable using the following 
formula: (Xi≥Yi) = ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/∑(Yi). 45  X here refers to the causal 
variable, while Y is the outcome. For a single case, if X is lower than or 
equal to Y, necessity has been shown. For several cases, by contrast, the 
formula calculates the consistency of necessity, i.e. how often a case 
suggests that the causal variable is necessary. ∑ here means the sum of the 
values in the bracket. We therefore take the sum of whichever of the Y or X 
value that happens to be lowest in each case, and divide that number by 
the total sum of the Y values. 
                                                   
45 Ibid., 53. 
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  Next, coverage considers to what extent those causal variables that 
have been found to be necessary explain the outcome on their own. We 
find the coverage by measuring the extent to which the causal variable is 
equal to or lower than the outcome: (Xi≤Yi) = ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/∑(Xi). 46 
Again, X is the causal variable and Y is the outcome variable. We calculate 
the sum of whichever of the X or Y values is highest for each case, divided 
by the total sum of X values. One should not normally expect complete, or 
even near-complete coverage. Near-complete coverage could either mean 
that the causal variable is of singular importance to the outcome, which is 
quite rare, or it could mean that the causal variable is rather trivial.47 
 The truth table is the final step of the analysis. It tests whether any 
combination of causal variables is sufficient to explain the outcome. In 
other words, is there a pathway of factors which, by itself, is able to 
guarantee the outcome? The truth table lists all the possible combinations 
of causal variables to which a minimum number of cases affirm the 
outcome. In this case the threshold is at least four cases. Hence, those 
combinations of variables to which there are three or fewer cases are 
discarded as logical remainders. The number of possible combinations of 
causal variables is expressed by the formula 2k, where k is the total number 
of logically possible combinations. As such, a study with a single casual 
variable has two logically possible combination (the causal variable is 
either present or not), one with two variables has 4 combinations, and one 
with 10 variables has 1,024 possible combinations. As it happens the study 
in Chapter 5 makes use of five causal variables, meaning that there are 32 
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47 Ibid., 55. 
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possible logical combinations. Even in fs/QCA, the nature of the truth is 
such that all variables must be dichotomised. For this step, therefore, the 
values in the fuzzy set scores are recalibrated so that anything that scores 
below 0.5 is scored at 0, and everything above 0.5 becomes 1.48 The truth 
table then lists those causal pathways for which there are corresponding 
cases. 
 In analysing the truth table it is possible, through the process of 
logical minimisation, to establish if a causal variable is irrelevant to the 
analysis. Logical minimisation means that if two logical pathways to the 
same outcome are identical, except that one of the causal variables is 
present in one pathway but not in the other, we can consider it redundant 
to the analysis – the same outcome seems to be present whether the causal 
variable is present or not.49 It can then safely be assumed that this variable 
does not contribute to the outcome in any meaningful way. 
 
2.6 Case and variable selection 
 
 Fs/QCA is particularly appropriate for medium-n studies with a 
relatively limited number of cases. As I will elaborate on in Chapter 5, the 
study will analyse 102 cases in Africa, Latin America and Asia, with 
numbers primarily taken from 2010. The choice of 2010 as a base point is 
exclusively a result of practical considerations. Some of the key causal 
variables explored are only updated once every five years, every whole and 
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Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 96–97. 
49 Ibid., 186–188. 
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half decade. As the fs/QCA study was primarily undertaken in 2014, 2010 
represented the most recent available data. For data that is updated more 
frequently I keep 2010 as the reference point whenever possible, for the 
sake of consistency. While I discuss the case selection in more specific 
detail in the chapter, here I want to add that in fs/QCA the case selection, 
as with the calibration, is a matter of discretion on the part of the 
researcher. The cases cannot be chosen at random, nor do they need to 
encompass (in my case) every country in the world.50 The cases must bear 
a relation to the topic, and there must be a reason why this particular case 
has been chosen. While some cases have been left out for more trivial 
reasons (such as insufficient data), this consideration has led to the 
exclusion of some cases. As I will explain in more detail in Chapter 5, I 
have limited the study to those countries that were either colonies of 
European powers or otherwise closely influenced by them, but where the 
settlers did not displace the indigenous population. The two main 
categories of countries excluded are therefore countries in Europe, the 
former Soviet bloc, and countries such as Australia, USA and Argentina, 
which are predominately populated by descendants of colonial settlers or 
European immigrants. 
 The variable selection is similarly an exercise in judgment. While it 
is important to make sure that the chosen variables cover a broad array of 
likely factors, grounded in an extensive review of the subject, the fact that 
the number of logically possible pathways increases exponentially means 
that there is value to keeping the number of variables limited. This is 
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particularly important with regards to the truth table. Recall that a study 
with five causal variables yields 32 theoretically possible combinations. 
Adding just two more causal variables would yield 102 possible 
combinations, more than the number of cases. In this case, it would be 
difficult to know if the fact that a pathway has no cases is significant, or 
just statistical noise. One possible solution, allowing a study to use many 
more causal variables, would be to create a two-stage analysis that divides 
the variables into “remote” and “proximate” causes. The remote conditions 
are tested for first, determining the “outcome-enabling” conditions. Only 
those conditions that are deemed relevant are subjected to an analysis of 
“proximate causes” to determine more precisely the link between the 
causal variables and the outcome.51 That way, for instance, a study with 10 
causal variables that would have had 1,024 possible combinations (210) can 
be reduced to 64 combinations (25 + 25). Undoubtedly a two-stage process 
would have been extremely interesting for this study, but there are also 
issues of time, feasibility and study demarcation to contend with. For this 
thesis I have therefore opted for the more practical one-stage process with 
five causal variables. 
 The variables are, again, chosen according to the researcher’s 
judgment. The starting point for choosing the variables is a literature 
review that suggests which variables might be more relevant than others, 
but it is nonetheless a reiterative process.52 Given the need to calibrate, the 
researcher needs a good understanding of how and why the variable might 
be important. My five causal variables are malaria prevalence, ethnic 
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fractionalisation, average years of schooling, life expectancy, and 
institutional quality, against the outcome variable of GNI per capita. I will 
explain and justify these choices in Chapter 5. The list is by no means final 
or conclusive. As Ragin points out, choosing the relevant variables is a 
reiterative process whereby variables are dropped or modified while others 
are added as new information about the associations between them is 
discovered. Some may turn out to have been less relevant than originally 
thought, whilst others may turn out to show unexpected results in specific 
cases, leading the researcher to either redefine the variable or include 
additional ones to explain the discrepancy.53 The process of toggling input 
and output back and forth repeats behind the scenes. What is presented in 
this thesis is, of course, the final result.54 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has outlined the methodology behind the thesis, finally 
leaving us ready to move on with my argument. First, I located the main 
philosophical argument in the Anglo-American tradition, strongly 
influenced by what Rawls calls reflective equilibrium. The section also 
emphasised why I place an importance on examples from the real world 
over stylised thought experiments, long a staple in political philosophy. 
 Next, I outlined the methodology and method behind fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis, which is the main tool of analysis in 
                                                   
53 Ragin, “The Logic of QCA,” 122. 
54 According to (urban) legend, Otto von Bismarck once claimed that politics is like 
sausages: It is better if the people do not know how they are made. When it comes to the 
messy business of deciding the variables and testing the calibrations, I have taken the 
same approach. 
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countering the claim, presented in the literature review, that institutions 
are of overarching importance to the duty of development. First, in Section 
2.3, I made the case that philosophers need not solely defer to economists 
and other users (and occasional abusers) of heavy maths, but that the tools 
for answering the empirical questions that underpin your theories are in 
fact available to everyone. After briefly outlining some criticisms of the 
logic underpinning the institutional thesis in Section 2.4, the remaining 
two sections outlined the method, establishing necessary conditions and 
coverage, and briefly sketched the case and variable selection, which will 
be outlined in detail in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3 – The Duty of Assistance 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 Having established why internationalists believe that duties towards 
non-compatriots are limited in roughly the way they are outlined in The 
Law of Peoples in the literature review, the next question is what that duty 
actually entails. From simply saying that there is a duty of development 
assistance, this chapter aims to put some meat on the bones, and find out 
in more detail what it means to be developed in the relevant way – that is, 
a well-ordered society or one where citizens are able to lead decent lives; 
and what kinds of outcomes the rich developed societies have a 
responsibility, if possible, to bring about. 
First, a little road-mapping is in order. This chapter looks at the 
maximum theoretical extent of the duty of development. Therefore other 
considerations that might limit our global responsibilities are put to one 
side here. They will be discussed extensively in the next chapters. These 
include feasibility, whether we are actually in a position to help, or 
whether the situation is too intractable or by its very nature requires 
domestic solutions. I also exclude limitations brought about by concerns 
and respect for the target country’s sovereignty, as well as competing 
duties towards compatriots. They will become relevant in Chapter 4. 
Institutions being of primary importance is a particularly crucial practical 
limitation; it is therefore discussed extensively in Chapters 5 and 6, and 
left aside here. Finally, the history of the relationships between the 
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countries in question is not important for the moment, hence the focus on 
the theoretical extent. In the world we share, no inter-societal relation 
exists in a vacuum. The many questions of justice that arise from our 
shared history of colonialism, exploitation, use of resources, dominance of 
the international system, and past interference in domestic politics, will be 
addressed in Chapter 7. What is left is the theoretical question of what the 
duty of development assistance would be in the absence of these 
mitigating or aggravating factors. This chapter alone therefore does not 
tell us what the duty is in the real world, though it is a necessary starting 
point for answering that question. 
 The chapter proceeds like this: First I discuss Rawls’s duty of 
development and the various interpretations of his principles. Depending 
on how you read key sections, Rawls’s duty is either very demanding, more 
so than many realise, or not concerned with the wellbeing of individuals. 
In Section 3.3 I look at duties of assistance grounded in human rights, 
which seek to limit the scope of human rights to what is needed for a 
minimally decent life. Section 3.4 proceeds to explore what basic needs 
must be met, particularly through a discussion of Henry Shue, Thomas 
Pogge, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. I argue that the concept of 
basic needs is necessarily broader than the preceding section would 
suggest. In 3.5 I discuss existing international human rights treaties, 
finding that current international law already lends support to a broader 
conception of human rights than some internationalists claim is the 
maximum conception that can garner universal acceptance. 
 The next sections then change track, exploring ways of grounding 
international duties that do not derive from human rights. First, in 3.6, I 
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consider Mathias Risse’s idea of common ownership of the Earth, and his 
idea of access to water as a human right. I argue that it seems implausible 
that common ownership is able to do the kind of work it is supposed to – 
indeed, I am sceptical that it can even secure a right to something as basic 
as water. 3.7 discusses rights derived from liberal principles, particularly 
as advocated by Michael Blake. These give prima facie reasons to value 
democratisation. 3.8 asks in what way securing rights in perpetuity is 
different, and more demanding, than simply securing rights. Finally, 3.9 
sums up the argument and concludes. 
 
3.2 Rawls’s duty of development 
 
 Rawls argues that it is a duty of reasonably well-ordered peoples to 
bring burdened societies (and, at least in principle, outlaw states) into the 
society of peoples.1 We will leave benevolent absolutist societies aside here, 
as they constitute a separate case with separate duties. We have a duty to 
help burdened societies develop to the point where they are no longer 
burdened, and no further assistance is required. “[T]he aim is to realize 
and preserve just (or decent) institutions, and not simply to increase, 
much less to maximize indefinitely, the average level of wealth, or the 
wealth of any society or any particular class in society.”2 There is no 
corresponding duty for outlaw states. Rawls is never explicit as to why that 
is, given that their citizens presumably also have a right to the things 
described below. Perhaps he considers the task impossible, and outlaw 
                                                   
1 Rawls, LP, 106. 
2 Ibid., 107. 
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states must first graduate to the status of burdened societies before any 
duty of development kicks in.3 It sounds like a dubious proposition that 
the two are completely separate categories. Here I will put outlaw states to 
the side, however. The task of helping burdened societies is a daunting 
enough challenge already. 
 There is a duty to assist burdened societies up until the point where 
they become full members of the society of peoples. But where exactly is 
the cut-off point? There is no straightforward answer since Rawls makes 
two different claims about them, the first broadly institutional and the 
second focusing on the individual. In the first instance, “the aim is to help 
burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs reasonably and 
rationally and eventually to become members of the Society of well-
ordered Peoples.”4 In the second, “I do accept Beitz’s and Pogge’s goals of 
attaining liberal or decent institutions, securing human rights, and 
meeting basic needs. These I believe are covered by the duty of assistance 
discussed in the preceding sections.”5 Whether human rights and basic 
needs for individuals really are guaranteed through managing your own 
affairs as a reasonable and rational society is a different matter entirely. 
The individual-centred duty is later padded out and, seemingly, expanded. 
Now, “it seeks to raise the world’s poor until they are either free and equal 
                                                   
3 Rawls, LP. He says of the society of peoples that it is their “long-run aim to bring all 
societies eventually to honor the Law of Peoples and become full members in good 
standing of the society of well-ordered peoples” (93). Later he claims of development 
assistance that “[o]nly burdened societies need help” (106).  
4 Ibid., 111. 
5 Ibid., 116. 
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citizens of a reasonably liberal society or members of a decent hierarchical 
society.”6 
 Although these two responsibilities are correlated to a large extent, 
they do not overlap perfectly. Stable or well-functioning societies, at least 
reasonably so, do not necessarily need to secure the human rights and 
basic needs for all their citizens, provided that the poverty and rights 
violations that do occur are not substantial enough to destabilise the 
country as a whole. The number of people left out could potentially be 
quite substantial. But on the other hand, if the world’s poorest people must 
be elevated to the status of free and equal citizens of their respective 
societies, it follows that it is not enough for those societies to simply be 
stable or well-functioning. 
 So which of these two readings is the more plausible one? Here 
there is some disagreement. Samuel Freeman, on the one hand, stands 
firmly in the institutional camp, saying that “the domestic justice of all 
member nations is not a condition of justice in well-ordered societies.”7 If 
international justice does not presuppose domestic justice, it would follow 
that international society does not require its members to ensure proper 
and full membership for all their citizens, and that the law of peoples 
therefore does not look out for the interests of the individuals. Peoples 
must still meet basic needs and human rights, and be ruled by a common 
conception of the good, as per usual. But a people can be a respected 
member of the society of peoples without “even respecting basic liberties, 
                                                   
6 Ibid., 119. 
7 Samuel Freeman, “The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and 
Distributive Justice,” Social Philosophy & Policy 23, no. 1 (2006): 30. 
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so long as it respects human rights.”8 Leif Wenar, too, argues that the law 
of peoples is primarily about the justice of societies. To him, peoples are 
“good neighbours”. 9  Like good neighbours, you keep an eye out for 
anything beyond the pale, but other than that you keep to your own affairs. 
So when another country intervenes to stop human rights abuses or 
provide aid it is not for the sake of the persons harmed. The goal, simply, 
is to bring the society back above the minimal threshold of decency.10 
 By contrast, in David Reidy’s reading of Rawls the focus is on the 
individual. He says that “persons have a fundamental interest in and are 
entitled to membership within a well-ordered people [… which] will all 
meet in regular and reliable ways the subsistence and security needs of 
their members, afford their members formal justice and the core elements 
of the rule of law, [… protect] those human rights set out in Articles 3-18 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and organize political life on 
constitutionalist, consultative and broadly republican terms. Of course, 
liberal democracies will do more. But all well-ordered peoples will do this 
much.”11 Thus, Reidy says, contra Rawls’s critics, his theory is far from 
indifferent to the plight of the global poor. Consequently, “Rawls’s duty of 
assistance is a substantial duty of justice, more demanding than is 
generally acknowledged.”12 It is also more demanding than Freeman and 
Wenar’s reading of the same text. 
                                                   
8 Ibid., 30–31. 
9 Wenar, “Not a Cosmopolitan,” 98. 
10 Ibid., 101. 
11 Reidy, “Just Global Economy,” 219. Reidy gives no specific justification for leaving out 
Articles 1-2 and 19-30 of the Declaration. 
12 Ibid., 201. 
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 But accepting that the goal was to raise all members to the status of 
free and equal citizens, it is not quite clear what that actually means. 
Perfect freedom and equality is a tall order. Even in the wealthiest nations 
in the world, perhaps not counting rare exceptions like Norway or Iceland, 
there are individuals who find themselves so far down the socio-economic 
ladder that their status as free, let alone equal, members of society must be 
seriously questioned. Yet everyone would surely agree that a country like 
the UK has no claim to international assistance. But where do we draw the 
line? This is much more than just a theoretical question. India is a case in 
point. In 2011 a public debate raged in the UK about its annual aid budget 
of £295 million to a country in which half of children are malnourished, 
but which grows at a rate of close to 10% per year and, as aid critics were 
especially keen to point out, has its own space programme.13 Establishing 
the cut-off point for development, regardless of how the duties are 
grounded, will be a difficult task indeed. 
 To sum up, the Rawlsian duty of development is grounded in two 
ways. First, it is defined as a responsibility to establish a (minimally) 
liberal or decent world order. The duty is therefore to lift societies as a 
whole, not necessarily with reference to individuals. The second is a duty 
to preserve human rights and basic needs, which is a duty that we owe to 
individual citizens of burdened societies. It is still unclear just how 
demanding these duties are, however. That depends on what counts as 
human rights and basic needs, what the “coverage” of these rights needs to 
                                                   
13 BBC, “Who, What, Why: Why Does the UK Give Aid to India?,” 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-12607537. 
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be in each country and, for the general duty of development, how you 
define the cut-off point for membership in the society of peoples. 
 
3.3 The duty of assistance as human rights 
 
 The duty of development is at least partially grounded in a concern 
for upholding human rights. By looking at what gives rise to human rights 
and how they are justified, we will gain a better understanding of what 
kinds of claims can be supported under this heading. 
 Risse places human rights squarely in the context of institutions. 
“The language of human rights focuses on abuses committed by those in 
positions of authority: of two otherwise identical actors, only one might 
violate human rights, namely, the one that amounts to an abuse of 
authority.”14 Further, he says, “I take the concept of human rights to refer 
to rights (vis-à-vis agents who, in virtue of their size, power, etc., can 
intelligibly be held responsible for this matter) with regard to the 
organization of society that are invariant with respect to local 
conventions, institutions, culture, or religion.”15 
 Human rights, says Risse, are fundamentally membership rights. As 
such they share a key feature of citizenship rights, namely that they are 
premised on being part of a circle within which the specific duties imposed 
upon you qua membership must be justified. The relevant sphere, as the 
phrase implies, is humanity as a whole. Human rights guarantee the basic 
needs of all people, and the duty of upholding these rights is, at least in 
                                                   
14 Risse, On Global Justice, 69. 
15 Ibid., 70, his italics. 
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principle, owed by all people.16 But this type of membership right is a 
double-edged sword. Because of the extremely thin condition of 
membership, unlike the state, it can only support the most minimal 
conception of human rights. Therefore, we reach the “upper limit of 
human rights” when we argue for rights that do not protect the 
“distinctively human life”, but instead make reference to particular 
associations, such as shared membership in a state or some other 
collective endeavour, for establishing rights.17 
 For David Miller, basic needs play an even more definitive role, 
being the very grounding of human rights in his conception. They are thus 
fixed in specific features that all human beings share, namely their needs. 
This, he points out, places him in a separate camp from, say, Griffin’s focus 
on agency,18 or Sen’s on capabilities.19 These specifically, are a decent life 
which, he points out, is considerably less than what a flourishing life would 
require. Nor is the urgency of the need necessarily the determining factor. 
Some needs may be particularly urgent to an individual in their specific 
societal setting, given the established norms that are in place. But we are 
looking at universal human needs, conditions that hold true across all 
societies.20 The resulting scope for what can be considered human rights is 
therefore very limited. 
 Why set the threshold for human rights so low? Proclaiming 
something as a human right, Nagel says, gives it an inviolability against 
                                                   
16 Ibid., 73. 
17 Ibid., 78. 
18 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
19 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Penguin, 2009). 
20 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 181–184. 
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any other considerations, so that “while in some cases a right may 
justifiably be overridden by a sufficiently high threshold of costs, below 
that threshold its status as a right is insensitive to differences in the cost-
benefit balance of respecting it in each particular case.”21 This leaves very 
little room for anything apart from strictly negative rights, since more 
expansive positive rights are prone to clashing when resources are too 
scarce or the obstacles too great to implement them all at once. 
The less “fundamental” the right we are affirming, the more difficult 
it is to include it in the “core of inviolability” that remains constant across 
cultures.22 This, to Nagel, excludes the possibility of claims of justice on 
the international scale, bar the bare minimum standards of non-
aggression, respect for international law and very limited development 
assistance. This, by extension, sets the limit for international human rights 
to be realised. Although it is impossible to deny the urgency of 
international aid, this is a humanitarian issue, not a question of justice. 
This is more than just semantics. Justice, he suggests, concerns itself with 
relative statuses, and humanitarian aid is about absolute deprivation.23 
They therefore belong to completely separate moral categories. David 
Miller suggests another reason Nagel might have for rejecting the term 
“justice”. Often, poverty is caused by a particular group – say, the 
president and those who prop him up – who are responsible for the rest of 
the population’s plight. In this case, it is obvious that they have a strong 
negative duty to compensate for the harm they have done. But the chance 
                                                   
21 Thomas Nagel, “Personal Rights and Public Space,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 24, no. 
2 (1995): 84–85. 
22 Ibid., 93–94. 
23 Nagel, “Global Justice,” 118–119. 
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of them actually doing it is, of course, minimal. The question, then, is what 
kind of responsibility passes to the international community. Unless the 
situation is so bad that direct intervention would be the lesser of two evils 
(as in Rwanda or Bosnia, arguably) there is little outsiders can do to 
change the situation. In this case they might not be required to act, as per 
a duty of justice, and we may not have a right to pass judgement on 
outsiders who fail to do so.24 
 The idea that a global human right implies a globally binding 
responsibility is widely shared. This may not be an easily defined or 
singularly transmissible duty, but a succession of duties or a mix of 
continuous negative or positive duties to act or refrain from acting in 
particular ways. The primary bearer of duties, says Risse, is each 
individual’s state. Where the state satisfies its obligations to its own 
citizens, human rights will have been taken care of. But where this does 
not happen, the best way to help is to ensure that the state can protect 
human rights.25 While immediate short-term assistance may be necessary 
in the case of natural disasters, he believes that domestic institution-
building is the best way to secure human rights. This is a question I will 
take up in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 Where does this leave the upper limit for the duty of assistance? 
Risse concedes that there can be no set limit. But we can set out some 
guiding principles. In general, the more severe the distress, the greater the 
                                                   
24 Miller, National Responsibility, 257–258. Miller has reservations about Nagel’s 
humanitarianism/justice distinction. Where to Nagel, justice is inherently about how 
people stand in relation to each other, Miller sees no reason why comparative and non-
comparative forms of justice cannot both exist. Ibid., 256. 
25 Risse, On Global Justice, 79–80. 
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likelihood of success and the lower the costs, the more urgent the duty is.26 
Nonetheless, in light of Risse’s focus on institutions he argues that the 
effect of these restrictions will be that the duty is very limited in practice. 
D. Miller similarly acknowledges that if needs were to ground obligations 
simply qua needs, the list would quickly expand. He therefore places four 
limitations on rights claims, namely that it must be something that can be 
provided by human agency, it must be something that can be demanded by 
others (so there is no human right to love and respect), the demand cannot 
oblige others to violate their own rights, and any demand must take 
resource scarcity into account. This means not everyone’s needs must be 
satisfied at once.27 While the first two are fairly obvious, the last two 
prompt some questions. On a libertarian-leaning understanding of rights, 
it might seem that no positive rights could ever be human rights, lest they 
violate basic property rights. But D. Miller does not share this view. Only 
those rights that are themselves important enough to warrant human 
rights status are immune from violability, even to protect the human rights 
of others. But as for resource scarcity, the question must be asked how that 
scarcity came about in the first place. Barring the worst natural disasters, 
the fluctuations in the seasons and the weather that leave people 
malnourished, or the ways global interactions influence local conditions, 
are not unforeseeable. If I roll two dice, the odds of rolling a double-six 
may be small. But if I roll it enough times, it will eventually happen. In 
asking what our responsibility is for relieving the suffering that happens 
now, we must therefore also ask whether that harm could have reasonably 
                                                   
26 Ibid., 80. 
27 Miller, National Responsibility, 185–193. 
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been predicted (and we may have committed a sin of omission), or whether 
we may have been responsible for the underlying conditions that caused or 
exacerbated it. I discuss the former possibility in 3.8 and 3.9, while the 
latter is tackled in Chapter 7. 
 Fundamentally, the preceding analysis relies on a particular 
understanding of what it means to have human rights in the first place. 
Cosmopolitans emphasise the transcendent character of rights. They apply 
everywhere, and we have them by virtue of being human beings, regardless 
of whether they are recognised where we live. So far, so good. But Andrea 
Sangiovanni effectively outlines a further key difference. To 
cosmopolitans, the question of implementation and enforcement are of 
secondary concern. People have a human right to, say, freedom of speech 
irrespective of what regime they might live under, and as such the 
international community has a responsibility to enforce it. If it cannot be 
enforced given the present political realities this is regrettable, but it does 
nothing to change the status of free speech as a human right. 
 But according to what Sangiovanni terms a “practice-dependent” 
theory of human rights, the non-enforceability is paramount to the status 
of free speech as a human right. Principles of justice of any kind, says this 
theory, cannot be derived independently of the context that they exist to 
regulate. This is true not only for liberal rights only affirmed in democratic 
societies, but also for human rights which, far from being timeless, 
presuppose many of the features of the modern state, including a 
comprehensive legal system, coercion, population control, goods 
distribution, and so on; and whose purpose is to mitigate the worst 
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consequence for the people most disaffected by this system.28 The role of 
human rights in society is therefore a defining feature of those rights in 
itself. 
 In practical terms, the importance of human rights lies in their 
ability to define and regulate appropriate foreign policy. This means, first, 
that they justify military, economic or diplomatic intervention, 29  and 
second, that they require duty bearers with means of enforcement.30 
If we accept this logic it places some rather strict limits on the scope 
of human rights. If human rights are truly universal, everyone has the 
same claim to protection against everyone. Moreover, they must be 
justifiable across all cultural and institutional contexts, showing that no 
one can reasonably disagree. And finally, implementation must in 
principle be possible without disproportionate use of means, whether by 
force or otherwise.31 This, in practice, limits the list of human rights to 
those the international community can be expected to come to the defence 
of. It is not limited to those the current international system actually does 
come to the defence of, as that would be far too restrictive. But only if you 
can make a reasonable plea for international intervention is it a human 
right.  
So far, so minimal. But it is nonetheless worth noting that the list 
that we are left with is not strictly negative. As with Nagel confirming a 
responsibility to provide emergency assistance, it leaves some scope for 
                                                   
28 Andrea Sangiovanni, “Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2008): 17. 
29 I should add that the justification runs both way. Human rights can be used to justify 
forceful intervention into a foreign regime, and, where the foreign regime welcomes the 
intervention to, justify it to the intervener’s own population. 
30 Sangiovanni, “Justice and the Priority of Politics,” 19. 
31 Ibid. 
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positive duties of redress to those in dire need. At this point it cannot be 
determined what those limits are. However, the next chapter will explore 
the most likely objection to wide-ranging positive human rights, namely 
their claim that they clash with the restriction against disproportionate 
means – specifically, that aid beyond a basic level conflicts with national 
autonomy. 
 It seems that part of the motivation for strictly limiting human 
rights is precisely their importance. Internationalists largely agree with 
non-relationists that proclaiming something a human right imposes an 
obligation that is not only particularly stringent, but overrides any 
competing obligation an individual or association might have. For anyone 
concerned with limiting the overreach of international responsibility, 
justificatory minimalism is of paramount importance. 
 But the two are still very separate propositions. The extent and 
scope of human rights cannot be justified by how stringent the resulting 
responsibilities are. If it can be reasonably shown that human rights are 
more than just the bare minimum standards described in this section, it 
follows automatically that the duty is correspondingly more urgent. Unless 
the stipulation not to demand that anyone sacrifice their own human 
rights for others is being violated, which realistically it will not be, the duty 
is to fulfil the rights whatever they may be and at whatever cost. 
 This section has outlined two important limitations of human rights, 
as understood by a number of internationalists: That only the most basic 
requirements of a decent human life may give rise to them, and that they 
must be universally applicable and agreed upon. This does not mean that 
everyone must agree, but rather that everyone could agree to them, 
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irrespective of other conventions, their belief systems, or the first 
principles of justice that make up their society. The next two sections will 
look more closely at these claims in turn, Section 3.4 asking what a basic 
life requires, and 3.5 asking what agreement there currently is on 
international human rights.  
 
3.4 Basic needs 
 
 David Miller says, though it could have been said by more or less 
any internationalist, that only “essential rights, such as rights to life and 
physical security, belong on a list whose aim is to set a minimum standard 
separating the tolerable from the intolerable.”32 Elsewhere, he writes that 
“the purpose of a doctrine of human rights is to specify a global minimum 
that peoples everywhere, regardless of societal membership or cultural 
affiliation, are owed as a matter of justice.”33 Therefore, only the most 
basic needs, essential to a minimally decent human life, are protected by 
human rights status. But what are those basic needs? 
 There is no getting around the fact that the most basic needs, and 
therefore rights, have both negative and positive components to them. To 
Shue, they “are a shield for the defenceless against at least some of the 
more devastating and more common of life’s threats, which include [both] 
loss of security and loss of subsistence.”34 In Basic Rights, he is clear that 
he considers only a limited range truly basic rights, agreeing that the 
                                                   
32 Miller, National Responsibility, 166, his italics. 
33 David Miller, “Grounding Human Rights,” Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy 15, no. 4 (2012): 409. 
34 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, second 
edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 18, my italics. 
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urgency of a need is not necessarily what makes it a right. Hence even 
basic education may not count. A basic right entails an obligation that, 
while in the first instance discharged locally, may fall on the international 
community.35 Nonetheless, we should not be blind to the systemic nature 
of the kinds of needs deprivation that take place in the world. Policies may 
work to the benefit of certain privileged groups at the expense of the many, 
and even those policies that benefit the society as a whole may predictably 
leave specific groups in an intolerable situation.36 Where they are imposed 
from the outside, especially through international trade regimes, they give 
rise to duties that I discuss in Chapter 7. Where their sources are domestic 
it often throws up a lot of difficult questions related to pin-pointing the 
source of the abuse, identifying causes and establishing the right corrective 
course of action. 
When Rawls defines a list of basic, or primary, goods, he includes 
rights, liberties, opportunities, income and wealth as the broad categories 
of goods that exists.37 He has the justice of a liberal, democratic society in 
mind, which limits how much their fulfilment can be contained within 
global rights. Nonetheless, internationally applicable basic goods echo 
them closely. But we must be clear what basic goods mean. Perhaps falling 
short of creating a specified list of goods, universally valid across contexts, 
some inroads can be made towards clarifying what goods are urgent 
enough to warrant human rights protection. Pogge suggests four 
considerations. First, only those that are really necessary for “realizing a 
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36 Ibid., 47. 
37 Rawls, TJ, 54–55. 
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conception of a worthwhile life” are included. Second, goods are limited to 
those that are “minimally adequate”, meaning only basic forms of essential 
goods are covered. Third, it is having access to basic goods that matters, 
not having those goods in itself. And finally, they are limited 
“probabilistically”, meaning no one has a right to absolute security in basic 
goods beyond what can reasonably be expected.38 
 Basic goods include physical integrity, basic food, drink, shelter, 
clothing and basic health care provisions. They also include freedom of 
movement and action, basic education, and the opportunity to play a role 
in the economic sphere. Everyone has a right to a “minimally adequate” 
share of these goods.39 For simplicity’s sake we can suppose that playing a 
role in the economy is a process that, assuming the other basic needs are 
taken care of, generally happens organically. What is required, therefore, 
is that governments do not actively impede people’s participation, and stop 
others from doing so as well. The interesting ones are education and basic 
health care. Not only are they distinctly positive duties, they also require 
not just the distribution of a particular good, but the maintenance of a 
complex governmental infrastructure. Yet it would be hard to argue that 
basic education and basic health care are not fundamental requirements of 
a minimally decent life. Nonetheless, they show how the distinction 
between basic and more demanding human rights do not map neatly on to 
distinction between positive and negative duties. 
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Press, 2008), 44. 
39 Ibid., 55. 
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 Shue and Pogge both agree that the goal of human rights is to 
respect basic human standards of decency. Although development beyond 
these levels is highly desirable, and you would reasonably expect any 
government to seek it for all their citizens, they are not human rights. They 
may be what can broadly be described as citizens’ rights, the standard to 
which citizens can hold their rulers accountable. But they do not warrant 
an international response. Nonetheless, the breadth of scope is much 
wider. 
 Sen contends that we are better off thinking in terms of basic 
capabilities rather than goods. We each have different needs – some of us 
have physical or psychological disabilities that require special attention, 
and depending on our position in society, for instance as child-caretakers, 
the quality and quantity of “public goods” we need may vary. Similarly, 
they may vary across cultural, environmental and geographical settings. 
The question we should ask ourselves is therefore not what needs human 
rights should protect, but what capabilities are essential for human life. 
The needs vary across individuals, communities and peoples, but basic 
capabilities are shared by all.40 This would strongly suggest that basic 
responsibilities may be stronger for certain individuals or communities 
than what is reflected in conceptions of basic needs that take as its starting 
point a healthy (typically male) adult in his prime. 
 The upshot, argues Sen, is that the capabilities approach “proposes 
a serious departure from concentrating on the means of living to the 
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actual opportunities of living.”41 This particularly speaks against Rawls’s 
focus on access to and equality of specific goods, irrespective of individual 
circumstances. 
 The problem so far, as Nussbaum points out, is that we have yet to 
see anything specific.42 We get a clear sense that Sen thinks that the basic 
rights that follow from the capabilities approach will be an expansive set. 
Political rights, for instance, while not necessarily first order basic rights, 
are “not only pivotal in including social responses to economic needs, they 
are also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves.”43 
This gives us a strong idea of the kinds of rights that should be defended. 
There is still no list of basic capabilities and correlative rights, however, 
and it is therefore less clear which ones merit international 
responsibilities. Spelling out precisely what capabilities you consider 
essential, and therefore worthy of being protected by human rights status, 
certainly does a lot to clear up exactly what you mean by human rights in 
the first place. But on the other hand there is an advantage to being fuzzy 
at the margins. While some rights seem to obviously belong on the list, and 
others obviously fall outside its scope, it is difficult to establish clear-cut 
boundaries between the two, and a list of rights risks losing that crucial 
nuance. Nonetheless, if our goal is to make policy and change how 
international duties are being discharged in the world we live in, it may 
well be necessary and worth it to formulate it anyway. 
                                                   
41 Ibid., 233, his italics. 
42 Martha Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social 
Justice,” Feminist Economics 9, no. 2–3 (2003): 33–59. 
43 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 154. 
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 Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities worthy of human 
rights status come under ten headings.44 Life, bodily health, and bodily 
integrity establish some of the most crucial negative rights that all human 
rights traditions affirm. The next three, senses, imagination, and thought; 
emotions; and practical reason, establish the right to use senses in a “truly 
human” way, informed by education and experiences derived from 
personal choice, having access to a full and unconstrained emotional life, 
and to form a conception of the good. Affiliation covers life as social beings 
with concern for others, as well as “the social bases of self-respect and 
non-humiliation”, while play covers the right to recreation. Finally, 
control over one’s environment has two components. Politically, it means 
the ability to effectively take part in “political choices that govern one’s 
life”, and materially the right to own property on an equal basis with 
others.45 Many of these, as we will see in Section 3.5, resonate in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, despite not being basic rights in 
an internationalist account of rights. 
 Some of these rights, especially the first three, will not be 
contestable. Whether framed as capabilities, goods, or simply basic rights, 
the results are the same. They guarantee the negative rights that even the 
sparsest human rights traditions consider essential. Others seem to fall 
outside of a list that internationalists would endorse. Consider for instance 
influence over the “political choices that govern one’s life,” in Nussbaum’s 
words a basic capability. What does that mean? It cannot mean 
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parliamentary democracy. At any rate, she herself denies that that is a 
primary right.46 But even so, it is a vague concept, and it is unclear what it 
means at a more local level. Does it mean influence over family politics? 
Influence at the community level? If so, I think many internationalists 
would strongly (and probably rightly) argue that we have inadvertently 
wandered into society-conditioned territory. 
 But consider another option, namely that what we are dealing with 
is a class-based issue. For instance, the needs and opinions of women are 
systematically being ignored in society, or a system is in place that denies 
particular groups any meaningful control over their own life or the politics 
that surround them. They could be members of religious or ethnic 
minorities or, as in traditional Indian societies, stuck at the bottom rung of 
the caste system. While there is no doubt that people in these instances are 
being denied meaningful participation in political life, they are being 
denied a whole lot of other things on Nussbaum’s list that those who are 
sceptical of wide-ranging international duties would be more hard-pressed 
to disagree with. A woman in an oppressive and misogynist society will 
often, in addition to political influence, be denied bodily integrity and 
health, reason informed by proper education, recognition as an equal, self-
respect and freedom from humiliation, and non-discrimination, all of 
which are far more likely to feature in all human rights lists across 
conceptions of rights. What, an internationalist might ask, does the 
inclusion of political control bring to a list of core capabilities, or rights? Is 
a situation where a member of a particular group has all the rights 
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mentioned above, minus political participation, likely to occur? And if it 
does, would it not seem that even if it was a human rights violation it was a 
relatively minor one, if we can rank such things? 
 The other side of the coin, of course, is that the lack of political 
rights may be a strong signifier of a lack of other rights. Sen argues that a 
lack of political participation rights is itself a strong indicator that other, 
more basic rights themselves are at risk. “Political rights, including 
freedom of expression and discussion, are not only pivotal in including 
social responses to economic needs, they are also central to the 
conceptualization of economic needs themselves.”47 That is of course an 
empirical question. It sounds highly plausible to me, but one that cannot 
be verified here. But this reasoning is not, in itself, sufficient to prove that 
political rights are basic. We should keep an eye out for the denial of 
political influence to see if serious rights abuses are taking place. But to 
include them on the list we would have to subscribe to the idea that 
political rights are essential in and of themselves to a basically decent life, 
which sits badly with the internationalist conception of rights. 
 
3.5 International human rights treaties  
 
 Although there exists a bundle of international documents 
pertaining to various rights, too many to discuss here,48 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the predominant human rights 
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document, having formed the basis of discussions of human rights since its 
creation in 1948. Officially the UDHR enjoys near-universal support,49 
although there are reasons why you might question the genuineness with 
which most countries endorse it: As the preamble makes clear, 
membership of the UN comes as a package deal with the Declaration 
included, and the rate of human rights violations throughout the world, 
including by parties to the charter, should lead anyone to seriously 
question how internalised these rights have truly become. Nonetheless, the 
role it has had in defining the debate means it cannot easily be ignored. 
 Reading the Declaration, it quickly becomes obvious that it does not 
endorse a strictly minimalist conception of human rights. Although 
minimal right, traditionally conceived of as negative, make up the bulk of 
the articles, its scope is much broader than that.50 
 Articles 3-18 generally cover the rights that Rawls and other 
justificatory minimalists would endorse.51 These include the right to life 
and liberty, prohibition of slavery, the right to recognition before the law 
and to a fair trial including protection from arbitrary arrest, detention and 
exile, and the right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. They 
also cover the right to freedom of movement, to marriage and family life, 
and the right to own property and protection from arbitrary deprivation of 
it. Finally, they guarantee the right to freedom of conscience and religion, 
including the right to manifest your beliefs in public and to change your 
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religion.52 Although some, such as religious freedom, are more contested 
than others, there is so far little that could be reasonably objected to in 
most peoples’ eyes. 
 But what about the ones that supposedly go beyond minimal rights? 
At least three additional rights should be immediately acceptable to a 
Rawlsian. Article 25 guarantees everyone the “right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family” in 
terms of food, clothing, housing and medicine, and the security of these 
rights through times of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood or 
old age.53 Articles 26 and 29, further guarantee education, another basic 
right, and subjection only to law securing recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of everyone.54 
 So far we have not, I think, ventured outside the basic needs that 
“must be met if citizens are to be in a position to take advantage of the 
rights, liberties, and opportunities of their society. These needs include 
economic means as well as institutional rights and freedoms.”55 
 Other rights seem to fall more within the range of positive rights 
which, unlike education and sustenance, are not often considered basic. 
The right to work includes equal pay and the right to join trade unions, 
while other rights include leisure, social security and cultural life.56 Here 
the question of necessity outside of cultural practices is less clear. 
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 Finally, there can be little doubt that Article 21 runs contrary to 
both word and spirit of the law of peoples when it says that “the will of the 
people shall be the basis of the authority of government,” affirming 
democracy as a human right.57 This is especially obvious in light of Article 
2 which ensures that the rights guaranteed in the UDHR apply equally to 
all people regardless of race, gender, status, birth or, most importantly to 
decent hierarchical societies, religion.58 It must therefore follow logically 
that an internationalist conception of global human rights must, at the 
very least, discard some of the ones set out in the UDHR. But which ones? 
 To answer that we need to determine to what extent the justificatory 
minimalist account is justified; and if so, whether the current list of 
minimally acceptable human rights is not defined too narrowly. 
 For Onora O’Neill, the problem of allocation of duties throws a 
spanner in the works. Violations of “liberty rights” do generate clearly 
attributable duties, but “welfare rights” do not. Rights to goods and 
services are therefore violated in more abstract terms.59 Yet if you cannot 
have a claim that is not directed against someone or something in 
particular, and universal rights are rights against everyone in general, you 
have yourself a conundrum. But in practice most responsibilities have 
been given to states, which to O’Neill is deeply troublesome. Not only do 
many states not have the capacity to protect human rights, many of those 
who do actively violate them.60 
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 Another defence of justificatory minimalism is that, in Michael 
Ignatieff’s words, the “universal commitments implied by human rights 
can be compatible with a wide variety of ways of living only if the 
universalism implied is self-consciously minimalist. Human rights can 
command universal assent only as a decidedly ‘thin’ theory of what is a 
right, a definition of the minimum conditions for any kind of life at all.”61 
In a world of different civilizations, religions and cultures, each with their 
competing conceptions of the good, only the rights that protect “human 
agency”, by which Ignatieff means negative liberty, are able to command 
enough assent to be considered universal in any meaningful way.62 Not 
only that, “rights inflation – the tendency to define anything desirable as a 
right – ends up eroding the legitimacy of a defensible core of rights.”63 
This means only those strictly necessary to life itself are of primary 
importance, and all social, economic and political rights are of a secondary 
order. It is not sufficient, then, to think of “rights as trumps” as Ronald 
Dworkin does,64 unless you stick to a strictly minimal and non-mutually 
exclusive conception of rights. What happens if my right to property 
clashes with your right not to starve? While Griffin suggests that instances 
of human rights clashing like that are much less frequent than critics 
imagine, and are often resolvable, genuine conflicts do exist.65  
Nonetheless, there is no reason to assume that clashes of this sort 
spell the death for more extensive human rights. Conflicts of interest are 
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an integral part of political life at any level, and rights are no different. A 
violation of my right to property may in some cases be detrimental to my 
capacity to act as an autonomous agent, but when faced with degrees of 
human suffering I should be prepared to evaluate my claim to property 
rights in the proper context.66 This does not change the fact that my 
human right to property is inviolable in the face of non-rights based claims 
to it. Joshua Cohen convincingly rejects Ignatieff’s minimalism and refutes 
the idea that more extensive human rights are intolerant. Human rights 
are norms associated with membership of a political society, he says. This 
explains the inclusion of rights such as education and work, because they 
identify rights that are important for individuals to perform their 
membership functions.67 This is particularly pertinent considering that 
Rawls says the goal of decent hierarchical societies is to ensure that their 
members can live with their common conception of the good.68 
 But does it not still fly in the face of respect for local cultures and 
customs? The UDHR, says Cohen, precisely left out any reference to 
religion or natural rights in order to allow the followers of different views 
to decide how human rights fit into their broader philosophy.69 None of 
this limits the importance of toleration, not even a Rawlsian ideal of 
toleration that permits things that would be considered unjust in liberal 
societies. But the end result is not minimalism about human rights. That 
gives up too much. Some principles, such as democracy and equal political 
rights, may not be possible within toleration, but any reasonable 
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conception of membership must include some rights that go beyond an 
absolutely minimal level.70 So an internationalist conception of human 
rights should be prepared to endorse more than just the rights set out in 
Articles 3-18 of the UDHR. 
Finally, it is worth asking what is gained from endorsing a thin 
version of human rights. Macleod points out that Rawls’s eight principles 
in the second original position affirm human rights, but they do not 
specify which human rights, nor do they do anything to ground them in 
any independently agreed upon principles. We know that some human 
rights are endorsed only by liberals, yet the principles must appeal to 
decent and liberal peoples alike. So either a single list of human rights 
exists, consisting only of those endorsed by both sides; or else there are 
two lists, an extensive for one for liberal peoples, agreed upon by the 
representatives of the domestic original position, and a much narrower 
one that decent peoples possess.71 Yet by the unavoidable logic of the 
second original position, only the few that appear on both lists will be 
internationally recognized. The problem, says Macleod, is that if the only 
reason for endorsing the more limited list is that it is one that decent 
peoples decide on as a compromise, independently of the reasons either 
liberal or decent peoples had for endorsing their respective lists in the first 
place, by what force are outlaw states or burdened societies under any 
obligation to acquiesce to it? The list is not grounded in any independent 
principles, but simply derives its force from the fact it has been agreed to. 
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So what is to stop others from simply disagreeing? The upshot, argues 
Macleod, is that the “sense in which human rights are said to be ‘universal’ 
– and thus binding on all societies – seems to be inconsistent with any 
attempt being made to trim the doctrine of human rights to accommodate 
the ‘common good conception of justice’ embraced by decent peoples.”72 
To summarise, if our concern is with justificatory minimalism, there 
is a strong argument for endorsing more than just the bare minimalist 
account of human rights commonly defended by internationalists. This will 
not extend to a full endorsement of the UDHR, as some articles will be 
incompatible with Rawlsian toleration if taken as enforceable international 
human rights standards rather than aspirational statements, or rights 
applicable only to liberal societies. But others, especially Articles 25, 
guaranteeing a standard of living adequate for a person’s health and well-
being; 26, enshrining a right to education; and 29, stipulating that you can 
only be subject to laws that ensure the rights and freedoms of everyone, 
fall within the scope of reasonable agreement across cultures and religions. 
At a minimum, therefore, we should expect these to be included in our list 
of international human rights. 
 
3.6 Common ownership of the Earth 
 
 Another way of grounding human rights is common ownership of 
the Earth, which Risse has recently reintroduced to the debate. Unlike 
human rights which are thought of as stemming from our common 
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humanity, or in other words conceived of as natural rights, what gives rise 
to rights is our common ownership of the planet we share. This, of course, 
is no novel idea. John Locke wrote in 1689 that “he that leaves as much as 
another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all.”73 What is at 
stake here, then, is “original ownership”, things that exist independently of 
human labour or inventiveness, and give rise to claims that are both 
temporally and substantively prior to other property claims.74 
 The purpose of common ownership of the Earth is to ensure that the 
co-owners, everyone on the planet, are able to meet their basic needs. 
Taking its cue from natural rights theory, common ownership applies to all 
resources that exist independently of human effort – clean air and water, 
land and forest, and so forth.75 Individuals have a human right to these 
things. Expressed in the form of claims against authority, states owe them 
two fundamental guarantees: First, that their power cannot render people 
unable to meet basic needs through the use of these resources, and second, 
that they must make sure they have the opportunity to meet them.76 In one 
way this is an incredibly demanding right, since the right to these basic 
goods trumps any other consideration. In that sense they could require big 
sacrifices on the part of the developed countries to meet globally, much 
more than they are currently willing to do. But in another sense they are 
not demanding at all, since Risse’s conception of common ownership of 
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the Earth precludes from consideration any stronger claims to collective 
ownership rights beyond meeting basic.77 
 So far this view does not at first glance seem out of the ordinary. As 
Beitz says, it is a feature of just about all natural rights theories that they 
are distinct from positive rights. Hence many economic and social rights 
are, narrowly understood, political rather than human rights.78 
But this is precisely where the theory comes into its own. Compared 
with the much broader notion of “personhood” grounding rights, which 
guarantees certain basic positive freedoms, including the right to minimal 
provisions needed to live,79 common ownership of the Earth has the effect 
of resolving that debate in favour of the minimalist interpretation. Having 
a right to access the things nature provides for us in common does entail 
some degree of political representation and due process, and immigration 
if your current land cannot support you. These must be derivative rights - 
the right to representation is, by definition, not a pre-societal right. But 
once it has been established, you have a right to collectively ensure that it 
does not infringe on your liberty. Nonetheless, your rights do not extend to 
even the most basic health care.80 In effect, your government’s guarantee 
to ensure opportunities for basic rights to be met are strictly limited to not 
preventing you from accessing them to the extent you are able to do so 
without assistance. It is thus only a basic right to life in the narrowest 
sense. I argue that Risse’s argument fails in two ways. First, his account of 
non-interference is too narrow. And second, he paints himself into a 
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corner by relying on implausibly neat distinctions between naturally 
occurring and man-made resources. In the real world, such a neat 
separation does not exist. 
  Consider the specific case of water. Water, Risse says, is precisely 
the kind of pre-societal good where deprivation constitutes a violation of a 
natural right. Water exists independently of any human activity. The right 
to water, whether as drinking water or sanitation, is therefore a 
particularly urgent human right.81 While water can, of course, be taken out 
of its state of collective ownership in the fountain and made private in the 
pitcher, 82  it is naturally readily available to everyone. Therefore, in 
common ownership, everyone has a right to access it up to the point where 
their basic needs have been met, and they are immune from living under 
political or economic systems that interfere with this opportunity.83 The 
significance of this being a human right is that although it falls on states 
initially to ensure it, where they violate it or are unable to protect it 
sufficiently, it falls to the international community to do so.84 
 This responsibility seems at first glance very demanding, and in 
some ways it is, especially with regards to transfers of resources and the 
derivative right to immigration to resource-rich countries if your own 
territory is insufficient. It also gives rise to closely related rights, including 
– in any somewhat developed country – a right to enough education to 
compensate for lack of sufficient access to natural resources. But basic 
healthcare is disqualified on a technicality, since “access to such care does 
                                                   
81 Mathias Risse, “The Human Right to Water and Common Ownership of the Earth,” The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 22, no. 2 (2014): 178–180. 
82 Locke, Second Treatise, 20. 
83 Risse, “Human Right to Water,” 190. 
84 Ibid., 196–197. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 3 – The Duty of Assistance 
126 of 373 
not turn on access to original resources as much as, say, sanitation does, 
but instead turns on human services and ingenuity.”85 
 But is this sharp distinction between original and man-made 
resources really tenable? I think there are good reasons to be sceptical. 
Although it might seem a somewhat banal point at first, it is worth 
pointing out that when Locke and Grotius wrote about natural law and 
common ownership the Earth’s population was in the hundreds of millions 
rather than the seven billion it is today. Thankfully, there is no reason to 
assume that there is not enough water to support that many people. But it 
is nonetheless true that the population increase has led to less fresh water 
being available per person. Moreover, people are far more likely to live in 
densely populated urban areas than previously. This, says Stephen 
McCaffrey, “will lead inevitably to intensified competition for increasingly 
scarce water resources both within individual countries and between 
different countries.” 86  Keep in mind modern living arrangements, 
including cities and water-intensive farming.87 These are features which, 
placing reasonable bounds on theoretical abstraction, will have to be taken 
as a given. Does it really make sense, then, to talk of water in terms of a 
negative right not to be deprived of something you could reasonably expect 
to have access to from nature’s side alone? Contamination can happen 
because of chemical spills or the like, in which case it seems obvious that a 
negative right has been violated. But in most cases access to clean water 
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requires careful management, irrespective of any identifiable violations of 
a right. I do not in any way mean to suggest that clean water is not a 
human right. McCaffrey shows how the right to water is already implied in 
human rights documents, including the UDHR’s Article 25 and many 
others. 88  So do common ownership rights really make up a coherent 
category of rights separate from more expansive groundings of rights like, 
say, personhood? 
 What about duties that only apply in (at least slightly more) 
developed countries? Here a right to basic education applies because “the 
existence of states means that co-owners will often not have the possibility 
to make a living by accessing natural resources. As a substitute for this 
lack of access we need empowerment to participate in society.”89 So where 
the arrangements of states makes it implausible for everyone to live off the 
land, there is a human right to at least the level of education that would 
enable you to bypass those resources. A couple of questions present 
themselves. Is the human right to education dependent on being cut off 
from natural resources, or is it possible to have your human right to water 
fulfilled, and have a human right to education? Does the level of education 
you are entitled to depend on what would realistically be required in the 
country you live in to ensure your basic needs are met? Or in other words, 
is the “basic” in basic education a relative or absolute term? Is the 
distinction between living in rural and urban developments significant? 
And if so, why not guarantee a human right to a minimally sufficient share 
of the natural resources in the first place?  
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3.7 Rights derived from the liberal world order 
 
 So far, strategies for grounding a global duty of development have 
focused on human rights. This has been used to justify very narrow 
conceptions of rights and corresponding duties. I have argued that while 
there is some traction in these arguments, they fail to justify a set of rights 
defined as narrowly as they have been. But human rights are not the only 
way of grounding international justice, and the question of what justice 
requires is by no means settled. Blake argues that the reason for caring 
about justice internationally lies in the idea of toleration. The Western 
world, he says, will be concerned with analysing the interaction between 
countries based on liberal principles. Consequently we must ask what it is 
that political bodies owe to their citizens. For Blake the relevant moral 
justification a state must provide is for the coercion it exerts over its 
citizens. It does this by ensuring the equality of all those coerced by it.90 
Therefore the conditions that give rise to liberal principles of toleration are 
those that provide for these basic moral rights for the citizens. The reason 
for this relatively high threshold, where we refuse to tolerate countries that 
fail to meet these standards, is that the interests of the state, 
fundamentally, are not its own, but those of its citizens. These are to live in 
a state where the coercion imposed upon them is justified.91 We must 
therefore ensure that all persons “have access to those goods and political 
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institutions under which they are able to live lives understood as rationally 
autonomous.”92 This means living in an adequate state. 
 What does it mean to live in an adequate state? This, unfortunately, 
remains somewhat vague. One’s entitlements as a citizen can be denied in 
both positive and negative ways. You can, Blake points out, be deliberately 
starved, politically oppressed, or marginalised because of your race, 
religion, sexuality, cultural affiliation, and so on. But you can also simply 
find yourself in circumstances of extreme poverty, with no state action to 
help you. These are all cases where the global community as a whole has a 
responsibility to act.93 So far every internationalist would be on board. But 
while this sets a lower limit for acceptance, it is a lot less clear what the 
upper limit is. We get told nothing about where this obligation stops, apart 
from meeting the most basic needs. 
 Consider for instance the following example: “A citizen of Canada, 
thus, has no right to move to France – or vote in French elections – simply 
because she regards France as more congenial to her personal proclivities; 
if her autonomy is adequately protected in Canada, she cannot make a 
claim based upon autonomy to French citizenship.”94 Not many people, I 
imagine, would challenge this conclusion. But does the example really help 
us understand what is meant by a basic respect for autonomy? That is less 
clear. 
 Perhaps an example from Canada’s great neighbour to the south 
would have been more instructive. Canada has long been a favoured refuge 
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for American soldiers and draft-dodgers seeking to escape what they saw 
as illegal wars, first in Vietnam in the 1960s and 70s, and more recently in 
Iraq since 2003. In the case of Vietnam an estimated 20-40,000 
Americans made their way north, and many were eventually legitimised as 
asylum seekers by the Canadian government. Following the Iraq War the 
fortunes of the roughly 200 enlisted soldiers who tried to seek the 
Canadian government’s protection were more mixed.95 Already here the 
picture of what counts as adequate protection under the law and, more 
importantly, what counts as being “congenial to personal proclivities” – 
neither war was considered illegal or illegitimate by the majority of the 
population at the time – is muddied. So imagine what conundrums can be 
thrown up when the countries in question are no longer two of the 
wealthiest liberal democracies in the world, but ones where the gap 
between what individual citizens might reasonably consider adequate 
justification for state coercion, and how the state or the majority 
population sees it, is much wider. 
 However, one area where Blake in particular stands out from the 
rest is the assertion that liberal democratic rights have primary 
importance. “In the end, I suggest, we have a right to live in a democratic 
society as part of our more general right to these circumstances and 
political institutions necessary to defend autonomous functioning. The 
promotion and defense of just democratic institutions abroad is an 
obligation incumbent upon every just liberal state; to truly value the 
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autonomy of all humans is to work steadily for a world in which all face 
just democratic institutions.”96 
 This is considerably more than Rawls argues for. In fact, Rawls 
explicitly goes the other way and says that even doing anything to favour 
the spread of democracy is out of the question, because it disrespects 
decent peoples.97 However, on this point Blake finds himself more in 
agreement with the likes of Simon Caney, who argues that Rawls’s 
liberalism is incompatible with his respect for decent hierarchical peoples 
because they permit practices that liberal peoples would find 
unacceptable.98 
Yet international law is currently much better lined up with Rawls’s 
vision than Blake’s. Allen Buchanan points out that the current criteria for 
international legitimacy, as codified in the Montevideo Convention of 
1933, requires only a permanent population, a defined territory, a 
functioning government and the ability to enter into relations with other 
states. Nowhere does it demand that states must obey even a minimally 
decent standard of democratic or human rights. Although there is a fifth 
criteria, stipulating that states must not have breached basic international 
law, it is unclear how much this covers and if it is even enforceable.99 
To this Buchanan suggests two additional principles. First, only 
those states that respect human rights deserve international legitimacy. So 
far nothing majorly controversial, and this is already a part of the 
internationalist logic (albeit not completely – see Section 3.2). Second, 
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only those states that live up to a minimum level of democracy will be 
legitimate, for two reasons: Democracy, says Buchanan is itself important 
for the equal treatment of people’s interests. This argument might not find 
favour with many non-egalitarians, but the second one should. It has long 
been noted that although democracy might not be a requirement of justice 
itself, there is a strong and direct link between democracy and respect for 
human rights. Ensuring democracy therefore becomes an important tool 
for safeguarding those rights we care deeply about.100 
 Whether it is true that democracy is instrumental to ensuring rights 
is of course an empirical question, and one I cannot look into in any great 
detail here. But it sounds immensely plausible. A government that is 
directly accountable to the needs of its members will not neglect their 
needs to the extent that autocratic governments might. Further, you would 
have to ask whether it would be enough to insist on minimally democratic 
institutions, whatever that means; another empirical question. But 
assuming that Buchanan is right, it becomes hard to see how the claim 
should be denied. 
 Naticchia, in a reply to Buchanan, suggests that we have prudential 
reasons to be careful about insisting on democracy as a condition for 
legitimacy. For one, it may reduce incentives for minimally just behaviour, 
setting back the goals we were trying to achieve.101 But more importantly, 
there is too much at stake for us to be jeopardising the cooperation of 
powerful, non-democratic states when it comes to the formulation and 
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implementation of international legal frameworks. For those reasons we 
are better off conferring legitimacy on anyone who lives up to the minimal 
demands currently set out, and leaving aside the justice of those 
regimes.102 Blake, conveniently, finds himself halfway between the two. On 
the one hand, he says, prudential concerns should limit our willingness to 
criticise existing states, yet on the other hand we should be prepared to be 
more forceful with new, smaller states. Not because we case less about the 
citizens of powerful states, he is careful to point out, but simply because 
we have more tools against the smaller.103 While here I agree with Blake on 
both his reasoning and conclusion, I would also suggest a different reason, 
one that might appeal more to a Rawlsian internationalist, for treating 
cases differently. 
Would Rawls support this democratic requirement? I suspect he 
would not, even in the abstract, but he would be wrong not to. Rawls is 
clear that we cannot insist on decent peoples turning democratic. He is 
adamant that democratic peoples are not even allowed to offer incentives, 
against a background condition of fair cooperation and mutual respect, for 
decent peoples to make even the slightest moves towards democracy.104 
Presumably, then, the society of peoples cannot make any demands on 
burdened societies that their path to development must lead towards 
democracy. Otherwise they would fail to properly respect the decent 
peoples that are already members of the society of peoples, by failing to 
treat their form of government as morally equal. But it seems to me that 
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we are, in fact, dealing with two separate categories, which must be 
analysed and treated differently. In the one case we are dealing with 
certainty. This category is made up of decent societies which have proven 
themselves capable of respecting human rights and individual autonomy, 
despite their undemocratic nature. Whatever we, as liberal societies, think 
of their form of government, in terms of adhering to the minimal 
conditions for membership of the society of peoples, they have passed the 
test. But in the other case we are not talking certainty, but probability. We 
must ask ourselves, what is the best way forward for guaranteeing that 
human rights are protected in the future? If insisting on a democratic form 
of government increases the possibility of a positive result, it is reasonable 
to do so. A country that refused to democratise, and was consequently 
denied international legitimacy, may subsequently prove itself capable of 
respecting human rights. In that case it has earned membership of the 
society of peoples. But (assuming Buchanan is right) we should also 
acknowledge that it did so against the odds. Queens Park Rangers will win 
from time to time, but my money is still on Chelsea. 
Nonetheless I want to be careful not to push this too far. 
Democratisation carries great risks and as, for instance, the Arab Spring 
proved, demand for regime change can have many unintended, and deeply 
tragic, consequences. For that reason we should perhaps be very careful 
not to demand too much. 
 What is clear, at least, is that to Blake, there is no place for 
neutrality when it comes to global poverty and human rights deprivation. 
Contra, say, Risse who would first want to know how the poverty came 
about (an objection I discuss in Chapter 7), to Blake it is “illiberal” because 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 3 – The Duty of Assistance 
135 of 373 
its existence itself marks a failure of international responsibilities, 
regardless of how it came to be.105 
 One interesting feature of deriving principles of justice in this way, 
as Blake concedes, is that they can potentially be extremely far-reaching. 
They certainly do not seem to be limited by the same concerns for 
justificatory minimalism that comes across in much of the human rights 
discussion. While there the limitations are of a first order, reining in the 
very list of principles that can give rise to a claim to international justice, 
Blake is “quite agnostic” about the possibility of the world needing far-
reaching remedial and redistributive justice, even if he is sceptical that it 
will actually turn out to be the case in the world we live in.106 But his 
scepticism is largely down to practical considerations about how the global 
political system actually functions, and what the causes of deprivation  are. 
In principle, there is little to limit the potential for international claims of 
justice. 
 
3.8 Rights in perpetuity 
 
 Having a right in perpetuity raises the bar for what a minimally 
decent life requires even further. To say that we have a human right not to 
endure some particularly bad conditions is the same as saying we have a 
right not to endure them at any point in the future. Of course the future is, 
by its very nature, uncertain. Genuine natural disasters, like the tsunami 
that hit South East Asia in 2005, are usually impossible to predict, and 
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their effect too devastating to properly prepare for. In that case it is not 
clear how the human rights of those affected have been infringed, unless 
the state or the global community fail to respond appropriately after the 
fact. Nonetheless, it is easy to lay the blame on nature when man-made 
economic structures should bear the brunt of it. Three decades ago Sen’s 
seminal study of famines pointed out that market failures rather than 
actual food shortages lay behind most famines. For some famines the 
deprivation was not actually down to a lack of foodstuffs, but rather a 
failure of the market to secure its distribution, because price increases left 
some people unable to afford them. He further pointed out how famines 
were a unique feature of non-democratic regimes, lending further credence 
to Buchanan’s claims.107 
 To some extent, of course, this idea is already included in the 
internationalist idea that the goal of international justice is to develop 
institutions that enable governments to take care of their citizens. But 
what exactly does that mean? 
 Richard Miller uses an instructive example of a poor Malian farmer. 
(I discuss this example in more detail in Section 4.5 of the next chapter, so 
what follows here is only a brief outline.) Although the farmer is poor by 
our standards here in the West, R. Miller says, it would be insulting for us 
to assume that he is not living a fulfilling life because he has only a small 
portion of the wealth we do.108 All other things being equal, I think that 
argument makes a lot of intuitive sense. Provided he has enough to 
provide for himself and his family, he might be perfectly content with his 
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life and not want any outside interference, however well-intended. (Or, as 
I will argue in Chapter 4, he might not be.) 
 But let us think about the ways his life can be interfered with. He 
can be harmed by government interference, though repression, violence, 
or policies that actively seek to deprive him of his and his family’s 
livelihood. Or that can be the consequence of policies with other intended 
effects. All of these are violations of his basic human rights irrespective of 
whether his current situation still leaves him able to provide for himself 
and his dependents. 
 But there are also plenty of ways that the Malian farmer can be 
harmed by externalities at some point in the future. Droughts, changes in 
global commodity prices (perhaps as a result of Western dumping of 
subsidised goods), changes in natural environments or climate change, 
changes in the global market, urban sprawl intruding on his land, can all 
seriously affect his long-term ability to provide for his family. 
 His position therefore leaves him vulnerable to the uncertainties of 
future developments. Giving him and his family an adequate protection 
against fluctuations in his fortunes will invariably involve extending his 
and his family’s life options and needs beyond what would be considered 
basic needs if we were merely concerned with his immediate happiness. 
 The internationalist interpretation of the meaning of human rights 
discussed in this chapter has so far given an account of rights that make it 
hard to see how, for instance, education beyond the most basic would 
necessarily be included. At the very least, anything beyond the most 
minimal level would be hard to justify, depending on how it was denied. 
Where a country actively steps in to prevent part of its population, most 
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commonly girls, from being educated, or they knowingly allow groups 
within society to do so, they have arguably failed to treat all persons with 
equal respect and personal autonomy, regardless of the level of education 
that was being denied them. But where a country simply cannot afford, or 
does not have the infrastructure, to provide anything more than basic 
education to all its population, it would seem less clear that a breach of 
rights has taken place, provided that the basic education, at least, has been 
delivered. 
 But if we adopt a conception of human rights that accepts that 
enforceability is not always possible, when deciding what it means to bring 
a country into the society of peoples we must ask whether the education we 
are guaranteeing is a right solely by virtue of being an inherent good 
(though it certainly will be), or if it serves to protect and safeguard other, 
more important, rights as well. Coming back to the Malian farmer we can 
perhaps agree that his current lot is not bad at all, and although he is poor 
and his life options are limited by our standards, it is nothing we need to 
worry about. But given the vulnerability of life on the edge of poverty and 
the degree to which least developed countries find themselves at the mercy 
of externalities beyond their control, securing their minimally decent 
livelihood for the long-term must include giving them the means to plan 
for the future. What this means exactly will depend on the particular 
circumstances, but will almost certainly include access to sufficient 
education, to not be wholly dependent on rural agriculture, to at least 
some basic level of health care, and to either put some money aside or have 
access to some form of credit, to get you through rough patches. Following 
the discussion in Section 3.7, some form of democracy could be added to 
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that list. After all, only in this way will all peoples needs not just be met, 
but met “in regular and reliable ways.”109 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has made the argument that even in the most minimal 
internationalist version of global duties of development, it would still need 
to expand to include additional rights. 
 I started out by clarifying what Rawls means by his duty of 
assistance to burdened societies. The requirement can be understood in 
two different ways, each of which determines how extensive the duty is. In 
one reading, Rawls is primarily concerned with the justice of societies 
rather than individuals, meaning that not everyone needs to live decent 
lives in order for society to be just. But in the other reading, he cares 
mainly about individuals. The second reading, of course, sets the bar 
higher. 
 Next, I asked what human rights imply. What counts as a human 
right is of crucial importance, and internationalists largely agree that the 
definition must be narrow. Contrary to cosmopolitans, internationalists 
believe that implementation is of primary importance. Moreover, only 
those rights that are necessary for a minimally decent life count as human 
rights. And finally, there must be a degree of universal agreement about 
them. You might have expected that agreement to be evidenced by the fact 
that most countries have signed up to the UDHR. But that is not so. Only 
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those endorsed in Articles 3-18 of the Declaration truly count as human 
rights in the right sense. 
 International lawyers may quarrel with the idea of cherry-picking 
some sections and discarding the rest. But philosophers are not bound by 
these treaties (and arguably, neither are policy makers, but that is another 
matter entirely). Based on the internal logic of the internationalist 
position, Rawls and his followers are right to reject some of the remaining 
articles. But not all of them. 
 Specifically, three additional sections of the UDHR deserve the 
internationalist seal of approval, as they are essential for ensuring a 
minimally decent life: Article 25 guarantees a right to a standard of living 
that seems to correspond with the idea of a minimally decent life, but 
includes the crucial proviso that this must include protection during 
periods of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood and old age.110 
That is, while they are unequivocally necessary for a minimally decent life, 
they are rights that cannot be secured simply through the absence of 
government interference. The same is the case for Article 26, guaranteeing 
education, which falls into the same category. Of course, the right to 
education may already be included in other approaches to justifying global 
duties, as we saw both in Risse’s theory of common ownership of the 
Earth, and Blake’s justification of a liberal world order. But my 
investigation reveals these to be superfluous at least when it comes to this 
specific point: Education is already a human right, even on a narrow 
reading of rights. 
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 What is clear, then, is that certain kinds of deprivations may 
mandate a robust government response, and that where the government of 
a burdened society is incapable of doing so, the international community 
has a duty to assist them, provided that it is reasonable to think that 
outside assistance will be effective and helpful. Many internationalists 
would say our means are limited, as the most important factor is the 
quality of government institutions, narrowly defined as the ability to 
uphold the rule of law. That is an empirical claim, which I challenge in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
 Moreover, I argued that there are, at least prima facie, reasons to 
support Blake’s assertion that democracy is intrinsically important. To 
cosmopolitans this would be taken as given. But while there are many good 
reasons to support the spread of democracy, it seems to me that it is not 
necessary to stay true to the spirit of the law of peoples that we actively 
promote democracy as a matter of justice. I argued elsewhere that Rawls’s 
assertion, that even offering incentives to democratise would be out of the 
question, is unwarranted. Indeed later on, in Chapter 6, I will argue that 
actively supporting democratic consolidation is, in certain circumstances, 
one way institutions can be shored up. 
 And finally, I have questioned whether having a minimally decent 
life now is the same as having one in perpetuity. In order to feel 
reasonably sure of having a minimally decent life in the future as well, you 
must be able to weather at least the most foreseeable storms. Living on the 
edge of what a decent life requires means living in a deeply precarious 
situation, which in itself seems incompatible with a secure life. 
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 This gives us a powerful reason to set the threshold for when a 
burdened society becomes well-ordered higher than where it is currently 
set. That need not necessarily be a strict requirement of justice, as it 
would, at least in theory, be possible to imagine a society where a majority 
of the population lived just above the threshold for a decent life, but which 
had an extensive social security system designed to ensure that they never 
fell below the threshold. Whether that is a realistic possibility, however, is 
doubtful. In that case, you would want people to be better equipped, 
themselves, to protect their livelihoods. 
 I am not able to spell out precisely where that limit is here. But at 
the very least there are strong reasons to be wary of treating newly 
graduated well-ordered peoples as if they were any other well-ordered 
people. We have good reason to prefer that our interactions with these 
relatively poor societies follow not just the strict letter of the law of 
peoples, but also take their precarious situation into account. That is 
precisely what I argue in the next chapter. 
 This chapter has explored the minimum extent of the duty of 
development assistance to burdened societies under ideal circumstances. 
That is, without taking into account questions such as feasibility or 
competing considerations of justice which compel us to limit the scope of 
the duty. While I have argued that the duty is greater than 
internationalists take it to be, I have only been pushing against the edges, 
not shattering the theory with any kind of explosive force. Perhaps an 
internationalist might say, “I accept that, in theory, the duty of assistance 
to burdened societies could be greater than I have argued until now. But 
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that is of little practical import, since there are other powerful reasons to 
limit the scope of the duty.” 
 That is where my inquiry will be heading next, first through a 
detailed discussion of what duties exist to countries in the grey zone 
between burdenedness and well-orderedness, and when global duties may 
clash with duties to one’s own citizens, in the next chapter; then through a 
discussion of empirical matters. First the role of the institutional thesis 
(Chapter 5); and second, the question of how much we are really able to 
help, as things currently stand (Chapter 6). In both cases, I argue, the 
reasons given for limiting the duty in terms of practical applicability, while 
clearly relevant, are nonetheless not quite as compelling as 
internationalists claim. Finally, in Chapter 7 I argue that the history of 
injustice that has made the modern world gives us additional reasons to 
support, and even go beyond, the more demanding duty of development I 
outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4 – Global and Local Duties in 
Conflict 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 By now we have gained an idea of what our duties towards burdened 
societies, or least developed countries, are. But of course, these are not the 
only duties that societies have. Most obviously, they have extensive duties 
towards their own citizens. But they also have duties to treat members of 
burdened societies with respect and in ways that preserve their status as 
autonomous and independent peoples. In this chapter I investigate the 
moral dilemmas we encounter at the crossroads of these two duties and 
that of development assistance. 
 In Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 I discuss the sharp dichotomy that, at 
first sight, seems to exist between the duties owed internationally and 
nationally. Ostensibly, there exists a clear lexical ordering of duties; duties 
to citizens only being relevant once those that are owed to all humanity 
have been discharged. But this, I suggest, relies on an oversimplification, 
in two ways. First, there is no single indicator that tells when well-
orderedness has been achieved, and second, the change in status is not felt 
uniformly across a society. When both of these simplifications have been 
accounted for, it is much less obvious that there is a clear point at which 
global duties have been discharged. Section 4.5 then briefly considers the 
idea that rather than a duty of justice, there is a duty of reasonableness 
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that compels societies to do more, even if there is strictly no justice 
requirement to do so. 
 Next, in Section 4.6, I return to an issue I touched upon briefly in 
the previous chapter, namely the idea that self-respect and the desire for 
autonomy are important limitations of the duty of development. I argue 
that while that may be the case in some instances, and we should always be 
wary of imposing our own preferences and making passive recipients out 
of the subjects, it is far from clear that all potential recipients of assistance 
share the same Western conception of what national self-respect entails. 
Rather, I suggest, several different conceptions of self-respect may be 
relevant. Each of them has a different implication for the duty of 
development, and will in some cases restrict it. But it is far from clear that 
it will do so in the extensive and uniform way some suggest. Section 4.7 
concludes. 
 
4.2 Is there a conflict between global and local duties?  
 
Can there be a conflict between the duties we have towards non-
compatriots on the internationalist account, and those shared between 
citizens? Can a developed country have competing duties of justice 
towards the absolute poor non-compatriots in the developing world and 
the relatively poor members of their own societies? And if so, how can that 
tension be resolved? These questions occupy surprisingly little space in the 
existing literature, which to my mind constitutes a significant oversight. 
The answer generally seems to be that there is very little conflict. 
“Well-ordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies,” says 
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Rawls, and that duty comes before any duties to their own citizens.1 Blake 
asks what would make special responsiveness to the needs of one’s fellow 
citizens morally acceptable and compatible with equal respect for all 
individuals, and answers that you must ensure that all persons are able to 
lead a worthwhile life before special attention to compatriots is justified. 
While on the internationalist account, it is compatible with equal moral 
concern for all persons to give special attention to compatriots, this is only 
true if the country can show that it does so as part of a moral system that 
preserves the basic rights of everyone, citizen and foreigner alike.2 Risse 
goes further, and claims that the principles of justice under which the 
distribution of goods and rights take place are only valid if everyone has 
access to enough of them to lead a minimally decent life.3 Conversely, 
then, where they do not, the global order would be seriously flawed.4 (Of 
course, we also saw in the previous chapter how some rights apply globally 
regardless of the wealth of the rights-holder, in line with Risse’s principle 
of common ownership.) 
 So it looks like there is no conflict, but a clear lexical ordering of 
duties. It is only after we have properly dealt with the duties of justice we 
have towards people on account of our shared humanity that we can 
justifiably give preference to our own citizens. This, of course, is a strong 
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motivating factor behind limiting the duties we have towards non-
compatriots, along with the practice-dependent account of human rights 
we saw in the previous chapter. 
 Of course, even if internationalists are right that international 
justice claims must have a “core of inviolability”, to borrow Nagel’s 
phrase,5 which places a strict limit on what can count, it is a long stretch to 
then argue that anything goes once the strict requirements of justice have 
been fulfilled. Indeed, internationalists will argue that they do, in fact, 
show an adequate concern for non-citizens both in burdened and well-
ordered societies. To Blake, the international sphere is properly 
understood as a second-order site of justice. This has some implications 
for the duties countries have towards each other. Domestic justice is 
complete, he says, because individuals do not, within certain parameters 
(the law and some moral principles), have a responsibility to worry about 
the wider consequences of their actions. They may reasonably expect their 
domestic political structure to be able to protect the rights and interest of 
their fellow citizens. The international system, on the other hand, has no 
such political structure. Although international regulatory institutions 
exist, they do not have anywhere near the power to ensure equitable 
outcomes irrespective of individual state behaviour. International justice, 
therefore, is incomplete. The upshot is that each country has a duty not 
just to uphold the rules and regulations of international trade, but to be 
aware of the wider effects of their foreign policy decisions. 6  This is 
because, Blake argues, all individuals have a right to live under institutions 
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and circumstances that ensure their equal status. Any state that claims to 
uphold the moral equality of everyone must make sure they “are not 
causally complicit in sustaining those circumstances and institutional 
forms that deny autonomy to individual persons.”7 
Richard Miller endorses a similar view, arguing that, for instance, 
global organisations such as the World Trade Organization, with the 
backing from the US, are able to use the threat of power and aggression to 
get their way, even as that power often does not actually need to be put to 
use. Poorer or smaller countries without the same clout find themselves 
with little choice but to acquiesce to whatever is decided.8 This coercion 
would not be justified to the citizens of those states, and is therefore 
morally deeply troubling. The implications of this kind of power is 
something I discuss in detail in Chapter 7, but for now it is worth briefly 
mentioning to put the next sections into context. 
These authors nonetheless share an important assumption implicit 
in their argument. Your restrictions on legitimate foreign policy face a 
considerable drop as soon as you are reasonably sure that the subject of 
your foreign policy will not fall below the very low threshold for meeting 
the basic needs of an autonomous people I outlined in Chapter 3. Despite 
the difference between being just over or just under the threshold for well-
orderedness being one of degrees, then, the change in foreign policies that 
may legitimately be imposed upon them is one of kinds. The dichotomous 
distinction between burdened and well-ordered societies, I argue, is a 
weak point in the theory. On the border between well-orderedness and 
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burdenedness, where a society does not clearly belong in one category over 
the other, this creates some very uncomfortable and implausible 
conclusions. 
 
4.3 Dichotomies and oversimplifications 
 
 The language employed by many internationalists gives the 
impression of a strong concern for both international justice and duties to 
burdened societies. I will show, however, that the arguments used to 
justify a sharp distinction between the extensive duties towards burdened 
societies and the duties, consisting mainly of non-coerciveness, towards 
well-ordered peoples, hinges on that old trope of Western international 
relations, monolithism. Here, it comes to play in two ways. The first is the 
implicit assumption that the effect of any change is felt uniformly across 
all aspects of society. That is, there is no substantive difference between 
saying, “this country is not a burdened society,” and, “all the citizens of 
this country have the means to live minimally decent lives.” Or, at the very 
least, they do not on the face of it seem terribly troubled by the possibility 
that the two statements do not both hold true, or interested in developing 
philosophical enquiries into what happens in that case. 
 The second assumption is that a minimally decent life, however 
defined, is a single indicator, when in fact it can be divided into its 
individual requirements, such as access to clean water, food and security. 
This in turn implies that the way in which a country is or is not above the 
threshold does not matter a great deal, except insofar as some things might 
be easier to deal with than others. The two assumptions are often implied 
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at the same time and interchangeably, although I will deal with them 
separately here. I will start with the second assumption before returning to 
the first in Section 4.4. 
 In a book chapter dealing mainly with the problem of outlaw states, 
James W. Nickel shows how Rawls’s treatment of them creates a false 
dichotomy between those who, for instance, fulfil human rights on the one 
hand, and those who commit serious human rights violations on the other. 
This, Nickel contends, leaves out an important third option, that a country 
could have a mixed human rights record, engaging in some “low-level” 
abuses but staying clear of egregious violations.9 While these cases clearly 
do not merit strong diplomatic and economic sanctions or military 
intervention, it is not clear either why the countries should be tolerated as 
full and equal members of the society of peoples. In a similar vein, Caney 
further says that Rawls’s theory fails to take into account the possibility 
that peoples are liberal in some respects and decent hierarchical in others, 
for instance by being democratic and civil but not peaceful.10 A similar 
false dichotomy is at play between burdened and well-ordered societies. 
 Rawls suggests that burdened societies “lack the political and 
cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the 
material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered.”11 Well-
ordered societies, conversely, have those things. But in practice many 
developing countries have some of them but not others. They may have 
democratic political traditions without the resources and know-how to 
                                                   
9 James W. Nickel, “Are Human Rights Mainly Implemented by Intervention?,” in 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, ed. Rex Martin and David A. Reidy 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 268–269. 
10 Caney, “Cosmopolitanism and LP,” 104. 
11 Rawls, LP, 105. 
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compete in the global market. Or they may be rich in natural resources but 
plagued by political instability. So long as it does not translate into human 
rights abuses, and the instability does not threaten to spread into 
neighbouring countries, they will still be burdened societies rather than 
outlaw states. 
 In fairness to Rawls, his project is not to provide a roadmap for 
every possible scenario in global politics. He is primarily interested in the 
broad outlines. So pointing out that the boundary between burdened and 
well-ordered peoples is fuzzy is not in itself revelatory. Nonetheless, at one 
point you have to ask when conceptual simplifications stop being helpful 
and start obscuring the real issues. If this fuzziness is a substantial feature 
of the world as it is, failing to account for it in your theory is a rather 
considerable omission. 
 India would, I believe, qualify as a well-ordered people under 
Rawls’s scheme. That is perhaps a contentious statement, in particular 
given the fact that approximately 275 million Indians still live in abject 
poverty, 21.9% of the population as of 2011.12 Nonetheless, India seems to 
satisfy enough criteria to, at the very least, not be a fully burdened society. 
 Rawls says that “reasonably just democratic” societies must abide by 
three principles. The first two secure basic rights and liberties, accord 
them priority, and guarantee sufficient means to make use of their 
freedom. The third feature must “satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, and it 
requires a basic structure that prevents social and economic inequalities 
                                                   
12 World Bank, “India,” Data, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/india. 
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from becoming excessive.”13 But although no one would argue that the 
inequalities that currently exist in India are not excessive, the key word is 
arguably “prevent”. If Risse is right that historical trajectories matter, the 
fact that the proportion of people living in poverty has been substantially 
reduced, from 45.3% in 1993 to less than half of that 15 years later, is 
significant.14 
 But many Indians are still deprived of some of the indicators of a 
minimally decent life. India is a democracy with a rule of law and 
(relatively) well-functioning institutions, even if they are far from perfect. 
Nonetheless, its 275 million living in abject poverty suffer from a lack of 
healthcare, education, clean water, nutrition, and shelter. How are the 
duties towards those people shared, if at all, between India itself and the 
international community?  
 The answer may in some cases hinge on what exactly is at stake. If 
the population of an arid country consistently suffer from water 
deprivation, but is otherwise well-ordered, albeit not so rich that they are 
in a position to solve their problem by themselves, and the solution 
(building a dam, canals, and so on) seems relatively straightforward, 
perhaps then a case could be made that the society of well-ordered peoples 
have a responsibility to help them overcome their final burden to 
becoming a fully well-ordered country. Crucially, however, there is no 
indication whether internationalists believe this to be the case. Risse, 
                                                   
13 Rawls, LP, 49. 
14 World Bank, “India.” Some question the methodology behind these statistics, however, 
and argue that the Indian government has set the national poverty levels too low. A 
readjustment would result in a higher reported poverty rate. Anant Vijay Kala, “How To 
Read India’s Poverty Stats,” Wall Street Journal India, July 25, 2013, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/07/25/how-to-read-indias-poverty-stats/. 
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following Brian Barry, suggests that as a rough guide the greater the need 
and the easier it is for us to do something about it, the greater the demand 
put on us will be.15 But whether this applies if the country as a whole is 
reasonably well-ordered is less clear. Perhaps it is, in whole or in part, a 
domestic issue for the country itself to sort out. 
 But if the indicator that a portion of the population falls below is not 
easily distinguished from others, things get more muddled. Let us say, for 
instance, that they suffer in high proportion from a tropical disease such as 
malaria (which I discuss in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6). Assume, 
again, that the population is otherwise above the threshold for a minimally 
decent life in the other indicators, but only just. In this case eradicating 
the disease might not only require a one-off effort to build a vital piece of 
infrastructure, but also setting up and maintaining a disease prevention 
and health system that requires a continuous commitment to providing 
resources at a level which the country, in its current state of development, 
simply cannot afford on its own. 
 This scenario would seem to present the internationalist theory with 
a dilemma. Hypothetically, what is required to overcome an immediate 
and serious threat to people’s basic health and livelihoods, clearly a barrier 
to living a decent life, could be a public health infrastructure that extends 
far beyond what international justice demands. But how can you plausibly 
argue that your duty of development has been successfully discharged if 
people are dying from preventable diseases? This links with the concern in 
                                                   
15 Risse, On Global Justice, 80–81. 
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Chapter 3, that well-orderedness does not by itself guarantee that a society 
will be able to run complex institutions without outside help. 
 Diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and leprosy often spread through 
countries that quite clearly fall below the threshold for well-orderedness. 
In particular, malaria is prevalent in the central regions of Africa south of 
the Sahara and north of the Kalahari Desert, where deep poverty is 
widespread. But many middle-income countries suffer from them as well. 
In South Africa, for instance, 323,000 people suffered from tuberculosis in 
2012, as did over 75,000 in Brazil, 330,000 in Indonesia and no less than 
1.3 million in India. Russia even had 105,000 cases. In India a further 
million suffered from malaria, as did two million in Indonesia and 
242,000 in Brazil. Almost 135,000 Indians had leprosy.16 When it comes to 
central African countries, many of whom rank among the poorest in the 
world, it is clear why internationalists think there is a duty of justice to 
assist them. But in the cases I mentioned above, it is less immediately 
obvious. 
 You may retort that the way to overcome these diseases is through 
targeted immunisation programmes and making medicines more widely 
available, and that this could be done cheaper and more effectively 
through, for instance, NGO and donor-run programmes without the need 
to set up a full public health infrastructure. Some programmes have 
achieved remarkable successes worldwide, not least the WHO-led polio 
eradication campaign, which has reduced the disease from an estimated 
                                                   
16 World Health Organization, “World Health Statistics 2014” (World Health 
Organization, 2014), 93–101. 
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350,000 cases in 1988 to just 416 in 2013.17 But conversely, the Ebola 
outbreak that hit several countries in West Africa in 2014 and 2015, 
infecting an estimated 24,000 people and costing 10,000 their lives, laid 
bare the extent to which a weak health system can put lives at risk on a 
massive scale. The World Health Organisation (WHO) particularly pointed 
to the healthcare system, and a lack of infrastructure and human 
resources, as contributing factors to the outbreak.18 At any rate, the right 
course of action depends on what is required to combat the particular 
health problem. Some will require heavy investments in health 
infrastructure, while others will not. But that would seem to be an 
arbitrary way of determining whether access to a cure is necessary for a 
minimally decent life. 
 Combined, these examples illustrate the human cost of keeping the 
threshold for what development requires very low. With a better developed 
healthcare system, the affected countries may have been in a better 
position to deal with the Ebola outbreak – although that is not an 
argument I will develop here. These examples point to a blind spot in the 
internationalist theory of global duties of justice. If, in order to secure 
some of the requirements for a minimally decent life, other requirements 
must be secured significantly beyond the minimum threshold, has the duty 
                                                   
17 World Health Organization, “Poliomyelitis,” Media Centre, 2014, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs114/en/. As of 2014 the disease which, 
due to its highly contagious nature, the WHO classify as an epidemic wherever it is 
found, has been reduced to just three countries: Nigeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
18 World Health Organization, “Vaccination Must Be Scaled up in Ebola-Affected 
Countries,” Media Centre, 2015, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2015/vaccination-ebola-countries/en/; 
World Health Organization, “Ebola Virus Disease,” Media Centre, 2015, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/. 
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to non-compatriots been successfully discharged if the latter are only just 
above it? 
 Probably not, you might argue, as in this case an important 
requirement will not be secure. But when the threat is not constant, as 
with grave political instability or the ever-present risk of contracting 
malaria, it is less clear. As we saw in Chapter 3, the goal of international 
justice on the internationalist interpretation is to provide only a minimal 
standard that separates the “tolerable from the intolerable.”19 Only the 
most basic needs are covered. There, I think, lies the crucial difference 
with Ebola, or any disease whose prevention rests on a fairly substantive 
health infrastructure to the point where it can hardly be considered basic 
health care any longer. Once the outbreak has begun you can of course say 
that people’s minimally decent lives are at risk and there is a strong justice 
imperative to help. But until that actually happens, so long as the risk is 
only potential, it is not clear that there is such an imperative. At one point 
you have to make a decision that the duty we owe to non-compatriots has 
been discharged. This highlights a tension in the internationalist 
argument: Concern for the basic wellbeing of the global poor is genuinely a 
matter of justice, but as we saw in Chapter 3 the theory is predicated 
strongly on the idea that the limits of justice must conceptually be set 
extremely low. 
 You could perhaps argue that from the moment burdened peoples 
become well-ordered, it is not that the individuals that still live in poverty 
no longer matter, but rather that it is the newly minted well-ordered 
                                                   
19 Miller, National Responsibility, 166. 
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state’s primary responsibility. But without any concern for how this people 
just newly above the threshold will actually be able to live up to it, the 
difference is hard to spot. We would, in effect, be wishing away the sorites 
paradox: Just as a heap with 1,000 grains of sand is indistinguishable from 
a heap with 999 grains, and that heap is indistinguishable from one with 
998 grains, so a society with 25% living below the threshold for a 
minimally decent life is indistinguishable from one with 24.99%, which in 
turn cannot be meaningfully told apart from one with 24.98%, and so on. 
It is pretty clear that two grains is not a heap and 10,000 grains is. 
Similarly, 5% living below the threshold for a minimally decent life may be 
small enough to conclusively say that the problem needs domestic 
solutions only. But regardless of whether, say, 20% or 25% is enough to 
warrant a concerted international effort, wherever your theory draws the 
line it will be arbitrary to some extent. 
 
4.4 Thought experiments 
 
 I now return to the first assumption of the two I outlined before, 
that the effect of change is felt uniformly across a society. I will here focus 
on one example in particular. This section will therefore largely take the 
form of an argument against the particular type of thought experiment 
used by Blake. 
 Throughout his work Blake uses the example of two fictitious 
countries, Syldavia and Borduria, to illustrate his examples. Although 
these countries appear many times throughout his book, each scenario is 
independent from the last, and the countries occasionally take turns being 
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the richer and more powerful partner. This has the effect of ensuring that 
we do not bring any prior knowledge into the thought experiment. The 
author has, in effect, granted himself a monopoly on knowledge of the 
relevant facts. I will argue that this fact is essential to understanding why 
his thought experiments have such intuitive appeal, and why their 
conclusions are ultimately problematic. 
Blake asks us to imagine an extremely wealthy society, Borduria, 
whose wealth mainly comes from being a tourist magnet for citizens of the 
neighbouring country, Syldavia. Syldavia then presents them with an 
ultimatum: Sign this treaty, or we will prevent our citizens from visiting 
your country. The effect of such a law could be a fall in per capita income 
by as much as 50%, but would still leave the Bordurians above the 
minimum global threshold, and would not put their status as a democratic, 
well-functioning government at risk. Has Syldavia committed an injustice? 
he asks, and concludes that it has not. Since the Bordurians are still a 
functioning autonomous system they may grumble about being coerced, 
but it is not ultimately a question of justice, unless we assume that 
societies have a right to maintain their current standard of living.20 
One of the neat things about imagined scenarios like this one is that 
they allow you to zoom in on the key relevant features, eliminating all 
others. Moreover, you are able to do away with the moral ambiguities that 
threaten to muddle your otherwise clear-cut argument. The problem, of 
course, is that these moral ambiguities do exist in the real world. Imagined 
scenarios like this one can therefore only tell us so much. 
                                                   
20 Blake, Justice and FP, 121–122. 
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Blake takes care to tell us at the outset that Borduria is not just well 
off, but “extremely” wealthy, and that even after the decimation of the 
tourism industry they will still be not just above the threshold for 
autonomous functioning, but “well” above it. 21  We can probably also 
assume that income inequality in Borduria is not great, and that no 
individual citizen stands to fall below the threshold as a result of Syldavia’s 
new foreign policy. 
The scenario therefore seems designed to ensure that the conclusion 
Blake reaches, that Syldavia’s policy is just, aligns as closely as possible 
with our moral intuitions. Perhaps, we might even think, Syldavia has 
legitimate reasons to be concerned with the amount of income lost in the 
casinos, hotels and restaurants of their neighbour. There is no indication 
of how wealthy Syldavia is, so we are free to imagine what we will. But now 
let us suppose instead that rather than being extremely wealthy, 
Bordurians are simply above the threshold by a comfortable margin, at 
least by global standards. They are, however, much poorer than the 
Syldavians, who count as one of the richest people on the planet. While 
failing to sign the treaty would still leave Bordurians above the threshold 
for autonomous functioning, it would only just do so, with very little 
margin left. 
Would this change the average person’s moral intuition about the 
justice of the case? I absolutely believe it would, but I am less convinced 
that it would make a difference to Blake’s argument. At least, I am not sure 
what difference it would make. 
                                                   
21 Ibid., 121. 
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Let us follow Blake’s line of reasoning for a minute, and construct 
our own thought experiment. Two countries, call them Superwealthia and 
Notasrichistan, are trade partners. But owing to the differences in 
economic clout, Notasrichistan is much more dependent on this trade than 
the Superwealthians are. They are, however, both well-ordered societies. 
The Superwealthians make the Notasrichistanians an offer they cannot 
refuse: “Open up your markets for our companies to import goods cheaply, 
potentially outcompeting your own industries, or we still stop supporting 
you financially.” If Notasrichistan chooses not to sign it will make them 
worse off, but not so much that their status as well-ordered is under 
threat. 
So far, nothing is substantially different from the Syldavia and 
Borduria case above. Both involve signing a deal with terms dictated by the 
side with more economic clout, but without coercion.22 Neither Borduria 
nor Notasrichistan face any sanctions should they refuse to sign, only the 
withdrawal of offers and privileges that Syldavia and Superwealthia were 
under no obligation to grant in the first place. They have, in Blake’s optics, 
done nothing wrong. 
Let us now bring these examples into the real world, as I reveal that 
Superwealthia is in fact the USA, and Notasrichistan is South Africa. This 
is still a thought experiment, and I do not expect it to necessarily bear any 
resemblance to how US-South African foreign relations are actually carried 
out. (In fact, I would be rather surprised if they did.) Nonetheless, by 
                                                   
22 Blake understands coercion narrowly. If one country “stands a significant risk of 
failing to achieve the rights guaranteed to its citizens on one half of the […] proposal, 
then to offer that and pretend it is not coercive is simply an implausible account of 
coercion.” However, the fact that one country stands to lose from a deal, whether they 
choose to sign it or not, is not by itself evidence of coercion (Ibid., 120). 
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putting some skin on the bones of this experiment we are better able to 
test if Blake’s hypothesis holds up. This is because, while Bordurians are 
no less real to our minds than aliens or numbers on a piece of paper, we 
can imagine what it is like to be a poor South African, and we can imagine 
what the effects of policies will be on the individual members of that 
society, in a way that we are excluded from doing with the Bordurians. 
South Africa is, even more so than India, a country which, despite 
being a developing country, falls comfortably enough within Rawls’s 
criteria for well-orderedness. It is not rich by any global standards, but 
wealth is not a criteria for well-orderedness. 23  It is democratic with 
regular, free and fair elections, a robust constitution and rule of law, and 
strong freedom of speech and of the press.24 It also has a per capita GDP 
(PPP) of $13,100 as of 2014, a strong financial sector and good 
infrastructure.25 It is, in many respects, a middle-income country. 
But there is a darker side to this shiny coin. The unemployment rate 
stands at 25.1%, considerably higher for the black youth,26 and with 20.2% 
of the population living in extreme poverty and a further 25.3% in 
moderate poverty, the state often struggles to provide necessary and 
adequate services for its citizens.27 In addition, millions of refugees, many 
of them economic refugees from Zimbabwe, place an increasing strain on 
its public finances and fuels harmful anti-immigrant rhetoric and 
                                                   
23 Rawls, LP, 106–107. 
24 Freedom House, “South Africa,” Freedom In The World, 2015, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/south-africa. 
25 Central Intelligence Agency, “South Africa,” The World Factbook, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html. 
26 Ibid. 
27 South Africa.info, “Poverty Levels in South Africa Dropping: Report,” 2014, 
http://www.southafrica.info/about/social/poverty-040414.htm. 
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violence.28 The US set aside US$ 486.2 million to South Africa in 2014, 
almost all of which was spent on health.29 
So the US presents South Africa with an ultimatum:30  “Sign our 
treaty, or we will cut off development assistance.” This would risk de-
funding programmes that keep the poorest children in school, vaccinated, 
fed, or kept warm during the winter. Even if the effect were limited to, say, 
1% of the population dropping from moderate to extreme poverty, almost 
600,000 people would suffer extreme poverty as a result. Even if the effect 
would be small enough not to threaten democracy, rule of law or the 
financial or physical infrastructure so there was no risk of South Africa 
losing its well-ordered status, I think most people would agree that 
600,000 people descending into extreme poverty is a serious moral 
concern. 
Should we feel any differently about this case than we would about 
Superwealthia and Notasrichistan, or about Syldavia and Borduria? 
Following Blake’s logic to the end, I think the conclusion has to be that we 
should not. The US does nothing unjust in demanding this deal. Of course, 
I am here assuming that in leaving out any consideration of the 
distribution of wealth within a country, Blake considers it more or less 
                                                   
28 Jonathan Crush and Godfrey Tawodzera, “Medical Xenophobia and Zimbabwean 
Migrant Access to Public Health Services in South Africa,” Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 40, no. 4 (2014): 655–70. 
29 US Government, “South Africa,” ForeignAssistance.gov, 2015, 
http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/OU.aspx?OUID=174&FY=2013&AgencyID=0. 
30 You might here object that the development assistance the US provides is an 
obligation, and that it would therefore be unjust for them to retract it regardless of the 
circumstances. They certainly have a duty of development assistance. The US have not 
signed up to the pledge to spend 0.7% of GDP on overseas development aid, and indeed 
do not come close to it. They currently spend 0.2% (Development Initiatives, 
“Investments to End Poverty” (Bristol: Development Initiatives, 2013), 216). But if South 
Africa is well-ordered it is not clear why the US have a duty to assist them specifically, 
rather then even poorer countries. US development assistance to South Africa could 
arguably, then, be considered a gesture of goodwill instead. 
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irrelevant to the point he is making. I cannot say for sure if that is correct, 
but I think it is the conclusion that follows most closely from his argument. 
But the domestic distribution of wealth matters a lot, and my example 
points to a gap. 
 By focusing on whether societies rather than individuals are well-
off, we effectively downplay the inequalities that exist within them, and we 
ignore the fact that foreign policies of any nature, whether relating to 
trade, protectionism, capital investment or flight, or diplomacy more 
generally, do not have uniform consequences throughout society. By the 
low standards of well-orderedness that internationalists espouse, countries 
will almost always progress to that stage before all individuals within them 
secure a minimally decent existence. There might be a point at which it 
predominantly becomes a question for each country to sort out for itself. I 
think most would intuitively agree. But it is important to agree why. Either 
it is because they no longer matter, which would of course be an absurd 
proposition. Or else it is because at one point we recognise that although 
we still care deeply about those people as a matter of justice, we are no 
longer in the best position to deal with their problems, given that the most 
effective long-term solutions to poverty come from within. This change in 
focus of responsibility will likely take place along a sliding scale of sorts. It 
will be a very difficult task to work out quite what the responsibilities will 
be at different stages. (That is perhaps for a later project to work out.) 
 Nonetheless, the conceptual simplicity underpinning this thought 
experiment prevents us identifying this problem. This, I think, highlights 
the problem of putting too much stock in thought experiments completely 
detached from the real world, when we are trying to work out what we 
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ought to do in the real world. The effect is to endorse a view of justice 
whereby once you have set a global minimum requirement, there are no 
more duties outside of those set by your conception of international justice 
more generally. Unless that conception includes a commitment to being 
sensitive to the effects of global inequalities, which internationalist global 
justice does not, this view seems intuitively unjust. Whether intentional or 
not, Syldavia and Borduria paint over some very important moral 
considerations in the name of conceptual simplicity. But the world is more 
complex than that. 
 
4.5 Demands of reasonableness 
 
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 I outlined two problems with the way 
internationalists sharply drew up the distinction between burdened and 
well-ordered societies. They both point to the possibility of a conflict 
between what justice requires internationally and what it requires 
domestically, when it is unclear when one ends and the other begins. 
 How can these conflicts be resolved? Risse offers an approach that 
seems to have the potential to solve them at the level of practicality, but 
without disturbing the philosophically more troubling assertion that a 
separate list of global obligations exist on either side of the sharp dividing 
line between developed and non-developed countries. Instead, he suggests 
that there might be a demand of reasonable conduct that may apply in this 
case: 
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Let us say that anything that can reasonably be expected of us 
is a “demand of reasonable conduct.” “There is a demand of 
reasonable conduct on person P to perform action A” is then 
equivalent to “P can be reasonably expected to do A,” as well 
as to “It would be unreasonable for P not to do A.” 
Obligations of justice are demands of reasonable conduct, and 
particularly stringent ones, but they are not the only ones.31 
 
 On a purely philosophical level this approach might seem 
unsatisfactory, as it fails to solve the problem of what our duties are, 
leaving a rather fuzzy middle-ground. Yet I suspect that the fuzziness is a 
feature rather than a bug. It could enable us to argue that some things 
ought to be done, at least in normal times, even if they are not the kind of 
absolute moral demands that rights are. 
 You might then say that although, for instance, it is not a duty of 
justice to help disease-prone countries develop their healthcare systems to 
better deal with potentially devastating outbreaks, to raise global 
education levels or to give some trade advantages to some countries, there 
is nonetheless a duty of reasonableness. Or, if we return to my previous 
scenario, we might then say that although the Superwealthians do not have 
a duty of justice not to impose their deal on the Nonasrichistanians, they 
nonetheless have a duty of reasonableness to at least take the interests of 
the other party into account. Reasonableness, then, goes further than 
demands of justice in terms of its scope, while not containing that crucial 
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feature of duties of justice, that they can only be subordinate to other, 
more demanding or more immediate, duties of justice. 
There is a degree of intuitive appeal to this answer. In our own lives 
we usually distinguish between the things that it is reasonable to refrain 
from doing, and the things that are downright forbidden. We might say 
that someone has acted wrongfully even if they have not technically done 
anything wrong, by acting against common understandings of 
reasonableness. But it also highlights one possible weakness. In our lives 
the consequences of acting unreasonably can be significant. Even if we will 
not run into trouble with the law we risk losing respectability and harming 
our social standing, which in turn could harm our friendships or career 
prospects. Hence, most people will comply with these demands of 
reasonableness even if there are no formal requirement for us to do so. It 
is not immediately clear to me that there is the same imperative for states 
to live up to demands of reasonableness. Not that failing to follow accepted 
norms will not have consequences; they could be severe. But states 
nonetheless have the option not to follow the norms in a way that 
individuals cannot. Whether self-interestedness is an inevitable feature of 
the system, as realists claim, or a result of how the players choose to play 
the game, as critics contend, the end result is the same. It is not clear how 
states would feel compelled to live up to vague duties of reasonableness 
when, (a) they are explicitly not duties of justice, and they cannot therefore 
be held to account when breaking them, and (b) the kinds of legally 
enforced close inter-personal ties that ensure individuals’ co-operation in 
a domestic structure have no comparison in the international arena. 
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There is another, potentially more devastating, problem at a deeper 
conceptual level. Internationalists agree that global justice takes lexical 
priority over duties of domestic justice. But duties of justice generally take 
precedence over other concerns, both domestically and internationally. In 
some cases demands of reasonableness might, according to some, 
command us to continue to offer substantial amounts (whether money, 
natural resources, human resources, etc.) even after the target country (or 
a majority of its citizens) has attained a minimally decent life. But others 
will argue that, the demands of justice having been met internationally, the 
resources must be spent on the worst off within the donor country, even if 
those people are still much better off than the global poor. Remember that 
domestically the concern is with relative poverty. Absolute poverty, 
arguably, does not feature as part of a domestic theory of justice, as 
absolute poverty in a well-ordered society is simply a particularly 
egregious form of relative poverty. There is therefore, in principle, no limit 
to what claims of justice can override international duties of 
reasonableness. If the lexical ordering of principles is maintained, any 
domestic inequality will take precedence over global concerns of any 
nature, above the minimum threshold for justice. 
 Who wins out? Which claim is more pressing? As Chris Armstrong 
points out, it is by no means clear what happens if nations violate moral 
standards of reasonableness in the name of domestic justice.32 Risse seems 
primarily concerned with immigration rights, and does not seem to 
consider other problems with this principle. 
                                                   
32 Chris Armstrong, “Global Justice between Minimalism and Egalitarianism,” Political 
Theory 42, no. 1 (2014): 119–29. 
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 What is clear is that the point at which demands of justice do 
potentially transition into demands of reasonableness depends on the cut-
off point at which a society ceases to be burdened and becomes well-
ordered. As we saw in Chapter 3, there is disagreement about when this is, 
as it depends on whether we should properly be concerned for the welfare 
of individuals or for the stability of a society. In the former the duty will be 
much more demanding, and the dilemma Risse outlines seems less 
pertinent. In the latter the duty is less demanding, but the potential scope 
for duties of reasonableness is much greater. Perhaps, though that is an 
argument for another day, it is more plausible to say that there is both a 
duty of concern for the stability of burdened societies, and for the well-
being of individuals in them, each of which carry their own responsibilities 
and will be discharged in different ways. 
 
4.6 The crutch of self-respect 
 
As I showed in Chapter 3, we can reasonably extend our definition 
of basic needs to encompass things well beyond what is necessary for basic 
survival, to access to basic education, nutrition and some forms of health 
care, and move towards more encompassing ideas of basic needs necessary 
to live a flourishing life. Could you nonetheless insist that basic needs 
defined not in those terms, but in terms of what can be required in 
assistance from most developed countries, are much less demanding? 
Richard Miller suggests that the answer is yes. Indeed, citizens of 
developing countries would not want anything more, because they desire 
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national self-respect and self-determination. Starting his argument at the 
personal level, he says: 
 
Still, people can lead lives truly their own when they lack 
access to a flourishing national university, live in small 
quarters, and have possessions much sparser than nearly all 
Americans’. To deny that someone in Mali could live a 
satisfactory life as a result of an intelligent choice to become a 
farmer, craftsman or shopkeeper with an income that is a 
small fraction of the American average is inaccurate and 
insulting. The overcoming of such limits is not, as such, a goal 
of the acquired responsibility for development.33 
 
 This, R. Miller is at pains to stress, does not mean that basic needs 
will be satisfied by mere physical survival. In particular, political 
institutions that guarantee security and stability are essential. 
Nonetheless, there are limits to the responsibility of concern, which are 
defined by the need to balance the fulfilment of basic needs with due 
weight given to national self-respect and self-reliance: 
 
The concern is residual because the acceptance that must be 
sought by the responsible structural adjuster is acceptance 
compatible with self-respect. Self-respecting people in a 
sovereign country prefer self-reliance, both individual and 
                                                   
33 Miller, Globalizing Justice, 156. 
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collective, to outside help. They want to be able to take pride 
in their own accomplishments. They favor collective efforts 
that express the proper valuing of ongoing relationships by 
displaying special concern corresponding to the inherent 
value of interpersonal ties. These ties largely bind within 
borders and do not include subordination to the American 
empire. Self-respect induces a strong preference for 
reciprocity, the ultimate, wholehearted return of important 
benefits. Such reciprocity is sustained by ongoing projects of 
willing cooperation within developing countries, not by 
processes of foreign help.34 
 
 There is a lot to be commended in the stringent, albeit not that far-
reaching, duty of assistance that R. Miller lays out. Nonetheless, some 
issues scream out for clarification. They are not mere philosophical trifles 
about the merits of various cut-off points and approaches to development, 
but questions that cut to the heart of what development is. These questions 
will need to be answered before we can be satisfied that we have a coherent 
theory of international duties on our hands. I will return to these issues 
shortly. 
 On a more basic level there seems to be something profoundly odd 
about R. Miller’s suggestion, however. As he is primarily concerned with 
setting out what the responsibilities of the rich, developed world is, the 
most plausible interpretation is that the limitations that result from this 
                                                   
34 Ibid., 155. 
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principle should be placed on the donor countries. He is therefore, in 
effect, arguing that out of concern for the self-respect and self-reliance of 
the recipient country, the donor should refuse to offer help past a certain 
point. This is self-contradictory. Accepting that it is true that too much aid 
would be damaging to a country’s self-respect, it makes little sense for the 
donor to decide when that point has been reached. We can imagine a 
developing country at one point saying, “even though we are still relatively 
poor by global standards we are now well enough off that everyone lives a 
satisfactory life. Now, our self-reliance as a people becomes more 
important, and we do not want to receive any more assistance.” But that 
has to be their decision. Precisely out of respect for their self-
determination, we in the developed countries cannot dictate when that 
point comes. Otherwise we are imposing the very kind of paternalism we 
are trying to avoid. 
 But taking R. Miller’s concern as valid, let us look closer at his 
argument. Notice the subtle rhetorical trick he employs in equating the 
“process of foreign help” with “subordination to the American empire”. 
That seems to me a rather large, unjustified step. The fact that he zeroes in 
on the US is not significant here, except insofar as he articulates a 
particularly American understanding of what independence and self-
reliance entail. His book consistently uses American examples to illustrate 
his points throughout, and you may read “Britain”, “France”, “Portugal”, 
and so on, as applicable. Nonetheless, the implication seems to be that at 
least some degree of coercive subjection from the donor country is an 
inherent part of the process of outside help. 
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 He thereby implicitly excludes the possibility that outside assistance 
can take place in non-subordinate, democratically accountable and 
genuinely beneficial ways. While it may often be the case that in practice 
an aid programme is paternalistic and undemocratic, it is a rather different 
proposition to say that they are so by their very nature. In another context 
Nickel accuses Rawls of taking one important role played by human rights 
– determining if interventions are justified or not – and making it central 
to the argument without considering other possible roles or combinations 
of roles.35 It seems that R. Miller makes the same logical error by taking an 
admittedly genuine concern, the self-respect of societies, and making it the 
overarching concern above all others. He therefore fails to consider what 
other goals apart from preserving their self-respect they might have, or 
whether they derive their self-respect from different sources. 
 Another problematic assumption is that the interpersonal ties which 
matter so greatly to the population are neatly defined across all sections of 
the developing country in question. That may be true (albeit not perfectly 
at all) in largely homogeneous countries or those, like the UK, with a 
strong sense of patriotism and common sense of purpose that tie people 
together across ethnicities and languages. It is less obvious that this 
should be true in largely fragmented countries without a strong central 
state or a strong sense of national belonging. 
Imagine a country that has a large proportion of people living in 
very poor conditions, but is otherwise well-ordered and ruled in the 
interest of its citizenry. It is becoming richer, with a growing middle class, 
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and the proportion of the population living in absolute poverty is falling 
steadily. Brazil might be a good example of this kind of development. A 
middle-income country with a GDP per capita of almost $11,700, the 
absolute poverty rate of Brazil is 8.9% as of 2013, down from 14.1% in 
2008.36 The developed world might be able to speed up the process of 
bringing the remaining poor out of poverty through systematic assistance. 
(That is an empirical assertion that I cannot address right now.) Out of a 
concern for national self-respect, however, it would seem that we should 
not. Helping their fellow citizens out of poverty is precisely the kind of 
shared project that will enable the people of the country to take pride in 
their collective accomplishments. But is there any reason to assume 
without prior investigation, for instance, that the Northern regions would 
not also prefer to get ahead by their own efforts, rather than depend on the 
more prosperous South? Or that the same would not be true of the rural 
populations versus the urban, or the descendants of slaves or of the 
indigenous population versus the descendants of white settlers? In the 
specific case of Brazil it is probably unlikely that groups within it should 
feel so fiercely individualistic that they would reject help from other 
groups within the society even if they valued independence and self-
respect in the way R. Miller suggests they should. But there is no reason to 
expect that to necessarily be true in all cases. Many Scots seem to prefer to 
go it alone rather than remain tied up with England. And some African 
countries, perhaps most notably the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
could plausibly lack many of the common sympathies that citizens in a 
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shared state are supposed to have. The question, then, is to what extent 
these common sympathies can really to be said to be integral to statehood. 
And if not, are they guaranteed to develop naturally? And what if they do 
not? And perhaps more importantly, if they form as part of a concerted 
effort within a society, what is to say that they could not also develop, as 
part of an equally concerted effort, across borders? 
But perhaps, you might object, this is only a relevant concern for so-
called middle-income countries. But R. Miller does in fact make quite clear 
how low the point at which this becomes a concern is. In arguing against a 
tripling of development assistance over a ten-year period, suggested by the 
economist Jeffrey Sachs in 2005, R. Miller expresses concern that it will 
hamper the self-reliance, as everywhere “people properly prefer to get 
ahead by their own efforts and, if they need help, properly prefer it from 
those to whom they are bound by symmetrical ties of family or civic 
obligation.”37 To put that into perspective, Development Initiative estimate 
that in 2013 Kenya, reasonably stable but still very poor, received US$ 
66.40 per person, less than 18¢ per person per day. As Kenya’s 
government currently spends $424.03 per person each year,38 so a 200% 
increase in development assistance could see that number increased to 
$556. This is hardly a radical transformation of Kenya’s fortunes. Yet, it 
seems, this would be enough to raise red flags. 
 Of course you might charitably argue that if some of the countries 
that receive a disproportionately high amount of aid were to have their 
donations tripled, the effect would be to hamper their sense of self-reliance 
                                                   
37 Miller, Globalizing Justice, 221. 
38 Development Initiatives, “Investments to End Poverty,” 50. 
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in a morally important way. On this reading R. Miller points to an area 
where the effects of such a policy on certain countries is grounds for 
concern. Even assuming, for the sake of the argument, that this is a 
genuine worry, this kind of reasoning would not hold up. The proposal to 
which R. Miller objects is to triple the total donations made by the 
developed world. We must assume they would be distributed through a 
scheme designed to maximise their effectiveness, presumably by 
prioritising the poorest.39 
 R. Miller’s motivations aside, however, I think the assumption that 
self-reliance is as all-important as he makes it out to be can be challenged 
on a deeper level. It rests on a particular reading of nationality, one borne 
out of a particular (and particularly) Western school of thought which goes 
back as far as Thomas Hobbes’ and John Locke’s contrasting visions of the 
State of Nature, as well as the canonical work of John Stuart Mill, 
emphasising a unique form of political self-reliance. 40  Whereas this 
assumption is largely taken to be self-evident and universal by R. Miller,41 
                                                   
39 The way US aid is currently distributed, some countries receive a disproportionate 
amount, closely linked with their strategic importance. Thus Israel, a highly developed 
country, is the single biggest recipient. And Afghanistan and Pakistan, though genuinely 
counting among the world’s poorest, receive money far in excess of what countries with 
similar levels of poverty receive (United States Government, “Congressional Budget 
Justification: Foreign Assitance Summary Tables, Fiscal Year 2015,” State.gov, 2015, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/224071.pdf). You can criticize this policy 
from many different angles. A strong case could be made that by subordinating 
assistance to military and geopolitical interests the US do more harm than good. Or, as I 
argue in Chapter 6, assistance will likely do more good if skewed towards countries that 
are stable and have reasonably well-functioning institutions. In either case, tripling aid 
levels without first addressing the underlying issues would, indeed, would be very bad 
idea. But not for the reason R. Miller suggests. His reasoning is deontological; it would 
be wrong to increase assistance beyond a certain point, full stop. The reasons I suggest 
are epistemic; it would be wrong to do so, immediately and across the board, under 
current conditions. 
40 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1968); Locke, Second Treatise; John 
Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
41 As indeed is the norm in most modern political theory, according to Will Kymlicka and 
Christina Straehle, “Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism: A 
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Anthony Smith points out how the need for self-sufficiency is inextricably 
tied up with a Western sense of the nation, whereby the “homeland 
becomes a repository of historic memories and associations,” and the 
“land’s resources also become exclusive to the people; they are not for 
‘alien’ use and exploitation. The national territory must become self-
sufficient. Autarky is as much a defence of sacred homelands as of 
economic interests.”42 
 The question, so far left unexplored, is how far these values are truly 
universal so that, for instance, the poor Malian farmer in R. Miller’s 
example earlier can be said to (a) share the same sense of belonging to a 
nation (or people), (b) share the same understanding of what national self-
reliance means, and (c) place as much importance on it relative to other 
needs and desires he may have for himself, his family and his community. 
Smith cautions us to be sceptical. The modern state, idealised by Rawls as 
a nation-state even if few states live up to that description,43 is a relatively 
recent European invention, dating back only a few hundred years. 
Moreover, while in Europe the nation initially emerged by chance as 
political associations of convenience grew over time – with nationalism 
only to follow much later – in the rest of the world nations were largely the 
result of concerted efforts and nationalist movements.44 But given that this 
nationalism was often fuelled by anti-colonial settlement with little 
                                                                                                                                                 
Critical Review of Recent Literature,” European Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 1 (1999): 
65. 
42 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), 9–10. 
43 Smith distinguishes between the state as the political structure, and the nation as an 
ethnic or cultural association. Only where there is a near-perfect overlap can the term 
nation-state be applied. Ibid., 9–14. 
44 Ibid., 100. 
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purpose or agenda outside of seeing the backs of the imperialist powers,45 
you have to wonder if these emerging nations are truly national in the 
sense R. Miller implies. Add to that the fact that in many cases nationalist 
sentiment had to be established quickly after independence, whereas it has 
developed slowly and gradually over centuries in Europe and Asia. Peer 
Vries, for instance, argues that for the first several hundred years West 
European states were primarily consolidated among a small elite of rulers, 
administrators, lawyers and merchants in the upper echelons of society. 
The process of modernisation by which states came to be as we know them 
today, pervasive and efficient, only took off in the 18th century and 
gathered steam in the 19th century, as a result of increased inter-state 
competition brought about by the industrial revolution. Even then, the 
process and speed of consolidation varied greatly from country to 
country.46 
 The upshot is that self-determination can mean many different 
things to the ordinary citizen. At the very least, therefore, R. Miller would 
have to theorise how that fact influences the relationship between the 
dependencies and the former colonisers. Here I will list just four possible 
different conceptions of group identity, out of a potentially infinite number 
of possibilities. I will not attempt to make any judgment as to which is 
more likely, in part because it falls far outside my area of expertise, and in 
part because I strongly suspect that some will apply in some cases while 
others will apply in others. But that is precisely the point: Self-respect and 
                                                   
45 Ibid., 111. 
46 Peer H.H. Vries, “Governing Growth: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the State 
in the Rise of the West,” Journal of World History 13, no. 1 (2002): 67–138. 
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group identity cannot readily be treated as monolithic and immutable 
across different settings. 
 First, members of a people might see themselves not primarily (or at 
least not only) as members of a national group, but of several others at 
once. These need not be competing identities, but could just as well be 
complimentary. They could be local: Family, town, community; or 
international: Pan-Africanism, global feminist solidarity, a sense of affinity 
with the global poor and disenfranchised. Others again may be both local 
and global at the same time: A Christian or a Muslim may at the same time 
feel a strong sense of belonging to their local place of worship and the 
community that surrounds it, while feeling a sense of affinity with the 
global community of Christians or Muslims. Each of these identities has 
the potential to carry with it its own sense of belonging and a sense of 
pride in the achievements of one’s community, and concern for the well-
being of others who share in it. It is by no means clear that the national 
identity is the only one that is able to foster strong feelings of communal 
self-respect. Common examples include “minority-nations” that try to 
maintain their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness and resist 
assimilation into the dominant culture of their country.47 
 Second, for many people the kind of identity R. Miller talks about, 
rooted in pride in a collective national project, may simply not play the 
role he thinks. Take for example the context of soft power, which unlike 
traditional “hard” power cannot be imposed from above, but requires some 
degree of willingness on both sides. It is not immediately clear that people 
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in the developing world as a whole prefer a vague concept like national 
independence to, say, a more Western, or simply more affluent, life-style.48 
In other words, does the collective self-respect of peoples necessarily stand 
and fall with national economic and political self-reliance? I am not sure. 
 Third, you have to consider whether the importance R. Miller places 
on self-reliance as a value in itself (if only for its instrumental value, in 
enabling self-respect) is really as clear cut as he makes it out to be. Within 
feminist theory, care ethics have emphasised “‘dependency’ and 
‘vulnerability’ not as conditions to be overcome, but rather as ways of 
being for normal human subjects.”49 It thus recasts dependency not as 
something shameful to be avoided, or indicative of a lesser moral standing 
or worth, but as something that is a natural part of life. For individuals 
this is obviously the case in childhood and old age, but also during periods 
of illness which most people will experience at some point in their lives. 
Conversely, in some periods of a person’s life their self-respect will be 
inextricably tied up not with their independence, but with their role as 
dependable providers of care to others, during pregnancy and parenthood 
and, depending on the cultural norms present, when relatives are old or 
sick, or otherwise in need of care. By contrast, the default conception of a 
person in modern liberal thought is typically a sound-minded, rational 
individual, implicitly male, adult, able-bodied, and white; or at least not in 
a position where his status as a respected and valued member of society is 
                                                   
48 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: 
PublicAffairs, 2004). 
49 Fiona Robinson, “Stop Talking and Listen: Discourse Ethics and Feminist Care Ethics 
in International Political Theory,” Millennium 39, no. 3 (2011): 847. 
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questioned, or his voice within it stifled, because of features beyond his 
control. 
 To Fiona Robinson there is a similar blindness to the role of care in 
the international stage. The assumption, in part inspired by dependency 
theorists’ focus on neo-colonial relations between the global North and 
South, is that the goal must be to eliminate dependency so that a formal 
equality, or at least the appearance of it, can be established. This, she 
argues, is papering over the cracks and failing to understand the 
fundamental nature of the relationship between countries. While formal 
equality between countries might be realisable, it will not be actual 
equality. Richer and more powerful countries will always be above the 
poorer and less powerful ones. The question, then, is not how to achieve 
equality, but how to manage the dependency that naturally exists to the 
benefit of all.50 
 Moreover, it risks casting the donor exclusively as the agent, 
reducing the recipient to a passive member with no agency of their own. 
This need not be the case. For instance, rather than passively receiving 
assistance from the outside, the recipient could be an active part of the 
process, using those donations to transform their society and benefit their 
fellow citizens – and deriving their self-respect from it. Citizens of least 
developed countries are not passive recipients. Whether money is given 
directly to governments or to non-governmental organisations on the 
ground, local agents are part of the process; almost always as the hands 
that carry out the work, and very often as an integral part of the process of 
                                                   
50 Ibid., 855. 
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deciding where resources should be spent.51 While the positive effects of 
participation on development outcomes may not always be obvious, this is 
a problem of implementation, and should not be seen to detract from the 
normative value of participation in itself.52 The picture of local agents as 
passive is, more often than not, inaccurate. From personal experience, 
through my brief stint working at ActionAid Nepal on an education project 
in 2012, I saw first-hand the importance that local staff and stakeholders 
played in all parts of the process of allocating and spending money on 
projects. 
 And finally, you might ask if the change from burdened to well-
ordered society is not, in fact, a lot more fraught with danger than this 
school of thought would suggest, and would necessitate a particularly 
strong international response to manage the transition peacefully. It seems 
that transitions are often particularly dangerous times for emerging 
democracies, when wealth creates tensions and the upheavals of old power 
structures play havoc with the political and monetary fortunes of the 
established elites. As plenty of examples have shown, when the burgeoning 
seeds of democracy threaten to push through the dense undergrowth of 
vested interests and established practices, violence risks spreading like a 
forest fire. Or mushrooms on a dewy field. Or devil’s grass. You get the 
gist. While surely no one would claim that violence follows automatically 
from democratisation, Mansfield and Snyder nonetheless caution us 
against assuming that the road to stability is always smooth. Depending on 
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52 Ibid., 1245. 
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the level of development and extent of civic and political norms and 
institutions, the process may be relatively smooth or fraught with 
difficulty.53 
 In making this last point I do not intend to make an argument either 
for or against supporting democratic transitions, nor for or against 
interventionist foreign policies in the name of either stability or 
democratisation. That is clearly a debate for another time. What I am 
simply saying is that, as far as heuristics go, “peoples will always prefer 
self-reliance” is a fairly implausible one.  
To finish the section it is worth zooming out a bit. When Rawls talks 
about peoples he is making a claim about ideal theory. He is creating a 
useful illusion of a simplified world to establish guiding principles of 
justice under ideal circumstances, in part for the sake of conceptual 
simplicity. He leaves the discussion of burdened societies to the section on 
non-ideal theory, and although we are given only a sketch outline of his 
thoughts on the matter he is at least clear that the question of what is owed 
to the world’s poorest lies squarely within the realm of the non-ideal.54 
This should make us cautious about carrying assumptions about 
ideal theory directly over into the non-ideal. Of course, the term “burdened 
society” is not one R. Miller employs. Still, his conception of the societies 
in need of help are similar. He imagines them as essentially well-ordered 
in all relevant ways, except that they lack the wealth and government 
infrastructure necessary to count as well-ordered. In this particular case 
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54 As evidenced by the fact the whole discussion takes place in a section entitled 
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they are imagined to possess the sense of patriotic pride, often associated 
with statehood, that is common in the Western and developed world. 
Is this a fair assumption? I do not see how it can be. Even if such 
pride is the norm in the West, and particularly in the US where R. Miller 
hails from, it does not follow that it must be part and parcel of any well-
ordered society. 
Perhaps it would seem to follow naturally from what Rawls says? If 
burdened societies are defined by their lack of wealth and good 
institutions, it might seem to be implied that they are essentially well-
ordered in all other respects. This is not a claim that Rawls explores at all, 
but many critics have questioned if well-ordered peoples display even a 
fraction of what he attributes to them. Lea Ypi, for instance, suggests that 
Rawls gets wrong what he should be ideal and non-ideal about: In being 
ideal about what peoples look like (liberal, or at least well-ordered, nation-
states) but non-ideal about the global structure (composed of nations with 
near-perfect sovereignty under rules closely resembling what already 
exists) he gets it the wrong way around. Instead he should have been non-
ideal about states (not all reasonable, with no universal overlap between 
cultural and political communities) and ideal about what the international 
system could look like, given those facts.55 
If there are good reasons to think that Rawls’s idealised notion of 
societies are a step too far even when just dealing with liberal democracies, 
there are even better reasons to think they do not apply to countries that 
are much poorer, arguably less socially coherent, and perhaps most 
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importantly, have not had modern conceptions of statehood modelled on 
them. What this discussion shows, then, is that you have to be really 
careful about what assumptions you allow to be carried forth into different 
philosophical scenarios. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has sought to challenge the idea, implicit in the 
Rawlsian internationalist argument, that the duty towards burdened 
societies is a neatly demarcated one, both in terms of its lexical priority to 
domestic duties and in terms of societies falling clearly into the categories 
of burdened or well-ordered, without any overlap between the two. 
 Section 4.2 started out by asking whether there is a conflict between 
duties of development assistance and duties to compatriots. 
Internationalists argue that there is not. Section 4.3, however, suggested 
that this view relies on a dichotomous oversimplification, implicitly 
assuming that countries are either fully in or fully out of the categories of 
burdened and well-ordered societies. This, I argued, squares very poorly 
with the fact that several countries in the world display some of the 
features of burdenedness and some of well-orderedness, not fitting neatly 
into either category. That then gave way to a discussion, in Section 4.4, 
about the way this simplification comes into play in the thought 
experiments of Blake: That one country does not do anything wrong by 
coercing another into an agreement so long as the measures threatened, 
were they carried out, would not leave the country below a threshold. This 
argument becomes less convincing when the stylised fictional countries of 
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Blake’s thought experiment are replaced with actual countries in the 
world, for which things like poverty, health and aid statistics are available 
and the consequences of the threatened measures can be estimated. 
Section 4.5 briefly considered the idea that there could be a demand of 
reasonableness in such cases, which put a burden on the wealthy countries 
that nonetheless fall short of a requirement of justice. 
 Section 4.6 challenged the other simplification, that our concern for 
self-respect and self-determination must necessarily compel us to limit aid 
to a low cut-off, as any additional assistance would compromise their self-
determination. I argued that this notion of self-respect makes the mistake 
of universalising a particularly Western conception of what it means to 
belong to a nation-state, and that depending on the country they may have 
a different understanding of what self-respect entails and what the value of 
self-determination is. 
 This and the preceding chapters conclude, for now, the normative 
argument for an expanded duty of development. But it is still possible to 
concede that the duty of development is as I claim, in theory, but that 
there are nonetheless powerful reasons not to engage in carrying it out: 
That empirical facts about what causes development and what wealthy 
countries can do to affect it from abroad suggest the task is extremely 
difficult. That is where the argument proceeds next. 
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Chapter 5 – The Role of Institutions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 To refresh our memories: The tenet which, following Risse, I will 
call the “institutional thesis”1 or “institutionalism” holds that the main 
cause of economic development, and therefore of countries’ ability to 
escape the status of “burdened society”, is the quality of their institutions. 
Rawls, too, builds the principles of the duty of development assistance in 
part on this idea.2 The features of those institutions, moreover, are highly 
endogenous, stemming from causes that are rooted in the history and 
political and social culture of each society — things which are not very 
malleable and, at any rate, very difficult to influence from the outside. 
Therefore, it is implied that “institutions possess: (1) explanatory power to 
account for differential socio-political outcomes in different contexts; (2) 
prescriptive power that makes them the solution to socio-political 
problems across nations.”3 
 The premise has immense consequences for the overall theory, for 
the moral requirement to help burdened countries is more than 
theoretical. It has direct policy application. Moreover, since this duty does 
not presuppose any fundamental changes in the current makeup of the 
                                                   
1 Risse, “How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?” 
2 Rawls, LP, 108. 
3 S.N. Sangmpam, “Politics Rules: The False Primacy of Institutions in Developing 
Countries,” Political Studies 55, no. 1 (2007): 201. 
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international political scene, it is an immediate one whose applicability 
must be considered in the context of the world as it is. 
 It is hard to argue against the objection that, if there are strong 
reasons to think that the task of aiding development in burdened societies 
is an extremely difficult one, our responsibility to act is diminished 
accordingly. Ought implies can, as the old cliché goes, and any moral 
requirement must be tempered by practical feasibility. 
 The institutional thesis must therefore stand and fall on empirical 
evidence. It holds up if the primacy of institutions can be proven to be a 
reasonable assertion across a wide range of country cases. This entails two 
different proofs. First, that the institutions have a direct influence on 
growth that cannot be replicated or augmented by other factors. And 
second, that the causes of good institutions themselves are of a first order, 
meaning they are not down to exogenous factors. The test here is whether 
other first-order causal variables prove equally good, or better, at 
predicting the outcome variable of economic development. 
 This chapter will show that the claim, ultimately, does not hold up 
to scrutiny. This, as I will make clear, is not meant in any way to suggest 
that institutions are not a key factor in determining the causes of economic 
growth. In fact, as we will see, the overwhelmingly prevailing consensus is 
that they are, and my study confirms this. It is, however, meant to show 
that it cannot be proven to a sufficient degree that the only major causes of 
growth are endogenously developed institutions which are not affected 
from the outside. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 I first 
discuss prevalent approaches within the development literature, focusing 
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on the conceptual and methodological weaknesses of the claim to primacy 
of institutions, including conceptual confusions about what institutions 
are, and the failure to identify the ways other factors continue to 
profoundly shape the development of these institutions. I then discuss the 
causes of development emphasised by other strands of the literature, 
focusing in particular on geographic factors and human resource 
endowments. 
 The remainder of the chapter then turns to the fs/QCA method for 
analysing the institutionalist claim, looking at the relationship between 
institutions and four other causal variables – malaria risk, ethnic 
fractionalisation, years of schooling and life expectancy – on an outcome 
variable, GNI per capita. Section 5.4 discusses the variables, one outcome 
variable and five independent variables; and the case selection, 102 
countries from across Africa, Asia, the Americas and the Middle East. 
Sections 5.5 and 5.6 present the results of the fs/QCA analysis, finding that 
not just good institutions, but also low malaria risk, high levels of 
schooling and high life expectancy are necessary for high levels of 
development to come about. Conversely, none of the causal variables are 
by themselves sufficient to bring about the outcome. Only a combination 
of all five, or at least four, of the variables results in high GNI per capita. 
This strongly suggests that the primacy of domestic institutions as an 
explanatory variable is not nearly as clear-cut as parts of the literature 
claim. 
 The chapter finishes by discussing the implications of the findings 
for the internationalist thesis in Section 5.7, arguing that while poor 
institutional quality may in many cases count against development efforts 
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in particular cases, it cannot be assumed that a lack of development is 
necessarily coupled with poor institutional quality. In those cases it seems 
that the reasons the institutional thesis gives against development 
assistance do not apply. Section 5.8 concludes. 
 
5.2 Overview – the overarching role of institutions 
 
 The direct causal link between formal institutions and growth is, 
depending on your standpoint as a development economist, either a near-
proven fact or a deeply problematic assumption open to serious 
questioning. Dani Rodrik maintains that the overwhelming importance of 
institutions in determining growth is a widely accepted fact within the 
literature, 4  a view echoed by Easterly et al. who note that “‘poor 
institutional quality’ and ‘failure to implement better policies’ are […] 
frequently identified as the causes of growth collapses, endemic poverty, 
and civil conflict,”5 and by Acemoglu and Robinson who see them as the 
primary and most significant cause of nations failing today.6 Hence, says 
Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda, “a broad consensus among growth 
economists, development experts and aid donors views ‘good governance’ 
as a pre-requisite for sustained increases in living standards.”7 
 This does not necessarily mean that other factors will not play a part 
as well. But many argue that they are severely limited either in scope or in 
                                                   
4 Rodrik, “Introduction,” 10. 
5 William Easterly, Jozef Ritzen, and Michael Woolcock, “Social Cohesion, Institutions, 
and Growth,” Economy & Politics 18, no. 2 (2006): 103. 
6 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, 
Prosperity and Poverty (London: Profile Books, 2012), 369. 
7 Dellepiane-Avellaneda, “Good Governance, Institutions and Economic Development,” 
196. 
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time span. Acemoglu and Robinson point out that geography, including 
topography, climate and demographics, are significant predictors of 
institutional type at “critical junctures” in history, determining the type of 
institutions that develop. 8  Thus the low population density in North 
America in the 16th and 17th centuries led to the development of settler 
colonies, which then led to inclusive institutions. Meanwhile, the richly 
populated South American colonies favoured extraction through the use of 
slave labour, leading to more extractive institutions, the effect of which is 
felt to this day. 9  Similarly, unique historical and geographical 
circumstances allowed Botswana to develop strong institutions upon 
independence, which enabled them to harness their diamond-rich 
underground without succumbing to the resource curse. 10  James Ang 
agrees, similarly finding that the conditions that shaped pre-modern 
institutional arrangements are reflected in current ones because of the way 
those effects work through institutions.11 Analysing the effect of seven 
different proxies for pre-modern development, and accounting for the 
effects of migration throughout the ages, he finds that all proxies, but 
particularly the initial rate of technological adoption, are significant 
indicators of modern-day levels of growth.12 
                                                   
8 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 67. 
9 Ibid., 22–24. 
10 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “An African Success Story: 
Botswana,” in In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives for Economic Growth, ed. 
Dani Rodrik (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 80–119; In addition, see 
James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier, “Political Foundations of the 
Resource Curse: A Simplification and a Comment,” Journal of Development Economics 
106 (2014): 194–98, on why success stories like Botswana do not invalidate the 
theoretical foundations of the resource curse. 
11 James B. Ang, “Institutions and the Long-Run Impact of Early Development,” Journal 
of Development Economics 105 (2013): 1–18. 
12 Ibid., 2. 
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 By contrast, Jeffrey Sachs criticizes these findings for relying on far 
too simplistic methodological assumptions, by systematically ignoring 
other factors, such as natural resources, geopolitics and technological 
progress, and by getting the authoritarian incentive structure wrong. First, 
they assume that authoritarian governments are by definition hostile to 
economic development. But this does not hold up to empirical scrutiny; 
China is an example of that. And second, they conflate invention with 
diffusion of technology, despite the fact that importing technology is not 
necessarily difficult or costly. 13 More importantly, the analysis fails to 
consider the way that state centralisation comes about. In Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s account it is a question of leaders’ choices. But those choices 
are constrained by the resources available. Hence they skirt over the issue 
of why African states are mostly still very decentralised.14 You might then 
wonder why, if centralisation is so effective, no African ruler has ever 
thought about doing it? 
 In addition, Dellepiane-Avellaneda argues that in relying on a 
definition of institutions that places a premium on property rights, the 
economic literature remains naively silent on historical narratives. It 
rarely talks about how property came about, how the distribution 
conditioned social development, or how certain property distributions 
came to be legitimised.15 How can you evaluate the private property regime 
of, say, South Africa where the beneficiaries of apartheid are still 
overrepresented, or the former Soviet blocs where endemic corruption 
                                                   
13 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Government, Geography, and Growth,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5 
(2012): 143–144. 
14 Ibid., 144–145. 
15 Dellepiane-Avellaneda, “Good Governance, Institutions and Economic Development,” 
209. 
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shaped the post-Cold War privatisation push, without an understanding of 
the way they came about? Under the right conditions an effective property 
right regime could be a destabilising factor, not a stabilising one. 
 In some areas there is disagreement about what is meant by good 
institutions, most notably the question of whether institutions must be 
democratic or not. There seems to be anecdotal evidence to support both 
sides of the argument. On the one hand, the majority of the wealthiest 
countries in the world are democracies, and economic growth in Eastern 
Europe after the Cold War largely went hand in hand with 
democratisation. But on the other, the success of Asian countries such as 
Singapore, Taiwan, and China, seem to suggest that democracy is not a 
prerequisite for growth. But while no school of thought would suggest 
democracy hinders growth, there is no conclusive evidence so suggest it 
helps it either.16 
 In one instance Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson define good 
institutions as “corresponding to a social organization that ensures that a 
broad cross-section of the society has effective property rights. We refer to 
this cluster as institutions of private property.”17 Good institutions must 
therefore have the following features: they must ensure property rights, 
allowing productive people to receive returns on investment, and these 
guarantees must be available to “a broad cross-section of the society,” 
rather than just a privileged upper class.18 Democracy is missing from this 
definition, and they do not suggest that democracies inherently possess 
                                                   
16 Ibid., 198–199. 
17 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “Botswana,” 86. Their italics. Their definition was 
taken from an earlier article by the same authors. 
18 Ibid. 
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advantages in securing property rights that cannot be attained by different 
means. Rodrik, similarly, argues that good institutions which can provide 
long-term growth provide “dependable property rights, manage conflict, 
maintain law and order, and align economic incentives with social costs 
and benefits.”19 The latter feature is missing from Acemoglu et al., but 
otherwise they are very similar. 
 Knack and Keefer do not offer a definition of institutions as such, 
but nonetheless posit that “the security of property and contractual rights 
and the efficiency with which governments manage the provision of public 
goods and the creation of government policies are significant determinants 
of the speed with which countries grow.”20 The relevant proxies, then, are 
those that measure the extent to which governments are able to protect 
property. Factors such as expropriation risk, repudiation of contracts, 
government corruption and quality of bureaucracy, contract enforceability 
and nationalisation potential all combine, in their analysis, to create 
powerful measures of institutional quality.21 
 The overarching theme of these definitions can perhaps best be 
summed up as constraints on the executive. A country has good 
institutions when the actions of key decision makers are restricted in ways 
that are beneficial to the development of society, and render policy-making 
for personal rather than public gains difficult or impossible. To capture the 
effects of institutions, we therefore need a suitable proxy for constraints on 
the executive. A widely cited paper by Knack and Keefer suggests that 
                                                   
19 Rodrik, “Introduction,” 11. 
20 Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures,” Economics & Politics 7, no. 3 
(1995): 207. 
21 Ibid., 210–211. 
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contract enforcement, being one of the means by which states protect 
private property, is the best measure. In particular, they test aggregate 
measures of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) from 1972, 
proxies of which are expropriation risk, rule of law, repudiation of 
contracts, government corruption and quality of bureaucracy; and the 
Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI), whose proxies are 
contract enforceability, infrastructure quality, nationalisation potential, 
and bureaucratic delays.22 
 This relatively narrow focus on securing property rights and 
business environments stands in sharp contrast with other social sciences, 
most notably politics and political philosophy. Thomas Weiss runs through 
the various definitions of the closely related concept of governance 
expressed by various global governmental and non-governmental 
organisations.23 They vary in their degree of focus on society as a whole, or 
purely on central government. The World Bank, for instance, focuses on 
the exercise of power in managing a country’s economic and social 
resources, focusing not only on the government’s ability to formulate and 
implement policies, as some economists do, but also on the form of 
political regime, and the way the country’s economic and social resources 
for development are managed.24 In another definition, by contrast, it is the 
way elements in society exercise authority, influence politics and make 
                                                   
22 Ibid., 210–212. 
23 Governance and institutions are not identical. The Commission on Global Governance 
defines governance as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and 
private, manage their public affairs.” Thomas G Weiss, “Governance, Good Governance 
and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges,” Third World Quarterly 21, 
no. 5 (2000): 797. 
24 Ibid. 
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decisions. Governance, then, is not confined to the government.25 But at 
any rate, what is missing entirely is a concept of social responsibilities. The 
examples mentioned here are universal in ignoring the provision of 
education, healthcare, pensions, infrastructure and disease control. Good 
institutions, then, are hardly a guarantee that the state will be able to 
provide the necessary conditions for human development and stability. 
Unless one subscribes to the view that secure property rights are the only 
relevant cause of growth, the institutional thesis leaves out too many 
relevant factors. 
 Sangmpam points out that institutionalists “tend to see institutions 
everywhere,” 26  even where the link with the formal definition of 
institutions in spurious. Thus, James Ang writes of Jared Diamond that he 
“proposes that superior modes of agricultural production following the 
transition from hunting and gathering to sedentary agriculture, or the 
Neolithic transition, led to the accumulation of food surpluses.” This 
supposedly suggests that the “idea that institutions are precipitated by […] 
historical forces is not new.”27 But if things like modes of agriculture can 
count as a type of institutions, even if only in a preliminary sense, what 
does not count? It is perhaps no surprise, then, that for his analysis Ang 
relies on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (as do I), which are 
considerably more limited in scope. 
 It would be difficult not to put this rather narrow focus on strictly 
economic – rather than social or political – factors down to a certain 
                                                   
25 Ibid. 
26 Sangmpam, “Politics Rules,” 205. 
27 Ang, “Institutions and the Long-Run Impact of Early Development,” 2. 
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degree of convenience bias on the part of the economics profession.28 
Some things are, put simply, a lot easier to quantify than others, and it is 
perhaps understandable, though regrettable, that these things tend to be 
given more weight than others. But the subordination of the political 
aspect of institutions to the economic one, says Sangmpam, is particularly 
problematic. The focus on economic institutions at the legislative level 
thus seems chosen out of convenience, based on similarities with an 
already established theoretical framework rather than theoretical 
justification. 29  But this ignores the deeply political underpinnings of 
institutions. Institutions, say Powell and DiMaggio, cannot be reduced to 
the formal legal and economic instruments of the state, but encompass the 
“phenomenological process by which certain social relationships and 
actions come to be taken for granted […] which explains why sociologists 
find institutions everywhere from handshakes to marriages to strategic-
planning departments.”30 Hence chronic instability, such as in Somalia or 
Burundi, does not necessarily reflect the absence of institutions, but could 
indicate the prevalence of destructive institutionalised social patterns over 
constructive ones.31 
 The problem, then, is that the concept of institutions ends up 
becoming far too complex for our purposes as social scientists. If 
institutions can encompass all and any of the myriad intersections of 
formal and informal human interactions that take place in society, what is 
left to measure? This possibly explains the economics profession’s 
                                                   
28 Dellepiane-Avellaneda, “Good Governance, Institutions and Economic Development,” 
203. 
29 Sangmpam, “Politics Rules,” 201. 
30 Powell and DiMaggio, quoted in ibid., 202. 
31 Ibid., 212. 
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tendency to see institutions as a set of narrowly defined, easily measurable 
parameters, but it hardly justifies it.  
 Putting these issues aside and focusing on the methodological 
difficulties with measuring economic institutions, we find further 
difficulties. Using measures such as the rate of appropriation of private 
property and respect for legal frameworks including contract enforcement, 
as Knack and Keefer do, is a common way of measuring the quality of 
institutions. But what do these proxies actually show? Glaeser et al. 
suggest that the proxies measure outcomes – that is, the rate of 
appropriation or extent of contract enforcement as it has actually taken 
place over the course of the study. They do not necessarily, as they have 
been interpreted, show institutional constraints, but rather one of 
institutional constraints or the choices of individual rulers. 32  When a 
ruling body respects private property rights they might be forced to do so 
by restrictive rules, or they might choose to respect them based on political 
calculations. Alternatively, the institutional constraints may be tight 
enough to make appropriation of private property inexpedient in most 
cases, but not tight enough to exclude the possibility of doing so, should 
the government decide that their calculations have changed. Or the 
constraints on the executive, as it were, may consist not of formal 
institutional constraints, but of informal constraint based on ranges of 
socially accepted behaviour.33 Some cultures, it would seem, have a greater 
tolerance for (or have grown more numb to) corruption than others. 
                                                   
32 Edward L Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, “Do Institutions 
Cause Growth?,” Journal of Economic Growth 9, no. 3 (2004): 271–303. 
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 This means that as proxies for good institutions, rather than simply 
for good governance, they are not up to the task, and it’s not clear what 
their measurements are actually showing – are they and economic growth 
simply linked with a third or more factors, such as geography or human 
capital? But as we will see shortly, my analysis makes use of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, despite all the criticisms of such measures I have 
laid out here. This reflects the difficult choices a researcher sometimes has 
to make. Simply put, datasets covering almost every country in the world, 
rigorously put together according to carefully considered criteria (and, I 
might add, not behind an expensive pay-wall) are rather thin on the 
ground. Still, by analysing institutional quality, narrowly defined, as just 
one of several relevant variables, we can hopefully get a fuller picture. 
What are these other variables? In principle the list will potentially be 
endless, but the following five seem particularly apt to test for. As I made 
clear in Chapter 2, however, this list is derived not from independent, 
objective principles, but from the researcher’s own judgment. I make no 
claim that this list of variables is final, only that it is carefully considered. 
 
5.3 Other possible impediments to growth 
 
 What factors, other than institutions, deserve a closer look? Broadly 
speaking, they fall into two categories – geography, and human resources. 
Within geography a slew of theories have been advanced. While 
Montesquieu’s assertion that the hot conditions near the equator naturally 
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lend themselves to idleness34 has seemed out-dated for a long time, the 
tendency of the world’s poorest countries to congregate between the 
Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn has not passed many by. But the 
economics profession’s collective decision to ignore this fact, argues 
Landes in quoting economist John Kenneth Galbraith, “reveals the deep-
seated optimistic bias with which we approach problems of development 
and the reluctance to admit the vast differences in initial conditions with 
which today’s poor countries are faced.”35 The effects of institutions and 
geography may complement each other. AIDS, for instance, has hit Africa 
particularly hard, due to the fact that the disease first broke out there, and 
that the environmental conditions are ideal for it to spread. Yet the 
differences in infection rates between African countries must at least to 
some extent be put down to each country’s success or failure in effectively 
tackling the epidemic. 
 Acemoglu et al.36  and Easterly and Levine 37 both claim to have 
proven that the effects of geography on growth only manifest themselves 
indirectly, through the incentives they provide for creating extractive or 
growth-focused institutions. This, says Sachs, is an odd argument. The 
geographic particulars that supposedly determined the institutions that 
were originally established – disease environment, immigrant mortality 
rates, transport costs, and agricultural productivity – will often still apply 
                                                   
34 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1977), 243–247. 
35 John Kenneth Galbraith, quoted in Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, 5. 
36 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development.” 
37 William Easterly and Ross Levine, “Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments 
Influence Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics 50, no. 1 (2003): 3–
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today, and therefore continue to influence economic productivity.38 After 
all, the high temperatures and strong prevalence of germs, emphasised by 
Landes39 and Diamond40 should by and large have the same effect today as 
they did when the institutions were set up. Of course, improvements can 
be made. Both Italy and the American South, for instance, were once 
hotbeds of malaria infestation. Today the disease has been eradicated in 
those areas through concerted government efforts.41 But even though, were 
it not for strong governments, these areas would still be malaria zones, it 
does not mean any country with strong governments could do the same. 
Malaria was never as rampant there as in sub-Saharan Africa, and the 
tropical climate coupled with the particular species of mosquito that is 
active there make the disease that much harder to kill.42 
 Many different measures of geographic endowments have been 
proposed involving a variety of factors, such as climate, isolation, and 
disease environment.43 Nonetheless, there seems to be a convergence of 
opinion on both sides of the argument that the prevalence of malaria and 
the associated mortality rate is the most accurate single proxy for the 
overall effects of geography.44 As a single measure of a complex issue, it 
                                                   
38 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Institutions Don’t Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita 
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40 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1998). 
41 John Luke Gallup and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Economic Burden of Malaria,” American 
Journal of Tropical Medical Hygiene 64, no. 1–2 (2001): 86. 
42 Ibid., 88. 
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leaves out many variables that are likely to be significant at some level, 
including transport costs or world market integration. But it captures, if 
imperfectly, many other factors such as proximity to the equator, since 
malaria spreads most effectively in tropical regions, as well as overall 
disease environment, since a climate conducive to malaria is likely to be 
conducive to other diseases as well. Moreover, the disease environment is 
likely to have a degree of spill-over effect into other proxies of geography, 
such as agricultural productivity. 45  Specifically, malaria is a better 
indication of ecological environment than most other diseases that are 
prevalent in developing countries, since these are often the result of 
impoverished living conditions, such as unsafe drinking water, sanitation 
and sewage treatment, or inadequate housing. They could then equally be 
a cause and the effect of poverty. The prevalence of malaria, by contrast, is 
predominantly determined by climate and ecology. Some of the world’s 
poorest countries are entirely or relatively malaria-free (Nepal, North 
Korea), while some wealthy countries (Oman, United Arab Emirates) 
struggle with much higher malaria levels than you would expect, were they 
an effect of income.46 
 Another measure frequently mentioned is the ethnic makeup of a 
country. According to Alesina et al., the measure of ethnic fractionalisation 
has become a standard independent variable in studies seeking to explain 
differences in cross-national growth rates.47 This is particularly acute in 
Africa, which is miles ahead of any other continent in terms of both ethnic 
                                                   
45 Gallup and Sachs, “The Economic Burden of Malaria,” 88–89. 
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(2003): 156. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 5 – The Role of Institutions 
202 of 373 
and linguistic diversity. 48  The measure by which this is calculated, 
however, is subject to some debate. Alesina et al., following Easterly and 
Levine, derive an ethnic fractionalisation index by the probability that two 
randomly selected people in a country will belong to the same ethnic 
group.49 The authors find that ethnically diverse countries increase the 
potential avenues for political rifts. This is especially potent given the 
tendency for politics to play out along ethnic, linguistic or religious lines in 
many developing countries. One might therefore expect a country with less 
ethnic fractionalisation to be more conducive to strong politico-legal 
institutions. 
 This risks being a little bit inaccurate, given that the ethnic makeup 
of a society can change over time, either as a result of natural, organic 
demographic shifts or as a result of shock. However, these changes are not 
likely to be very significant, barring a few select exceptions. Further, the 
way ethnicity is defined plays an important role. If language is counted as 
an important distinction, for instance, blacks and whites in the United 
States could be counted in the same classification. Similarly, the 
distinction between ethnic groups as significant political communities is 
less than clear-cut, with distinctions or similarities being downplayed or 
exaggerated depending on the political circumstances.50 However, despite 
these problems, Alesina et al. maintain that ethnic fractionalisation may 
still directly or indirectly capture important factors determining 
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development success.51 Mozaffar and Scarritt, for instance, find that the 
seemingly odd qualities of African politics – low levels of electoral and 
legislative competitiveness, the presence of a few large parties and several 
tiny ones, and low party system fragmentation – are determined by the 
effects of ethno-linguistic fragmentation on the way the parties play the 
political game.52 
 What about the effects of human resources? Many have emphasised 
the role of human capital in long-term economic development, especially 
when it comes to having a well-educated population. 53  Glaeser et al. 
suggest that schooling is a very useful proxy for levels of human capital, 
and moreover, that human capital is significantly correlated with levels of 
growth.54 The logic is fairly obvious. A more highly educated population 
makes implementing new technology much easier. Moreover, high levels of 
education could lead to more benign politics and increased political 
stability, meaning the primary benefit of education is not necessarily just 
economic.55 Lant Prichett, however, points out that there is no guarantee 
that higher levels of education are necessarily going to lead to growth, 
partly because sometimes greater amounts of education translates poorly 
into better quality, and partly because increased education is sometimes in 
                                                   
51 Alesina et al., “Fractionalization,” 157. 
52 Shaheen Mozaffar and James R. Scarritt, “The Puzzle of African Party Systems,” Party 
Politics 11, no. 4 (2005): 399–421. 
53 Robert J. Barro and Jong Wha Lee, “A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the 
World, 1950-2010,” Journal of Development Economics 104 (2013): 184. 
54 Glaeser, La Porta, and Lopez-de-Silanes, “Do Institutions Cause Growth?,” 296–298. 
55 Seymour Martin Lipset, in ibid., 282. 
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high demand, but for purposes in the private sector that are not conducive 
to the overall improvement of national economies.56 
 How do you measure education for the purposes of finding out its 
effect on growth? Barro and Lee argue that the strongest measure of 
education as a source of human capital is the combined years of schooling 
for all adults. Studies have previously used literacy or enrolment rates to 
attain human capital, however, Barro and Lee point out that this data fails 
to “adequately measure the aggregate stock of human capital available 
contemporaneously as an input to production.” 57  In other words, 
increasing enrolment rates will not make a difference for anyone above 
school-leaving age, and will only have a delayed effect on human capital. 
 Health is another important factor of human resource endowments. 
Health is linked closely with malaria, but it is nonetheless separate in key 
ways, namely being much more exogenous in nature, interacting not only 
with the geographical environment, but also with institutions and social 
issues. David N. Weil identifies several ways health can affect the 
development of a country. Healthier people are more effective workers, 
and more likely to perform well at school. They are also more likely to 
invest in schooling in the first place, and to save for retirement. Physical 
labour productivity may also rise because healthier workers improve 
marginal capital output. 58  Cervellati and Sunde further argue that 
individuals make major life decisions by taking their life expectancy into 
account. Increased life expectancy should therefore lead to more human 
                                                   
56 Lant Pritchett, “Where Has All the Education Gone?,” The World Bank Development 
Review 15, no. 3 (2001): 367–91. 
57 Barro and Lee, “A New Data Set,” 184. 
58 David N. Weil, “Accounting for the Effect of Health on Economic Growth,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 3 (2007): 1266. 
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capital formation and better economic growth.59 Weil notes, however, that 
because of the endogenous nature of health it is difficult to trace its effect 
on growth directly. Richer people can afford healthier food and better 
medical treatment, and are less at risk from many fatal and debilitating 
diseases.60 Nonetheless, he finds that “health is an important determinant 
of income variation,” even if poor health by itself may not be a “major 
stumbling block to economic development.” 61  As an overall proxy for 
general health, life expectancy therefore seems the obvious choice. 
 So far I have presented a picture of some of the causes of economic 
development that is considerably less straightforward than the link 
between institutions and development presented by a large part of the 
literature. The next section will preliminarily put the claims of the 
institutional thesis to the test, using fs/QCA. It will not test whether there 
is a correlation between development and institutions, as well as the other 
possible causes of growth identified here, but whether any of them turn 
out to be necessary or sufficient to the outcome. The key question is not 
whether good institutions correlate with growth, about which the literature 
is unanimous in its agreeing. The relevant question is whether, as the 
institutional thesis implies, institutions alone are both necessary and 
sufficient to explain a lack of development. 
 
 
                                                   
59 Matteo Cervallati and Uwe Sunde, “Human Capital Formation, Life Expectancy, and 
the Process of Development,” The American Economic Review 95, no. 5 (2005): 1655. 
60 Weil, “The Effect of Health,” 1267. 
61 Ibid., 1301. 
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5.4 Variables and case selection 
 
 In this section I sketch first the outcome variable, GNI per capita, 
and then the five causal variables, malaria risk, ethnic fractionalisation, 
literacy rate, life expectancy, and institutional quality. 
 In the study I score all factors along the same six-score scale, where 
a score of 1.0 indicates that a case is “fully a member of the set”. 0.8 means 
“mostly a member”, 0.6 “more in than out of the membership set”, 0.4 
“more out than in the membership set”, 0.2 “mostly not a member”, and 
0.0 “not a member of the set at all”. 62 The scores should always be 
interpreted to mean that a higher score is more desirable. For instance a 
1.0 for malaria prevalence means very low levels of malaria, while a 1.0 for 
education levels means very high levels of education. 
 
5.4.1 Variables 
 
 In the study I use the following outcome variable: 
 GNI per capita: To measure the effect of growth I follow the World 
Bank in relying on income levels measured in US dollars. The numbers 
were taken from the World Bank’s data bank,63 and are predominantly 
from 2010.64 
                                                   
62 The scoring used here is identical to the one used in Claire M. Metelits, “The 
Consequences of Rivalry: Explaining Insurgent Violence Using Fuzzy Sets,” Political 
Research Quarterly 62, no. 4 (2009): 675. 
63 World Bank, “GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (current US$),” Data, accessed April 19, 
2014, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD. 
64 In the relevant column in the Appendix, data not from 2010 is marked with the year it 
is taken from. A few cases with missing data have been estimated using World Bank 
country classifications. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 5 – The Role of Institutions 
207 of 373 
 To calibrate these numbers, I use the World Bank’s guidelines, 
which define low income countries as those making $1,035 or less, and 
high-income countries as those making $12,616 or more. The World Bank 
defines the threshold between lower middle and higher middle income 
countries as $4,085.65 I will therefore take this to be the threshold where 
countries are more rich than poor. Unfortunately the World Bank operates 
with four categories of countries, rather than the six used in this fs/QCA 
study. The cut-off point between 0.2 and 0.4 is therefore the middle point 
between $1,035 and $4,085, or $2,560. Similarly, the cut-off point 
between 0.6 and 0.8 is halfway between $4,085 and $12,616, or $8,350. 
 Given the discussion in the previous section, I make use of the 
following five causal variables: 
 Malaria prevalence: The dataset I use is derived from research by 
Sachs,66 which compiles two separate measures into one. The first is the 
proportion of each country’s population that lives with the risk of malaria 
transmission. This number is then multiplied by the proportion of cases 
that involve a fatal variety of malaria, plasmodium falciparum, thus 
largely eliminating the effects of non-fatal malaria strands from the data. 
The resulting index then rates countries on an absolute scale from 1 to 0, 1 
being the entire population at risk from fatal malaria (though not 
necessarily suffering from it), and 0 meaning the entire population is free 
of risk. 
                                                   
65 World Bank, “How We Classify Countries,” Data, accessed April 19, 2014, 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classification. 
66 Sachs, “Institutions Don’t Rule.” 
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 For the calibrated measure some assumptions must be made. First, 
any degree of malaria risk that is a statistically significant degree above 
zero is going to have at least some negative impact. And second, a country 
must have a critical mass of inhabitants not at risk from malaria in order 
to avoid being fully within the subset of countries suffering from the 
disease. I therefore set the calibrated score of 1 (fully malaria-free) at 0.05, 
and 0 (fully suffering from malaria) at 0.75. The cross-over point between 
being more in that out of the subset of malaria-free countries is set at 0.5, 
meaning half the population is at risk.67 
 Ethnic fractionalisation: For this analysis I use the dataset found in 
Alesina et al.68 Their set covers 190 countries worldwide, including all 
cases selected for this study. They measure three different aspects of 
fractionalisation, namely ethnicity, language and religion. The index 
ranges between 1 and 0, both of which end points are practical 
impossibilities. 1 corresponds to a perfect chance of two randomly selected 
people being from different groups, and is therefore only possible if each 
person constitutes his own group. 0, by contrast, would only happen when 
every member of a country came from the same group. When using this 
data set to identify a single measure of fractionalisation one is invariably 
faced with a dilemma. The authors’ rationale for measuring three separate 
aspects is clarity and accuracy. Combining the three to a single measure 
reduces both of those. But equally, using only one of the measures means 
                                                   
67 The calibration was derived by analysing cases found in “World Malaria Report 2013” 
(Geneva: World Health Organization, 2013), 
http://www.who.int/malaria/publications/world_malaria_report_2013/en/. 
68 Alesina et al., “Fractionalization,” 184–190. A digital version of the data is available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/papersum.html. 
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leaving out potentially significant data. In the end, I choose to focus solely 
on ethnic fractionalisation. 
 To calibrate the data I assume, firstly, that a country need not 
consist almost entirely of a single ethnic group to be considered ethnically 
homogeneous. Similarly, I assume that the same is true in reverse, so that 
there is a threshold above which further fractionalisation becomes 
insignificant. To gage the halfway point I follow Easterly et al. who “define 
as most cohesive those societies in the lower half of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization […] and as least cohesive the reverse.”69 That is, the 0.5 in 
the fs/QCA analysis is an ethno-linguistic score of 0.5. In line with the 
literature’s assumption that low levels of fractionalisation are more 
conducive to development than high levels, I define as 1.0 on the 
calibrated scale as 0.20, and 0.0 as 0.80. The remaining points are at 0.35 
and 0.65, respectively. 
 Education level: I take data primarily from Barro and Lee, 
measuring the mean average years of schooling for the population above 
25 years of age.70 The standard measure for educational attainment is the 
population aged 15 and above. However, I use the other measure in order 
to be able to supplement missing variables with estimates from the United 
Nations Development Programme, using Barro and Lee’s methodology.71 
 To calibrate the data I note that Barro and Lee estimate the average 
levels of education in advanced countries of 11.30 years and in developing 
                                                   
69 Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock, “Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth,” 110. 
70 For a detailed breakdown of the collection methods, see Barro and Lee, “A New Data 
Set.” 
71 United Nations Development Programme, “Mean Years of Schooling (of Adults) 
(years),” https://data.undp.org/dataset/Mean-years-of-schooling-of-adults-years-
/m67k-vi5c. 
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countries of 7.01 years, with standard deviations of 2.61 and 2.41 years, 
respectively. 72 However, these numbers are for the population 15 years and 
above, where my data is for 25 years and above. The mean average for 15 
and above is 1.16 times higher than for 25 and above.73 For the calibrated 
score of 1.0 I therefore use the estimated mean average for developed 
countries 11.30 x 0.86 = 9.7, and for the crossover point between more in 
than out of the set of highly educated countries I use 7.01 x 0.86 = 6.0 
(rounded). I define the calibrated 0.2 score at two years’ average 
schooling. The points separating 0.2 and 0.4, and 0.6 and 0.8, 
respectively, is set at the halfway point between those two points. 
 Life expectancy: The data for life expectancy is taken from the 
World Bank’s databank. 74 To calibrate, I assume the following cut-off 
points: 0.0 is set below a life expectancy of 50 years, as these countries are 
considered wholly outside the set of countries with long life expectancy. 
1.0 is at 75 years of age, and I set the halfway point at 68 years. 
 Aggregate quality of governance indicators: To measure the 
quality of institutions I make use of an aggregate of the set of six 
Worldwide Governance Indicators computed by the World Bank.75 The 
data is compiled with the assumption that governance must be defined 
neither so broadly that virtually any human interaction counts, nor so 
narrowly as to focus on only a single variable, for instance management of 
national economic resources. Instead they define governance as 
                                                   
72 Barro and Lee, “A New Data Set,” 191. 
73 Author’s own calculations. 
74 World Bank, “Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (years),” Data, accessed April 19, 2014, 
data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN. 
75 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues,” Working Paper, Policy Research 
Working Paper (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010). 
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the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country 
is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the 
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them.76 
 
  The data thus measures six unique aspects of governance: voice and 
accountability; political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control over 
corruption.77 They therefore all relate specifically to formal institutions 
and governance structures, lacking any mention of the traditions, culture 
and know-how that Rawls emphasises.78 
 The World Governance Indicators score more than 200 countries 
based on perceptions of quality of governance, giving each country a score 
between 2.5 and -2.5, denoting highest and lowest quality of institutions 
respectively. The score is balanced, meaning it is assumed that the world 
average for each year is the same.79 In calibrating the data, I further note 
that the highest score possible does not correspond to good institutions, 
but to excellent ones. For instance Norway, the most developed country in 
the world according to the most recent (2013) Human Development Index, 
                                                   
76 Ibid., 4. Italics omitted. 
77 A more detailed description of each variable can be found in ibid. 
78 Rawls, LP, 106. 
79 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators,” 12. 
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scores only 1.72 out of 2.5. France scores 1.26 and Italy 0.52.80 I therefore 
set the point at which a case is fully within the set of countries with good 
institutions at 0.5. Conversely, I set the point at which a case is fully out at 
-1.5. To be fully out of a set, then, a country must fail to provide even the 
most basic services and security to its citizens. In reality only a handful of 
countries are fully out: The Democratic Republic of the Congo, North 
Korea, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The cross-over point is 
set at the halfway point between these ends, at -0.5, and the quartile cross-
over points at 0.0 and -1.0, respectively. 
 
5.4.2 Case selection 
 
 This study analyses a total of 102 separate cases, the data taken 
from 2010 whenever possible. These include 49 countries in Africa, 11 
Middle Eastern countries, 21 nations in the Americas, and 21 in Asia.81 The 
countries included in the study are those countries that are traditionally 
considered part of the developing world, or whose history was 
substantially shaped by European colonisation. It does not, however, 
include former dominions, such as Australia and Canada, or countries 
whose population is almost entirely made up of white European settlers. 
These are, of course, not always clear-cut cases. For instance, South Africa 
was considered a settler dominion of the British Empire.  Nonetheless, as 
                                                   
80 World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” Data, accessed April 19, 2014, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators. 
81 The division of countries into regions may be somewhat arbitrary. For instance Egypt 
is African but could have been considered Middle Eastern as well. The grouping of 
countries into regions is not important for the analysis, however, but is merely 
illustrative. 
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the white population never constituted the majority, and today comprises 
less than 10% of the total population,82 I have included it here. Similarly, 
Argentina and Chile are both excluded, despite being former Spanish 
colonies, as they consist almost exclusively of descendants of European 
settlers – 97% and 88% respectively83 – while Brazil is included in my 
study despite being 53% white.84 
 The majority of countries omitted from the study therefore, 
effectively fall into three main categories: European countries, their now-
independent former settler dependencies, and former Soviet republics. The 
study has further been limited to countries with a population of at least 
500,000,85 in recognition of the unique opportunities to small countries in 
terms of, for instance, economic specialisation, but also the relative 
vulnerability to external factors compared to larger countries.86 Finally, a 
few countries were excluded for their newness and the consequent lack of 
data, or simply because of holes in the dataset that could not be filled from 
other sources. East Timor and South Sudan, independent in 2009 and 
2011 respectively, are not part of the study for the first reason, while 
Yemen is an example of the latter. 
 Finally, the question of natural resources cannot be ignored when 
selecting cases. It might seem reasonable to exclude some big oil producers 
from the dataset, since oil producers, especially those with small 
                                                   
82 Central Intelligence Agency, “South Africa,” The World Factbook, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html. 
83 Central Intelligence Agency, “Argentina,” The World Factbook, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html. 
84 Central Intelligence Agency, “Brazil,” The World Factbook, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html. 
85 Using the population data in the CIA World Factbook. 
86 See, for instance, Lino Briguglio, “Small Island Developing States and Their Economic 
Vulnerabilities,” World Development 23, no. 9 (1995): 1615–32. 
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populations, have access to vast and relatively secure revenue sources 
independently of their human capital or rule of law. But when I have 
included them in this study it is for reasons of consistency. While, for 
instance, many states in the Middle East are typically referred to as oil 
states, the world’s largest producers are not necessarily defined by their oil 
production. Such states include the United States, Russia and Norway. In 
its purest form an oil state produces enough oil to uphold the state 
apparatus almost exclusively from this income, without any other major 
source of income or need to diversify its economy.87 But it is unclear which 
states actually fit this bill. On the one hand Angola derives 85% of its GDP 
from oil production and related activities, with diamonds contributing a 
further 5%. But on the other, its per capita GDP is not substantially above 
the average for sub-Saharan Africa, and the majority of the population 
lives on subsistence agriculture.88 In the other extreme, the United Arab 
Emirates are one of the richest countries in the world thanks initially to 
their oil reserves, but have diversified heavily in the last decades, meaning 
oil now only makes up 25% of GDP.89 In both cases, then, the presence of 
natural resources explains some, but far from all of its economic 
performance. 
 
                                                   
87 See, for instance, Jeff D. Colgan, “Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for 
International Conflict,” International Organization 64, no. 4 (2010): 676–677. For his 
purposes Colgan defines as oil states those that derive at least 10% of their GDP from oil 
in any given year. But he notes that other measures, including total production or per 
capita revenue from oil exports have all been used, and that each has its merits and 
disadvantages. 
88 Central Intelligence Agency, “Angola,” The World Factbook, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. 
89 Central Intelligence Agency, “United Arab Emirates,” The World Factbook, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ae.html. 
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5.5 Fs/QCA – necessary conditions and sufficient pathways 
 
 The fs/QCA analysis consists of three separate steps. The first tests 
for the necessity of each individual causal condition on the outcome 
condition. 90  The fs/QCA method tells us which causal condition, or 
combinations of causal conditions, are necessary or sufficient to lead to the 
outcome in question. To briefly recap, a condition is necessary to bring 
about the outcome if the fuzzy set scores in the causal condition X are 
higher than or equal to the scores in the outcome condition Y in all or most 
cases: (Xi≥Yi) = ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/∑(Yi).91 
 The second step assesses the coverage of the causal variables that 
explain the outcome. That is, to what extent does the causal variable 
explain the outcome? Note that this step only applies to those causal 
variables that are found to be necessary to explain the outcome. Recall that 
necessity is found when the causal variable is consistently equal to or 
higher than the outcome variable. By contrast, we find the coverage by 
measuring the extent to which the causal variable is equal to or lower than 
the outcome: (Xi≤Yi) = ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/∑(Xi). 92 
 The third step involves constructing a truth table to test which 
combinations of events are sufficient to bring about the outcome. These 
are calculated by first dichotomising the findings so that variables that 
score above 0.5 are labelled 1, and those scoring below 0.5 are labelled 0. 
Each of the possible combinations of variables is then examined to see if 
                                                   
90 A detailed summary of all causal conditions can be found in Appendix A. 
91 Ragin, Redesigning Social Enquiry, 53. 
92 Ibid., 61. 
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there are any particular pathways that contain several cases, meaning 
those particular pathways to development are potentially statistically 
significant. 
 
5.5.1 Univariate analysis 
 
 The following table shows a box plot for all the variables in the analysis. 
The box plots show the distribution of the cases that fall above or below the 
median average, and within the lower and upper quartile, represented by the 
boxes. It also shows the minimum and maximum scores, represented by the 
whiskers.93 
 
 
 
 Cases range from 0.0 to 1.0 for all of the variables, meaning that at 
least one country has scored the highest possible, and at least one the lowest. 
                                                   
93 Author’s own calculations. 
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 Three things are particularly interesting about these findings. First, as 
the leftmost box plot shows, the lower and upper quartiles for malaria 
prevalence are 0.0 and 1.0 respectively. That means that at least 26 countries 
score the lowest possible, and at least 26 the highest. This suggests that 
malaria distribution is extremely polarised: most countries tend to either be 
hard hit by it, or not have it at all. 
 Second, for both average years of schooling and governance indicators, 
the cases tend to cluster around one particular value. The lower box appears to 
be missing because so many cases score 0.4 that it is both the median and 
lower quartile for both variables. 25 or fewer cases score 0.0 or 0.2. 
 And third, a majority of cases have low GNI per capita, the median 
being 0.2 and the upper quartile 0.4. This is a natural consequence of the case 
selection criteria. 
 The following five scatterplots show each of the independent variables 
relative to the outcome variable. A dot indicates the existence of at least one 
case with those particular scores, while the size indicates the number of 
observations for each combination of scores. The bigger the dot, the more 
observations for that score. 
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 Remember that necessity is found if the scores in the causal 
condition (the X axis) are higher than the scores in the outcome variable 
(Y axis) in a majority of cases. So see if that is the case, look at the line that 
runs from the bottom left hand side (0.0, 0.0) to the upper right hand side 
(1.0, 1.0), dividing the chart into two triangles. The variable is necessary if 
a majority of observations lie in the bottom triangle. Conversely, although 
it does not apply to any of these, the variable would have been sufficient if 
the majority of observations were in the upper triangle. 
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 At first sight it would appear that malaria prevalence, average years 
of schooling, life expectancy and good institutions are all necessary 
conditions for high GNI per capita, but that does not seem to be the case 
for ethnic fractionalisation. 
 
5.5.2 Set theoretic consistency – outcome necessity 
 
 In the following table I summarise the set theoretic consistency for 
outcome necessity for each of the five causal variables, using the fs/QCA 
software package Kirq.94 The ~ here means the negated variable, low GNI 
per capita. In each case, the score is found by first taking the smallest 
score for either the causal or outcome variable for each case, and then 
dividing that score by the sum of the causal variables: (Xi≥Yi) = 
∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/∑(Yi). The smallest score is used because the table 
specifically tests the hypothesis that the causal variable is necessary for the 
outcome – that is, that the score for the outcome variable will never be 
higher than the score in the causal variable. Therefore any case in which 
the outcome score is lower than or equal to the causal score supports the 
hypothesis, while any case in which the outcome score exceeds the causal 
score counts against it. In each of the cases, the negated outcome score is 
simply the score inverted, so that 0.0 becomes 1.0, 0.2 becomes 0.8, and 
so on. 
 
 
 
                                                   
94 Christopher Reichert and Claude Rubinson, Kirq (Houston, TX: University of 
Houston-Downtown, 2011). 
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CASE 
 
GNI ~GNI 
MAL Regular 0.89 0.42 
  Negated 0.27 0.64 
FRA Regular 0.62 0.35 
  Negated 0.79 0.80 
SCH Regular 0.90 0.52 
  Negated 0.58 0.65 
EXP Regular 0.89 0.49 
  Negated 0.43 0.62 
INS Regular 0.88 0.50 
  Negated 0.59 0.67 
 
 At a 0.80 threshold the calculations reveal five causal variables with 
a statistically significant relationship with GNI per capita. One of those, 
however, is more likely to reflect statistical noise than a relevant result. 
The negated ethnic fractionalisation variable only just clears the threshold 
against the negated GNI variable, suggesting that a low level of ethnic 
homogeneity is correlated with low income levels. However, the same 
causal variable simultaneously almost clears the threshold relative to high 
income levels, at .79, suggesting that low ethnic homogeneity implies high 
income levels. The result is therefore unlikely to be significant. Testing to 
see if the fractionalisation variable could be significant when coupled with 
another variable, it does yield significant necessity scores for the following 
causal combinations (consistency scores in brackets): 
 ~FRA+~SCH (0.83) * ~FRA+~EXP (0.83) * ~FRA+~INS (0.83) * 
~MAL+~FRA (0.83) * FRA+~MAL+~SCH+~EXP (0.80) * FRA+~INS ≥ 
GNI.95 
 Where ~ indicates the negation of an outcome, + denotes logical-or 
(either of the causal variables present), * separates the different causal 
                                                   
95 Calculated using Kirq. 
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combinations, and the number in brackets indicates the degree of outcome 
consistency. A qualitative consideration of the cases, however, would 
suggest that none of these combinations is likely to be significant 
indicators of growth. It hardly seems intuitive that the absence of ethnic 
homogeneity combined with a low degree of schooling, as in the first 
example, should be a necessary condition of growth. If anything, you 
would expect the opposite to be true. A more likely explanation, then, 
would be that the logical intersection of these variables (that is, taking the 
higher of the two scores for each case) will yield a combined variable that 
scores the same as the outcome. The more parsimonious solution, 
therefore, is to conclude, barring any further investigation, that the degree 
of ethnic fractionalisation is not a necessary predictor for growth, even if 
this does not rule out the possibility that fractionalisation can have an 
effect in less direct ways. 
 Of the other four, however, there is a clear pattern emerging. 
Malaria (0.89), years of schooling (0.90), life expectancy (0.89) and 
quality of institutions (0.88) are all suggestive of a necessary causal 
relationship with high GNI per capita at the 0.80 level. 
 Incidentally we should not be surprised that the reverse is not true. 
Unlike in a regression analysis, the presence of a factor confirming an 
outcome on the one hand, and the absence of a factor confirming the 
absence of an outcome on the other, are two entirely separate things. The 
necessary causal relationship between low levels of GNI per capita and a 
poor malaria environment (0.64), low degrees of schooling (0.65), low life 
expectancy (0.62) and poor institutions (0.67) all show consistency levels 
well below the threshold for statistical significance. This makes intuitive 
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sense. After all, there are many ways to fail, and many possible ways a 
country with seemingly good conditions for growth can fail to develop. For 
instance, North Korea scores very highly in malaria and years of schooling, 
and better than halfway in life expectancy, yet it is extremely poor. It 
seems overwhelmingly likely that the low quality of institutions is the 
important factor in this case.  
 Having established that four of the five causal variables are 
statistically necessary to produce the outcome, the next step of the analysis 
is to calculate the coverage of each necessary cause. That is, what 
percentage of the outcome can be explained by reference to each particular 
variable? The left column repeats the consistency scores for outcome 
necessity I calculated above. The right column represents the coverage 
score, calculated using the formula (Xi≤Yi) = ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/∑(Xi). It takes 
the sum of the lower of the outcome or causal scores for all cases, and 
divides it by the sum of the outcome scores. The closer the causal scores 
are to the outcome scores, the better the variable explains the outcome. 
For instance, in a case where institutions score 0.8 and the development 
score is also 0.8, the causal variable covers the outcome better than on in 
which the scores are 0.8 and 0.4, respectively. I calculate the following 
degrees of coverage.96 
  
Variable Consistency Coverage 
Schooling 0.90 0.48 
Life expectancy 0.89 0.46 
Malaria 0.89 0.46 
Institutions 0.88 0.49 
 
                                                   
96 Calculated using Kirq. 
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 All four variables display a high degree of coverage at just under 
0.50. Institutions (0.49) cover the outcome slightly better than the other 
three measures. However, at only a 0.03 difference between the variables 
it is not possible to draw any inferences from this. A statistically 
significant degree of coverage is typically 50%. If it is too low the 
particular variable may be insignificant. Conversely, coverage of close to 
100% may suggest that the causal variable is extremely significant. It may 
also suggest that the variable is trivial or obvious. 
 
5.5.3 Set theoretic consistency – outcome sufficiency 
 
 To determine the sufficiency pathways to the outcome of high GNI 
per capita, I calculate a truth table. The truth table lists all possible 
combinations of causal variables and checks whether there are any cases 
that follow that particular pathway to an outcome. It then further records 
whether those cases confirm or reject the outcome of high GNI per capita, 
or lead to contradictory outcomes. The truth table in this case tests five 
causal variables, meaning there are a total of 25 = 32 possible 
combinations. In a fuzzy set analysis the fuzzy variables are dichotomised 
meaning a score of 1 on the table indicates the case scoring above 0.5, and 
0 indicating a score below 0.5. Using a frequency threshold of four, 
meaning at least four cases represented in a single pathway, the 
calculations reveal six significant pathways comprising 70 of the 102 cases. 
The 26 logical remainders with none or too few cases are eliminated. 
 
 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 5 – The Role of Institutions 
225 of 373 
MAL FRA SCH EXP INS N Cons. Outcome 
1 1 1 1 1 8 0.79 Contr. 
1 0 1 1 1 16 0.74 Contr. 
1 0 1 1 0 10 0.64 Contr. 
0 0 1 0 1 4 0.30 False 
0 0 0 0 5 7 0.23 False 
0 0 0 0 0 25 0.14 False 
 
 At a consistency threshold of 0.75, only a single pathway seems to 
offer a statistically relevant pathway to high development: a high score in 
each of the five explanatory variables, meaning a low-risk malaria 
environment, low levels of fractionalisation, a high degree of schooling, 
high life expectancy, and good institutions (MAL*FRA*SCH*EXP*INS ≥ 
GNI). The results, however, are contradictory at a proportion threshold of 
0.80, meaning at least 80% of the cases must display the outcome. While 
eight countries follow this pathway only five of them – The Dominican 
Republic, South Korea, Mauritius, Singapore and Turkey – display the 
expected outcome of high GNI per capita. A further three countries display 
all the causal variables but not the outcome: Costa Rica, Jamaica and Sri 
Lanka. (The calculation awards points for near-misses, hence the 
consistency of 0.79 despite only 63% of cases confirming the outcome.)  
These countries, seemingly, have the necessary conditions for high 
development, yet have failed to convert it. One possible answer is that the 
influence of an as-yet unknown factor or combination of factors that hold 
true for the five countries that display the outcome, but do not hold true 
for the three that do not. Further research would be needed to suggest 
what they might be. 
 One further pathway narrowly fails to clear the consistency 
threshold, at 0.74: MAL*~FRA*SCH*EXP*INS ≥ GNI. This would further 
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suggest that the rate of ethic fractionalisation by itself is not significant. 
However, once again the outcome is contradictory, with only nine out of 16 
countries that follow this pathway having high GNI per capita. 
 Reducing the proportion threshold effectively eliminates 
contradictory pathways, since they must either be scored true or false 
depending on whether the majority of cases confirm or contradict the 
outcome.97 In this case it becomes possible to calculate the raw coverage of 
the single statistically significant pathway (MAL*FRA*LIT*EXP*INS) at 
0.50, meaning this particular pathway covers 50% of the cases that display 
the outcome. 
 Reversing the outcome variables I find several distinct paths to low 
GNI per capita:98 
 
 
MAL FRA SCH EXP INS N Cons. Outcome 
0 0 0 0 0 25 1.00 True 
0 0 0 0 1 7 1.00 True 
0 0 1 0 1 4 1.00 True 
1 0 1 1 0 10 0.92 Contr. 
1 0 1 1 1 16 0.81 Contr. 
1 1 1 1 1 18 0.77 Contr. 
 
 Here we see no fewer than six statistically significant paths to low 
GNI per capita that display a consistency of 0.75 or higher. The remaining 
26 possible combinations are all logical remainders at a frequency 
threshold of four. Three of those have a consistency level of 1.00, and 
contain no contradictions. The first of these contains almost a quarter of 
                                                   
97 Claude Rubinson, “Contradictions in fsQCA,” Quality & Quantity 47, no. 5 (2013): 
2860. 
98 Calculated using Kirq. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 5 – The Role of Institutions 
227 of 373 
all cases in this study, which is entirely unsurprising. The combination 
~GNI*~FRA*~SCH*~EXP*~INS, or a cases scoring low in every causal 
variable, corresponds perfectly with low GNI per capita. Similarly, 
~GNI*~FRA*~SCH*~EXP*INS, or a high score in institutional quality but 
a low score in everything else, fails to yield a single case of high GNI per 
capita. The seven countries in this category, Benin, Burkina Faso, Malawi, 
Mali, Mozambique, Senegal and Tanzania, all have low GNI per capita. 
Incidentally, they all score 0.0 on the calibrated score for GNI per capita, 
further underscoring that institutions by themselves are insufficient to 
account for growth.99 
 The four cases that follow the pathway 
~MAL*~FRA*SCH*~EXP*INS all confirm the outcome of low GNI per 
capita. The significance of this, however, is unclear. It could suggest that a 
case’s failure to satisfy at least a certain number, possibly three, of the five 
causal variables is sufficient to confirm the low GNI outcome. That 
assertion cannot be backed up by the evidence presented here, however. 
This is the only causal pathway consisting of low scores in three and high 
scores of two in the variables that is not labelled a logical remainder due to 
there being either none or too few cases. 
 The results can be summarised as follows: 
                                                   
99 The countries listed are not normally ones we would associate with good institutional 
quality, but keep in mind the following: (1) The 1 in the truth table indicates not that the 
institutions are good in the sense we normally understand that term, but that on a 
sliding scale from good to bad they fall more within the subset of good than of bad. 
Incidentally, they all score 0.6 on the calibrated score for institutional quality, only just 
crossing the threshold. (2) The Worldwide Governance Indicators measure things like 
corruption levels and degree of accountability, not provision of services. High 
governance scores can therefore be consistent with a country’s failure to provide the 
most basic services, like schooling, hospitals and anti-poverty measures, to its citizens. 
(3) The scores are from 2010. Mali’s governance scores therefore represent the situation 
before the eruption of civil war in 2013. 
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 (1) Malaria (0.89), schooling (0.90), life expectancy (0.89) and quality 
of institutions (0.88) all display a significant degree of causal necessity with 
GNI per capita. But the rate of ethnic fractionalisation does not, either alone 
or in combination with other causal variables. 
 (2) The four necessary causal variables all display a high degree of 
coverage. 
 (3) Only one causal pathway proves sufficient at a 0.75 consistency 
level to determine high GNI per capita, namely a high score in each of the five 
causal variables (0.79). However, one more only narrowly misses the 
consistency threshold, namely a low score in ethnic fractionalisation and a 
high score in the rest (0.74). None of them, however, consistently reveal the 
outcome, suggesting that these variables by themselves are only part of the 
picture. 
 (4) Three causal pathways do, however, prove sufficient to determine 
low GNI per capita at the 0.75 consistency level, and have zero contradictory 
cases. 
 
5.6 Discussion 
 
 It is telling that of the five separate causal variables that were tested 
here, four displayed a statistically significant relationship with GNI per 
capita. This suggests all or most of these four must be present to achieve 
high growth. 
 It is equally telling, but not surprising, that the relationship between 
the negated causal variable and the negated outcome variable is not 
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statistically significant in any of the four causal variables. This suggests 
that any particular variable is not in itself necessary to predict the outcome 
of low development. This is expected. The rather trivial lesson, but one 
that regressions do not easily capture, is that failure is a lot easier than 
success. The significance of the relationship between poor institutions and 
low development is considerably less than between good institutions and 
high development. In a sense, this echoes the principle of convergence in 
macroeconomics. All other things being equal, countries with a low level of 
development are able to achieve growth rates that are unrealistic for 
developed countries, since they have already developed their 
infrastructure, educated the population, and reduced illness. The low-
hanging fruits of economic growth have already been picked.100 
 What is the effect of institutions? The findings at first seem to lend 
strong support to the institutional thesis: There is a powerful correlation 
between the quality of institutions and economic performance. Each case’s 
score for institutional quality is consistently higher than or equal to its 
GNI per capita score, strongly suggesting that institutions are a necessary 
causal variable in relation to economic performance. In other words, good 
institutions seem to be a prerequisite for development. This is hardly a 
great surprise, and corresponds with the bulk of the development 
economics output on the topic. 
 What is equally significant, however, is that institutions are far from 
sufficient to explain economic growth. The absence of good institutions 
                                                   
100 Nazrul Islam, “What Have We Learnt from the Convergence Debate?,” Journal of 
Economic Surveys 17, no. 3 (2003): 309–62. 
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strongly suggests low growth, with a coverage of 0.49. However, the 
presence of good institutions does relatively little to explain growth itself. 
 Interestingly, this is a feature that conventional statistical methods 
do not take into account. From a logical standpoint, however, it is 
reasonable to assume that the presence of a particular factor can be an 
impediment to an outcome without simultaneously assuming that the 
absence of that factor will be conducive to growth.101 
 Why is ethnic fractionalisation not significant? It would be absurd 
to suggest that ethic fractionalisation does not affect development. There 
are plenty of examples to prove that ethnicity has been a driver of conflict 
and instability, which in turn has hampered development. Just looking at 
the spate of ethnically motivated conflicts that took place in the 1990s in 
the Balkans, Somalia and Rwanda should make it obvious that ethnic 
conflict has had a real and damaging effect on many parts of the world. 
 What it does not have, however, is a uniform way for the effects to 
manifest themselves on the political landscape. Put another way, this data 
suggests that ethnic fractionalisation itself is too dependent on the 
political, cultural, historical or geographical context to stand alone as an 
independent causal variable. It depends on the way the members of ethnic 
groups see themselves in opposition to other members of their state, and 
whether the historic processes of each country have led to particular 
patterns of trust or mistrust that feed into present day politics.102 Rwanda 
and Burundi, for instance, both score 0.8 for fractionalisation, as both 
consist of only two major ethnic groups, comprising 85 and 15% of the 
                                                   
101 Ragin, Redesigning Social Enquiry, 138. 
102 See, for instance, Posner, “The Political Salience of Cultural Difference.” 
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population respectively. Yet ethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis has 
fuelled some of the worst humanitarian disasters in modern times. 
 What does malaria tell us independently of quality of institutions? 
Perhaps the most obvious finding of this study is that both the prevalence 
of malaria and the quality of institutions are both highly correlated with 
level of development. To the institutionalist or geography-sceptic this 
would seem to suggest that that the prevalence of malaria tells us nothing 
that the quality of institutions does not already tell us. Acemoglu and 
Robinson, for instance, claim that the quality of institutions was 
influenced by the geographic starting conditions at the time of 
colonisation, but that the subsequent centuries of economic development 
come down to the evolution of institutions independent of geographic 
starting points.103 A more likely reading, however, is that the geographic 
endowment factors that lead to particular forms of institutions being set 
up, continue to exert their influence on economic development today, 
either directly or through their effects on institutions or both.104 
 What about the nine countries that score higher on GNI per capita 
than malaria prevalence? The following countries violated the general 
principle that low malaria prevalence is a necessary condition of high 
growth (fuzzy set scores for malaria first, scores for GNI per capita 
second): Angola (0.0, 0.2), Congo (Brazzaville) (0.0, 0.2), Equatorial 
Guinea (0.0, 0.8), Gabon (o.o, o.6), Namibia (0.2, 0.4), Oman (0.0, 0.8), 
Philippines (o.o, o.2) and Saudi Arabia (0.8, 1.0). Of those Congo 
(Brazzaville) has a per capita GNI of $1,381, only slightly above the 
                                                   
103 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail. 
104 Sachs, “Government, Geography, and Growth.” 
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threshold of $1,035 between those considered fully and almost fully out of 
the subset of rich countries. The same is true of the Philippines, at $1,406. 
The extent to which these two countries really violate the general 
correlation trend is therefore debatable. For the remaining seven, Namibia 
is the odd one out, and I cannot offer an explanation for it here. The other 
six are all major oil producers, relying heavily on the revenue from crude 
oil to sustain their GDP and national budgets. 
 These analyses suggest that states have, by and large, taken the 
same path to development. That is, in order for a country to develop, it 
must score highly in several categories, rather than just institutions. Of 
course, several of the variables are highly exogenous. Not only can high life 
expectancy and schooling improve economic development directly as well 
as through institutions, but higher GNI levels may also have a positive 
effect on health and education, as rich countries are able to afford a better 
quality of services for their citizens. But the cyclical nature is not a given. 
Depending on the circumstances the variables may feed into each other to 
varying degrees, depending on the conditions and policy priorities of any 
given country. 
 This points to one of the limitations of this study – it does not by 
itself establish which direction the arrow of causality points. It can in 
many cases be gauged by deductive logic and a knowledge of the specifics 
of each case, but this still falls far short of a statistical proof of 
directionality.  
 Within the fs/QCA method, I identify two possible avenues for 
further research. The first is to include a temporal dimension to the 
research, whereby the cases are examined at several points in time, and 
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the development of each variable over time is compared to see if changes 
in scores across variables follow a particular temporal pattern. Such a 
study, unfortunately, would be limited by availability of data. The further 
back in time you go, the bigger the holes in the available information, and 
the more cases will have to be rejected due to lack of data. 
 The second, and potentially more promising avenue of research, is 
to conduct a second round of analysis with a significantly smaller number 
of cases. Focusing on a sub-set of the sample in this study, such as only 
including sub-Saharan African countries, would enable the researcher to 
select cases that display the same patterns of the causal variables 
examined here, while testing for new ones that are more specifically 
relevant to that particular region. These may be able to reveal significant 
different pathways to certain development outcomes that cannot be 
captured by a study with the geographical scale of the one presented here. 
 
5.7 Implications for the institutional thesis 
 
 With these findings in mind, let us now return to the philosophical 
argument. When Risse writes that “prosperity is primarily determined by 
the quality of institutions,” 105  he is only half right. Institutions are 
necessary, but do not by themselves guarantee the right outcome. Risse 
argues that the institutional thesis creates a prima facie reason not to give 
development assistance: Since what is needed cannot be developed other 
                                                   
105 Risse, On Global Justice, 63. 
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than from within, and cannot be provided from the outside, it makes little 
sense to try to help.106 
 As a general principle, this is undoubtedly sound – although, as I 
argue in the next chapter, there may be some cases where outside 
assistance can shore up institutions where they already exist. But I would 
make two claims, one empirical and one normative. First, this study 
suggests that the prima facie reason against development assistance may 
be overcome in a significant number of cases, even among some of the 
poorest countries in the world. In these cases, the duty of assistance is not 
limited by the concerns Risse highlights, and is therefore potentially 
greater than we would otherwise assume. And second, it follows from the 
discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 that, given that there is a duty to assist 
developing societies in their task wherever it is possible, there must also be 
a duty to look out for those situations where it is possible. That is, we 
cannot assume that reasons against assistance, such as the institutional 
thesis, compelling though they may be in many cases, apply universally. 
 What the discussion has shown is that it is far from clear that 
institutions are as essential a factor as the institutional thesis makes them 
out to be. Yes, good institutions are necessary for high growth. But as this 
analysis has shown, it is by no means universally true that they are more 
significant than other factors. In fact, a healthy malaria environment, a 
high education level and a high life expectancy may all be equally 
necessary. Poor institutions are not by themselves a necessary factor in 
                                                   
106 Ibid., 68–69. 
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determining low GNI per capita. Even if the pathways to success are very 
limited, there are myriad pathways to failure. 
 With several factors being necessary, an important message to take 
away from this discussion is that state failure does not always hinge on the 
quality of institutions. In some cases this is, of course, the case. North 
Korea is a case in point (although, using Rawlsian terminology, we would 
of course label it an outlaw state rather than a burdened one). In other 
cases, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, conditions converge 
to create a near-hopeless situation of an extremely hazardous health 
environment, poor health in large part due to the prevalence of HIV, poor 
education levels, and very poor institutions. In this case it is not easy to 
see how the internationalist duty of assisting development can be met. But 
in other cases it is far from clear that poor institutions are the problem. 
Ghana, for instance, fits this category with (for sub-Saharan Africa) a very 
high institutional score of 0.8, yet with 0.0 in GNI per capita. What 
explains the difference? From the data discussed here the obvious 
explanation seems to be malaria which scores 0.0 indicating an extremely 
high risk. A score of 0.4 in life expectancy, indicating a poor health 
environment in general, compounds the problems. 
 The upshot is that the institutional thesis cannot be taken as the 
guiding principle by anyone who takes responsibilities towards the 
developing world seriously. While it is obviously true that in some cases 
poor institutions are the primary cause of poverty, this is not a universal 
rule. In cases such as Ghana, it is essential not to explain away an 
otherwise potentially significant responsibility to aid development by 
reference to lazy assertions; the problem is not necessarily that Ghanaians 
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do not know how to govern themselves properly. This does not mean that 
the solution is readily available; it may very well be that at present we do 
not know what it would take to turn the country around. It may involve too 
many unknowables to predict successes. Or perhaps the technology 
necessary to overcome their difficulties (such as effective means of 
combatting malaria) is not yet available. Nonetheless, when compared 
with earlier cases linked to strong Western geopolitical interests, such as 
South Korea, the effort being spent on cases like Ghana by the 
international community is pitiful.107 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I have shown that the institutional thesis, favoured 
by Rawls and Risse, does not hold up. I conducted an fs/QCA analysis of 
five independent variables – malaria prevalence, ethnic fractionalisation, 
education, health and institutional quality – and one outcome variable – 
development as measured in GNI per capita – across 102 countries. It 
showed that while good institutions are indeed a necessary precondition 
for development, so are all the other variables apart from ethnic 
fractionalisation. 
 The upshot is that it would be wrong to assume, as is implicit in the 
institutional thesis, that where a country fails to develop it is because of 
the poor quality of its institutions. There could be several reasons, and 
even if institutions cannot easily be improved from the outside, it may be 
                                                   
107 I discuss these examples extensively in Chapter 6. 
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that other factors are holding a country back. In those cases the 
institutional thesis does not constrain the duty of development in the way 
proponents think. 
 The main strength of using fs/QCA rather than regression analysis 
is that it captures the difference between necessary conditions and 
sufficient ones. Indeed, what this study has shown is that while no less 
than four of the five causal variables tested are necessary for development, 
none of them are sufficient by themselves to produce an outcome, and 
even those combinations that are sufficient reveal some degree of 
contradiction. This suggests that further research is needed to find out 
which additional variables separate the cases within the identified 
sufficient causal pathway that confirm the outcome, and those that do not. 
This is not an easy task. 
 The next chapter will explore in further detail the issue of causal 
relationships between improvements in the causal variables examined here 
and improved development, through a discussion of the effectiveness of 
development assistance and obstacles to its successful implementation. It 
will do so through a survey of the literature of development effectiveness 
and a qualitative case study, Ghana. 
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Chapter 6 – Our Capacity to Help 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter I disputed the idea that poor governance 
and poverty were strongly correlated. Instead, I showed that while poor 
governance is a sufficient precondition for poverty (badly governed 
countries are overwhelmingly likely to be poor), it is not essential for 
poverty either (even reasonably well-governed countries risk being poor if 
other factors conspire against it). Therefore, while we may grant (as, 
indeed, the research I present in this chapter suggests we should) that 
there is currently very little we can do to assist those in poorly governed 
countries beyond humanitarian emergency aid, our philosophical 
framework must not ignore the other group of developing countries, whose 
failure to grow is not a direct consequence of poor governance. In this 
chapter I argue that the relevant empirical question motivating a 
philosophical enquiry into the duty towards developing countries should 
not be, is aid effective? Rather, better and more relevant questions 
include: Under what circumstances is aid effective, what measures are 
likely to result in positive outcomes, and under what circumstances, and to 
what extent, will outside forces be able to intervene with a reasonable 
chance of success, without risking negative unintended consequences? 
 This chapter has four aims. First, it outlines what internationalists 
assume to be the current state of knowledge in development literature, 
about what aid on the ground can actually do, and why countries remain 
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poor. It finds that internationalists tend to be sceptical about the 
transformative ability of development assistance. 
 Next, in Section 6.3, it shows that a substantive amount of literature 
reaches a different conclusion, namely that there is plenty of evidence that 
aid under certain specific conditions can be effective. Although the 
situations in which this happens may be limited, the general conclusion is 
that aid has had a positive, if limited, effect overall, and that in specific 
situations it has done a tremendous amount of good. I also discuss 
qualitatively the role that institutions play in determining the success or 
failure of aid programmes. 
 Section 6.5 illustrates this through the example of Ghana, which 
scores very highly on the governance indicators, but has not in 23 years of 
democracy managed to convert this to wealth. I suggest three specific 
areas: Improving the strength of governmental capacity, especially through 
supporting elections; improving health through malaria eradication; and 
improving infrastructure and industrialisation. Finally, Section 6.6 asks 
what the broader lessons political philosophers, and internationalists 
especially, should take from these examples. I argue that there is a duty of 
development that applies to the likes of Ghana which, despite the 
protestations of internationalists, can in large part be discharged as things 
stand now. Finally, I suggest some general lessons for discharging the duty 
of development. 
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6.2 The duty of development in context 
 
 At times the duty of development assistance will be very demanding. 
At other times, it will not. That depends not only on whether a particular 
issue at hand normatively falls within the scope of what the 
internationalist duty of development requires. It also depends on whether 
there is anything we can actually do to cause the necessary changes. As 
with most things, there is significant disagreement in the literature. But is 
that disagreement reflected in the way our duties towards developing 
countries are presented? 
 Internationalists generally take a sceptical approach to aid 
effectiveness. An exception is Blake who, if nothing else, is refreshingly 
honest about empirical matters: “I am not an expert in empirical 
international relations, nor do I pretend to be.”1 His view on what is owed 
to the world’s poorest, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, is conditional on the 
assumptions he makes about how the world works, but he makes no 
attempt to prove them, or even ground them in existing empirical work. 
 But others have no such compunctions. Risse argues that 
philosophers “underestimate the relevance of empirical questions for 
normative enquiries, to the detriment of our discussions and of the impact 
of political philosophy outside philosophical circles.”2 Given the focus of 
this thesis it should come as no surprise that I nod in strong agreement 
with these sentiments, even if I disagree with his conclusions. 
                                                   
1 Blake, Justice and FP, 108. 
2 Risse, “What We Owe to the Global Poor,” 86. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 6 – Our Capacity to Help 
241 of 373 
 As non-ideal theory, dealing with the question not of what the ideal 
end-state of things ought to be, but how to make progress from our current 
starting point,3 it clearly matters to our political convictions what the facts 
on the ground are. Nonetheless, Rawls does not have much to say about 
what the duty to assist burdened societies actually requires, other than 
emphasising the role of institutions and political culture. He provides a 
few pointers, mainly on the importance of institutions and reasons to be 
sceptical about the importance of natural endowments, along with noting 
that merely giving money will usually not solve the problem. Moreover, he 
emphasises the importance of improving the rights of women as a means 
of development.4 
 Richard Miller highlights the role of special interests in the 
distribution of development resources. The world’s great powers, he says, 
are not motivated by a desire to help the world’s poorest, but rather in 
“using aid to cajole, support and threaten [in a way] that guarantees 
volatility as challenges and opportunities change location over time.”5 
Consequently, aid is often much more volatile than other resource flows, is 
wasteful, and is hampered by a limited bureaucratic structure that is 
incapable of absorbing it effectively. This places “stringent limits of 
political feasibility”6 on the duty of direct development assistance. By and 
large, the duty cannot be repaid. This has obvious implications for the duty 
of development. But it also places the emphasis elsewhere. The question 
here is not primarily whether the aid is being mismanaged on the ground 
                                                   
3 Rawls, LP, 89; Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory,” 660–662. 
4 Rawls, LP, 108–110. 
5 Miller, Globalizing Justice, 227. 
6 Ibid., 228. 
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in the target country, or whether it has unintended negative consequences. 
It is about the motivations behind giving it in the first place. The fault lies 
with the West, and with the way the world’s richest conduct their foreign 
policy. This is an area I return to in detail in Chapter 7. 
 Risse is equally sceptical, but his scepticism is instead aimed at the 
process of development assistance itself, arguing that, however well-
intentioned, aid is ultimately unlikely to be successful. He puts forward 
three reasons against international assistance, which must be overcome in 
order to justify it.7 This, he is clear, does not mean that they will never be 
met, only that they are not likely to met in many cases. Moreover, these 
reasons can be overruled if the need is great enough. The first reason is 
that assistance may be ineffective, because in too many cases we simply do 
not know what can be done. Institution-building – which is what really 
matters – cannot be exported but has to be developed within. The second 
reason is the risk of paternalism. Here Risse means something different 
from R. Miller’s paternalism objection I discussed in Chapter 4. Rather 
than assuming that any assistance beyond a certain level is paternalistic 
per definition, simply because societies will want to take pride in helping 
themselves without outside help, Risse’s concern is much narrower: 
Outsiders shape the institutions they set up in their own image, whether or 
not they are necessarily the best fit given the circumstances. The third 
reason is that the stability of the target country’s institutions could be 
                                                   
7 Risse, On Global Justice, 69. 
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undermined if they rely on outside assistance. Once the assistance ends, 
they could fall apart.8 
 These reasons are all clearly pertinent. The challenge is to show that 
they can all be answered, and that the duty of assistance is therefore 
significant. This does not mean that they can be answered in all cases; that 
would be far too high a bar. But conversely, it does not mean simply 
proving that there is a good enough chance that they will statistically be 
answered in some proportion of cases, however defined. That would be 
setting it too low, especially considering how significant the human cost of 
getting it wrong can be. The task must be to show that it is possible to say 
with a high enough degree of confidence what works and is needed in 
specific cases, and what works and is needed in others. Moreover, it must 
be possible to identify the interventions that are likely to be successful and 
therefore command a substantial duty, and which ones are likely to be 
inefficient and therefore do not. In the following section I go through the 
three reasons, to examine what the current development literature has to 
say about the challenges in overcoming each of them. 
 
6.3 Is aid effective? 
 
 Critics often accuse proponents of increased development aid of 
being overly optimistic about its potential to transform the fortunes of the 
poorest. They instead maintain that the majority of aid disbursed over the 
past many decades has at best been wasted, and at worst caused a lot of 
                                                   
8 Ibid. 
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harm. 9  Indeed, two of the most prominent voices in the public 
development debate in recent years, William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo, 
both come down squarely on the side of “aid does not work”. 
 Seemingly fond of dichotomous exposition, Easterly suggests that 
development aid is, lamentably, currently the preserve of “Planners” such 
as Jeffrey Sachs and the people behind the UN Millennium goals, while the 
solutions are actually to be found by the “Searchers”, who meticulously 
test small-scale interventions and rigorously confine their efforts to the 
areas they know work: 
 
In foreign aid, Planners announce good intentions but don’t 
motivate anyone to carry them out; Searchers find things that 
work and get some reward. Planners raise expectations but 
take no responsibility for meeting them; Searchers accept 
responsibility for their actions. Planners determine what to 
supply; Searchers find out what’s in demand. Planners apply 
global blueprints; Searchers adapt to local conditions. 
Planners at the top lack knowledge of the bottom; Searchers 
find out what the reality is at the bottom. Planners never hear 
whether the planned got what it needed; Searchers find out if 
the customer is satisfied.10 
 
 Moyo’s famous tirade against development aid, Dead Aid, is even 
more critical of what she sees as a tragic failure of the West in their 
                                                   
9 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
10 Ibid., 5. 
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responsibilities towards Africa. In refusing to hold governments to account 
and instead ensuring that no matter how irresponsibly they behave they 
are bailed out by Western money, we are in fact aiding and abetting the 
very poverty we are trying to prevent. While she does not deny that other 
factors may play their part, including geography, the history of 
colonialism, and ethnic tensions, none of these are deciding factors. After 
all, “Saudi Arabia is rather hot, and, of course, Switzerland is landlocked, 
but these factors have not stopped them from getting on with it.”11 Rather, 
the problems Africa faces all essentially come down to aid: “For most 
countries, a direct consequence of the aid-driven interventions has been a 
dramatic descent into poverty.”12 Instead, she says, we should inform each 
African government that all aid will be phased out over the next five years. 
This will force governments to grow up and get their house in order, to be 
able to secure capital on the private markets and attract foreign direct 
investment.13 
 But both these proposals, critics contend, fail to take fully into 
account just how complex the picture really is, albeit in radically different 
ways. In Easterly’s case, he seems to assume that every aid problem is one 
that can be solved by tapping into the hitherto underused potential of 
market dynamics, and by small-scale interventions. Moreover, there is a 
tendency for those projects that fail to be labelled as the fault of 
“Planners”, while those that succeed get attributed to “Searchers”. 14 As 
such, there is an element of the No True Scotsman fallacy to his thinking. 
                                                   
11 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid (London: Penguin, 2010), 31. 
12 Ibid., 47. 
13 Ibid., 74–76. 
14 Amartya Sen, “Review: The Man without a Plan: Can Foreign Aid Work,” Foreign 
Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 171–77. 
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Moyo, by contrast, is the ultimate thinker of big, sweeping thoughts. There 
seems to be little difference in her analysis between money given directly 
to local governments or administered by NGOs, or between money given 
today and the millions given to, for instance, Zaire’s Mobuto Seko Sese as a 
part of a deliberate strategy to keep him on side in the Cold War. All seems 
to be equally problematic. Moreover, her plan to transform some of the 
poorest, most corrupt autocracies in the world into responsible, efficient 
governments via hardly anything more than a phone call from the World 
Bank is, in her own words, “dead easy to implement.”15 It is no wonder that 
one reviewer, the executive director of the Overseas Development Institute 
Kevin Watkins, describes her as “tilting at windmills.” 16  The way the 
debate has played out in some of the most popular volumes, then, has 
largely been one of dichotomous juxtaposition, between those who argue 
that development aid works, and those who say it does not. 
 But what is largely absent from the public debate, but is nonetheless 
evident in smaller or larger degree in all of these commentators when you 
read beyond the by-line, is that development assistance is a tool, and its 
effectiveness depends on how, when and where it is being used. It is not 
clear that the question, “does aid work?” is actually all that meaningful a 
question. It all depends on what kind of aid is given. It depends on what 
the development assistance is used for, what the aim is, how well it is 
being implemented, and whether it is appropriate for the specific scenario. 
                                                   
15 Moyo, Dead Aid, 148. 
16 Kevin Watkins, “Why Dead Aid Is Dead Wrong,” Prospect Magazine, April 5, 2009, 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/whydeadaidisdeadwrong. 
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 The empirical question that should guide a philosophical enquiry 
into duties towards developing countries, therefore, should not be whether 
aid is effective. Instead, the question is whether we understand under what 
circumstances it is effective, and what kind of support will be necessary. It 
is intuitively logical that aid has the potential to be effective in some places 
while not in others. The question is to what extent development experts 
feel confident that they can prescribe the right medicine and be reasonably 
sure of success. 
 Where aid critics do indeed have a point is that aid virtually always 
has some negative externalities which work against the goals that donors 
work towards. But to what extent can aid be harmful, and how does that 
compare with other sources of government revenue? Unless done expertly, 
large aid flows may make it difficult for good governance to develop in 
both the short and long term. Bräutigam and Knack, for instance, argue 
that by doing the very things that improve bureaucracy and rule of law, 
such as reducing corruption and improving public finances, donors risk 
creating collective action problems that impede the adoption of these 
practices by local authorities. These include free rider problems, where the 
local governments may simply not have any incentive to adopt good 
practices, and face no significant penalty for not doing so. But they also 
include more intractable problems. Aid projects require government 
oversight, which pries resources away from the day-to-day business of 
running a government. Moreover, government institutions are not able to 
pay the salaries that donors can offer, creating a risk of brain drain from 
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the public to the third sector.17 While some of these problems are unique to 
aid, however, Faisal Ahmad finds that inflows of all kinds, both aid and 
remittances, can prolong authoritarian regimes by allowing them to shift 
from supplying welfare provisions to the people to paying off allies and 
would-be competitors alike.18 It is therefore not clear if aid programmes 
merely have some negative side effects, or if (some of) these are unique to 
aid programmes. 
 All of these potential revenue sources are, to a smaller or greater 
extent, volatile. Remittances depend on the economic climates of the 
places the money is sent from, and as the last several years have made 
abundantly clear, the price of oil can vary enormously from year to year. 
But aid volatility is different not necessarily because of its effects, but 
because it is one that donors in developed countries control. The question 
then is whether aid volatility is necessary, and if development assistance 
would be more effective if volatility were reduced. 
 First off it is important to note that not all aid volatility is bad. 
Positive volatility occurs as a response to an exogenous shock, such as a 
famine, floods, civil war or other emergency which requires an immediate 
response. Negative volatility, on the other hand, results from sudden drops 
in aid levels at the whim of the donor.19 While the aid volatility that comes 
from responding to a humanitarian disaster is a necessary by-product of 
that response itself, the danger is that a positive instance of aid volatility 
                                                   
17 Deborah A. Bräutigam and Stephen Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance 
in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, no. 2 (2004): 
255–85. 
18 Faisal Z. Ahmed, “The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and 
Government Survival,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 1 (2012): 146–65. 
19 John Hudson and Paul Mosley, “Aid Volatility, Policy and Development,” World 
Development 36, no. 10 (2008): 2089. 
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results in a negative one, when aid levels in another country are reduced to 
pay for it. 
 Studies by both Hudson and Mosley, and Bulíř and Hamann find 
that aid volatility exerts a small but significant negative influence on 
economic stability in donor countries. Moreover, aid volatility is not going 
away, but has in fact increased in the 2000s relative to the 1990s. Aid 
volatility is often as high as three times the volatility of government 
resources more generally, making sound fiscal policy hard to achieve.20 A 
big problem, in particular, is that “aid commitments continue to be poor 
predictors of disbursements, a problem that is particularly serious among 
countries with the lowest per capita incomes.” 21  Bulíř and Hamann 
therefore argue that macroeconomic stability should be given higher 
priority and made a more explicit goal of development aid.22 
 Excessive planning, especially when ideologically motivated, can 
play havoc with results. Jonathan Monten highlights the difference 
between the American occupation of Japan following World War II 
(WWII), and Iraq in recent years. Where the post-war rebuilding of Japan 
was focused on creating solutions tailored to Japanese conditions, the 
Bush administration sought to re-create Iraq in its image, as a liberal 
democracy.23  
                                                   
20 Hudson and Mosley, “Aid Volatility, Policy and Development”; Aleš Bulíř and Javier 
Hamann, “Volatility of Development Aid: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?,” World 
Development 36, no. 10 (2008): 2048–66. 
21 Bulíř and Javier Hamann, “Volatility of Development Aid,” 2061. Their italics. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Jonathan Monten, “Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 656 (2014): 187. 
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 One of the key lessons is that building institutional structure is 
extremely difficult. The question of what institutions are best suited for 
any given environment is therefore not necessarily one of best cultural fit. 
Nor is there any such thing as an “ideal” institutional structure. The best 
structure is the one that is already in place. Therefore, efforts should be 
focused on strengthening and empowering government where it is, even if 
it is not the form you would have chosen. 
 This does not mean that the international community should never 
promote democracy. Many autocracies are imperfect democracies, paying 
lip service to the ideals of democracies all-the-while rigging elections. But 
in these cases, whatever the rules these regimes pretend to play by 
(presidential, bicameral, etc.), civil society will almost certainly be pushing 
for the rules that exist to be followed. 
 The concern for avoiding paternalism also suggests that donor 
organisations should be very clear about how they intend to justify their 
operations to the local population, and ensuring that their policies are 
geared towards making recipient governments accountable to the people 
rather than to themselves. Hudson and Mosley suggest that where this has 
been done, in Uganda, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania to name a few 
examples, trust between donors and recipients have improved leading to 
better outcomes.24 
 The problems that aid causes are rarely unique to development 
assistance, but are caused to a similar, or worse, degree by remittances and 
natural resources. Abdih et al. suggest that remittances, sometimes 
                                                   
24 Hudson and Mosley, “Aid Volatility, Policy and Development,” 2097. 
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thought of as immune from, or at least less susceptible to, having adverse 
effects on governance quality, still affect the incentives that governments 
face. Despite normally being household-to-household transfers, thereby 
bypassing a potentially corrupt government altogether, remittances 
nonetheless encourage corruption and patronage politics. This is because 
they enable citizens to buy social goods, including health care and 
education, privately when they would otherwise have been provided by the 
government. Even if remittances themselves are not taxed, and therefore 
do not expand the total tax base, they enable the government to raise other 
taxes, such as VAT.25 Moreover, these effects seem to have no overall 
positive effect on growth, probably because some positive effects of 
remittances are outweighed in roughly equal measure by negative ones.26 
As a result, higher remittance rates are associated with poor institutional 
quality. 
 Another source of confusion, Paul Collier suggests, is that many aid 
critics assume that aid works in ways comparable to oil resources. That is, 
they are in effect free money that allows leaders to steer their attention 
away from providing benefits to the population and towards servicing ties 
of patronage. But, Collier says, aid is not free-flowing but comes with both 
restrictions and expertise attached. Consequently he argues that aid has 
proven much more effective than resource rents in providing lasting 
growth. While the effects of aid are hardly impressive, this is in large part 
                                                   
25 Yasser Abdih et al., “Remittances and Institutions: Are Remittances a Curse?,” World 
Development 40, no. 4 (2012): 657–658. 
26 Ibid., 664. 
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due to the fact that aid sums are several orders of magnitude smaller than 
both realised and potential resource rents.27 
 Indeed, the size of the average aid packet plays an important role in 
how it is evaluated. The ripple effect of a change in the level of aid may be 
substantially different from a similar change, percentage-wise, in a 
revenue source such as natural resources, where the latter may be several 
times larger. Therefore, Mushtaq Khan suggests, the way aid’s effects on 
the local economy is evaluated is often faulty, underplaying its importance. 
Critics implicitly assume that small variations in aid are replicable on a 
bigger scale. But if a 5% drop in aid is offset by an x increase in domestic 
savings, that does not mean a 100% drop in aid can be offset by 20x 
increases. When small drops in aid money are compensated for by other 
savings, it therefore does not prove that the effect of that aid was neutral. 
Moreover, identifying the effects of aid programmes might end up showing 
that they have non-linear outcomes. Linear changes in aid levels may 
result in changing magnitudes of outcomes, depending on contingent 
political and social factors.28 
 Ample research therefore shows that aid is hardly alone in having 
negative side-effects. Moreover, this is true for democratic regimes as well. 
On average, one study suggests, resource rents begin causing democracies 
to “under-perform” when they reach 8% of GDP. This, Collier suggests, is 
because check and balances, not least freedom of the press, play a key role 
in mitigating the potentially destructive role that competitive elections 
                                                   
27 Paul Collier, “Is Aid Oil? An Analysis of Whether Africa Can Absorb More Aid,” World 
Development 34, no. 9 (2006): 1485–1490. 
28 Mushtaq H. Khan, “Aid and Governance in Vulnerable States: Bangladesh and 
Pakistan since 1971,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 656 (2014): 68. 
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may have on national cohesiveness. But resource rents “gradually erode” 
these benefits, by enabling the governing party to buy off or silence 
critics.29 
 Indeed, argue Niño and Le Billion, the evidence of the former 
Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola provide an example of the 
different costs of over-reliance on both natural resources and aid. Recently 
Mozambique, with a relatively weak government structure, has had more 
success improving on social indicators, like poverty and child mortality 
reductions, relative to the more robust state in Angola. This would suggest 
that Mozambique, despite its high dependence on development assistance 
compared with Angola, has been more successful in those areas. The 
authors are careful to note that both countries started from very low 
baselines, and Mozambique still falls below Angola in many social 
indicators.30 Their research points to many problems with aid, including 
creating fiscal incentives in Mozambique that have kept resource 
extraction low and largely outside the control of the state, as well as 
making it very difficult to increase the tax base. Nonetheless, Angola has 
struggled with translating increased wealth and fiscal autonomy into 
actual improvements in living standards for the majority of citizens. Their 
revenue is geared towards ensuring regime stability, with a highly 
centralised government that struggles to reach far beyond the capital. The 
upshot, the authors argue, is that while aid donors are right to focus on 
accountability, they need to think about revenue collection and ensuring 
                                                   
29 Collier, “Is Aid Oil?,” 1484. 
30 Helena Pérez Niño and Philippe Le Billon, “Foreign Aid, Resource Rents, and State 
Fragility in Mozambique and Angola,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 656 (2014): 83. 
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that the twin goals of regime stability and the effective provision of social 
services line up.31 
 One of the more frequent criticisms of aid has been the way it has 
historically been linked closely with great power politics. As a tool of self-
interested foreign governments, both the US and the Soviet Union in 
particular used development aid not as a means of ensuring that 
democracy and rule of law were consolidated across Africa, but of ensuring 
the support of despotic rulers and access to valuable natural resources. 
These kinds of policies led to the US giving billions of dollars to the 
dictator of Zaire (the present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo), 
Mobuto Sese Seko, in the full knowledge that none of it would go to 
improving the lot of ordinary people.32 Against a backdrop like that, it is 
hardly surprising that aid has a bad reputation, or that historically it has 
been associated with poor governance. But Bräutigam and Knack find that 
there has been a change in attitude since the end of the Cold War. 
Although aid still has an overall negative effect on governance, this effect 
declined significantly from the 1980s to the 1990s. They attribute this 
change to an increased focus on reducing those negative side effects, which 
signifies a shift away from development assistance as primarily a political 
tool.33 
 All in all, then, the literature is fairly unequivocal in arguing that aid 
has some negative consequences. However, as Collier elegantly puts it, this 
is neither surprising nor evidence of failure. He invites us to compare it 
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32 Miller, Globalizing Justice, 171–176. 
33 Bräutigam and Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance,” 275. 
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with a hospital which, he argues, has a similar “negative baseline” that 
must be overcome. When you bring sick people together in a single 
building you risk infections and diseases that spread not just between 
patients but also between staff and visitors. Many people get sick from 
visiting hospitals. Similarly, development aid tends to lower government 
accountability and institutional quality. Yet a well-run hospital is able to 
overcome this negative baseline and provide a vital service, and no one 
would seriously argue that we would be better off without hospitals.34 
Where hospitals do fail, the solution is to fix them or, at worst, build a new 
one; similarly, where aid fails, the solution is not to rebuke the concept of 
aid itself, but rather to search for ways to make it more efficient. 
 The point is not to suggest that remittances or natural resource 
revenues are bad. But this overview shows that there is no obvious solution 
to global poverty that does not have potential drawbacks. This includes 
many of the solutions that aid critics suggest can substitute for aid money. 
Remittances, supposedly one of the more democratic means of supporting 
people in developing countries, are not immune from negative external 
effects on government. Nor is revenue from natural resources, even in 
democratic contexts. The fact that development aid has negative secondary 
effects in certain circumstances must therefore be understood in context. 
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6.4 How institutions play in 
 
 The idea that “aid is not working” has large traction in society at 
large, no doubt driven by images of corruption and hunger in developing 
countries, not to mention vast numbers of refugee clamouring to enter 
Europe on dinghies across the Mediterranean. The perceived failures of 
the structural adjustment programmes by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) surely cannot have helped aid’s image either. 
 Even within academia there is sometimes a tendency to ignore 
successful cases, or even of treating them as proof that aid is unnecessary. 
Easterly takes this approach: 
 
The Gang of Four – Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
– went from third world to first over the last four decades. 
China, India, and the Gang of Four did this through the 
efforts of many decentralized agents participating in markets 
(the ideal vehicle for feedback and accountability) without 
significant Western assistance as a share of their income, with 
some efforts by their own governments (at their own top), 
and without the West telling them what to do.35 
 
 If that list seems odd, it is because it probably is. It seems 
particularly implausible to argue that Hong Kong have pulled themselves 
up by their bootstraps without Western help. For all but the tail-end of the 
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20th century it was a British colony and, due to its strategic importance, 
was afforded the strong and pervasive governance structure denied “less 
important” British colonies, as well as the military protection necessary to 
maintain peace. Singapore did indeed grow rich largely without the help of 
Western development aid. But having a small and highly concentrated 
population and being located in (and possibly owing its existence to) a 
strategically important juncture on the international shipping routes 
between Asia and the rest of the world, it is not clear what lessons 
countries with less ideal geographies can learn from them. Burma or 
Rwanda are unlikely to become international trading hubs in the near 
future. 
 But the really interesting cases here are Taiwan and South Korea. 
Why? Because, as Kevin Gray points out, those two countries were 
completely dependent on American development aid in the earliest years 
following WWII.36 Moreover, the aid programme on which they depended 
took place on an almost unprecedented scale. Between 1946 and 1975 the 
US Government gifted South Korea over $69 billion, 37  while Taiwan 
received just under $42 billon. By contrast, the entire Latin American and 
Caribbean aid programme was only given just shy of $69 billion over the 
same period.38 Worked out on a per-person basis, that comes to $2,765 per 
citizen in South Korea, $3,730 in Taiwan, and just $387 in Latin America 
and the Caribbean over the 20 year period.39 Indeed, Gray finds that the 
                                                   
36 Kevin Gray, “U.S. Aid and Uneven Development in East Asia,” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 656 (2014): 41–58. 
37 In constant 2011 dollars. 
38 Gray, “U.S. Aid,” 42. 
39 Using population figures for 1960. Averages of calculations based on annual aid figures 
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“provision of U.S. military and economic aid played a crucial role in the 
post-war stabilization of South Korea and Taiwan and in laying the 
foundations for their subsequent economic development.”40 
 But lest you think there is a clear causal link between the amount of 
aid and the end result, Gray warns that that is not the case. Because for all 
the money the US poured into South Korea and Taiwan, neither was the 
largest recipient of US development aid in the region. That honour goes to 
South Vietnam who, between 1954 (when it became independent from 
France) and 1975 received an astonishing $115.7 billion.41 Yet the country’s 
economy failed to take off, and it was quickly plunged into war with its 
northern, communist, neighbour. Why? 
 The difference speaks to the importance of institutional quality as a 
necessary precondition for development. The determining factor in 
whether economic growth was able to take hold was, according to Gray, the 
kinds of institutions left behind by the colonial masters. South Korea and 
Taiwan had both been conquered by Japan early in the 20th century, and 
the Japanese had set about a rapid modernisation programme to 
incorporate them into the Imperial machine. This, in turn, led to 
“comparatively well-developed colonial bureaucracies and infrastructural, 
                                                                                                                                                 
were, approximately, 25 million in South Korea, 11.2 million in Taiwan, and 177.7 million 
across the least developed parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. Data from World 
Bank’s Data Bank (World Bank, “Health Nutrition and Population Statistics: Population 
Estimates and Projections,” Data, accessed March 25, 2016, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=Health%20Nutrition%20and
%20Population%20Statistics:%20Population%20estimates%20and%20projections) for 
South Korea and Latin America and the Caribbean, and from the US Census Bureau’s 
International Programs (United States Census Bureau, “Country Rank,” International 
Programs, 2016, 
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/countryrank/rank.php) for 
Taiwan. 
40 Gray, “U.S. Aid,” 55. 
41 Ibid., 42. 
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agricultural, and industrial development under colonial auspices.”42 To be 
sure, most of the product and produce were exported to Japan and thus 
benefited the local populations little, but the infrastructure was in place by 
the time US aid arrived. Moreover, the rapidity of Japanese colonialism led 
to the inherited power structures being uprooted, giving the traditional 
power base, who would otherwise have had vested interests in opposing 
modernisation, a much smaller say. By contrast, the French colonial 
administration had had only a light touch. It was mainly concerned with 
facilitating the export of raw materials to the ports and on to Europe, and 
educating the Vietnamese people or modernising the country was not 
important to them. Moreover, the country was ruled by just 3,000 officials, 
all French, compared with 87,500 officials in South Korea, of which only 
half were Japanese. South Vietnam, therefore, was ill prepared for taking 
over post-independence administration. Finally, because French colonial 
rule was not pervasive it did little to change the highly unequal 
distribution of land and property in traditional Vietnamese society, which 
enabled the established ruling classes whose vested interests ran counter 
to modernisation to assert their dominance over the post-independence 
political landscape. The result was growing resentment towards the 
regime.43 
 So it would seem that institutions are indeed necessary for aid to be 
truly effective, as Chapter 5 agreed. However, what is equally clear from 
this story is that those institutions are only one piece of the puzzle, and do 
not by themselves explain the incredible success of Taiwan and South 
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Korea. By contrast, the East Asian development story highlights the hugely 
important and beneficial role that a sustained, targeted and, above all, 
substantial development aid package can have in promoting economic 
growth, provided that the conditions are right. 
 But what if the conditions are not right? If the French colonial 
experience was a key factor in preventing development taking hold in 
South Vietnam, how does that bode for the former French colonies in 
Africa, or indeed all those African former colonies who were bequeathed a 
relatively weak governance structure and still struggle under it today? In 
these cases, Collier warns against radically scaling up the volumes of aid, 
at least in the short run. But in contrast with those who see development 
aid as a fundamentally flawed and unlikely to ever be successful, he 
maintains that with the genuine improvements in African governance that 
have happened in recent decades, and with improvements in donor 
practices that ensure better accountability and fewer wasted resources, 
there is a good chance that the continent may be able to effectively absorb 
more aid in the future.44 But for now it seems that in terms of the average 
African state’s ability to penetrate all aspects of society, and thus to absorb 
aid, Africa as a whole is currently more akin to South Vietnam than to 
South Korea or Taiwan. While there is good reason to be tentatively 
optimistic that this will change in the future, most African states may not 
ever be able to absorb the unprecedented levels of development aid that 
poured into these countries. South Korea and Taiwan may have been 
outliers. Nonetheless, Collier suggests that there are several reasons why a 
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significantly scaled-up aid effort may be right in the future. This could for 
instance be a big push to help countries on the brink of escaping poverty 
overcome the final hurdle, enabling them to break into global 
manufacturing markets. Other reasons include supporting a turnaround in 
failing states, acting as a cushion for international trade volatility, and 
offsetting the Dutch disease45 by pairing aid with increased trade, to name 
just a few.46 
 Efforts to promote good governance are much more likely to 
succeed where they are focussed on strengthening it where it already 
exists, rather than creating it from scratch. This proved to be the 
insurmountable obstacle to progress in Vietnam, despite the money 
poured in, and that lesson applies more broadly as well. Jonathan Monten 
therefore argues that a key priority in any programme should be to 
preserve and strengthen the existing state apparatus, as building it where 
it does not already exist is likely to be extremely difficult. What really 
matters is the strength of the state, rather than the scope. The scope of the 
state is the range of functions that the government claims to do, while the 
strength is its ability to carry out and enforce the decisions it has made.47 
While the first may be relatively easy to re-design, the second often 
requires an enormous amount of manpower, trust and institutional 
support, which are very difficult to set up quickly. 
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 On the whole, aid alone is extremely unlikely to solve the problems 
that the world’s least developed countries face. Nonetheless, it has in 
Collier’s estimation added 1% on average to African growth rates in the last 
30 years. While 1% is hardly an economic miracle, it has prevented some 
countries from falling apart under the strain of their many problems.48 “As 
bad as Africa’s growth performance has been over the past three decades, 
it would have been markedly worse without aid.”49 
 But even so, the rationale for continuing to support many of the aid 
projects throughout the developing world is not necessarily that they are 
likely to be successful, but rather that they are worth trying despite the 
risk. Trying to turn around a failing state is unlikely to work in any one 
instance, but the cost of failure is relatively low – the failing state will fail, 
as it was overwhelmingly likely to do anyway. But if the turnaround does 
succeed, the humanitarian benefits are massive and the financial payoffs 
relative to the cost could be exponential.50 
 
6.5 The duty of development in Ghana 
 
 Based on the previous discussion it is clear that external 
involvement can work in the right context, through a mixture of 
development assistance, concerted external pressure and an openness to 
investments. These initiatives have in the past been successful in 
graduating countries from amongst the world’s poorest to among the 
                                                   
48 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What 
Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 99–100. 
49 Collier, “Is Aid Oil?,” 1485. 
50 Ibid., 1492. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 6 – Our Capacity to Help 
263 of 373 
richest. It did, however, also show that these contexts may be quite rare, 
and that in many more cases the factors holding back least developed 
countries may be too myriad for the developed world to affect serious 
change, even through a sustained effort. 
 But it also opens up the possibility that such a sustained long-term 
effort may have a positive effect in a specific sub-set of cases. 
Internationalists place a high value on a country’s quality of governance 
for their ability to develop, and further argue that there is relatively little 
that outsiders can do to improve governance. The previous chapter 
qualified the first part of the statement, showing that while good 
governance seems to be a prerequisite for development, poor governance is 
not in itself enough to explain continued failure for development to take 
off. And the discussion in this chapter has shown that there is reason to 
believe that, although it is indeed very difficult to affect positive 
governance from outside, external pressure and assistance can help 
prevent well-governed countries from sliding backwards, and preserve the 
gains made through the country’s own efforts. 
 Having earlier made the argument in Chapters 3 and 4 that the duty 
of development must be considerably more demanding than most 
internationalists currently acknowledge, the question now is whether the 
second internationalist objection to a demanding duty of international 
assistance – that there is, in fact, relatively little we can do to affect such 
change – can be met. I do not propose here to provide an exhaustive list of 
ways the duty can be discharged. My aim is more modest than that: I will 
here only make the claim that there is a subset of least developed and 
moderately developed countries where growth has failed to take off not 
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because of poor governance or instability, but because of other factors. In 
these cases, I argue, the developed world may be able to make a 
substantial difference. If that is the case, we have a duty to do so, one that 
not only extends far beyond what the developed world currently does to 
aid them, but also beyond what internationalists claim the maximum 
extent of our duty to be. 
 One such country is Ghana, which I focus on here. Based on the 
fs/QCA analysis in the previous chapter, it is possible to preliminarily 
identify several other potential candidates (institutional quality score first, 
GNI score second). In Africa they include Benin (0.6, 0.0), Burkina Faso 
(0.6, 0.0) Lesotho (0.6, 0.2), Malawi (0.6, 0.0), Mozambique (0.6, 0.0), 
Namibia (0.8, 0.4), Rwanda (0.6, 0.0), Senegal (0.6, 0.0), Tanzania (0.6, 
0.0), and Zambia (0.6, 0.0). Outside of Africa, Guyana (0.6, 0.2), India 
(0.6, 0.0) and Indonesia (0.6, 0.2) may be candidates as well.51 I am not in 
any way saying that these countries are candidates for a successful 
increase in development assistance. These numbers are, as I have pointed 
out earlier, predominantly from 2010, and some institutional quality 
scores may have dropped significantly since then. Conversely, some 
countries not included here may in fact have improved their institutional 
scores enough since 2010 to make the list today. Moreover, other factors 
not captured by the institutional quality score will obviously be relevant, 
and different methods will be necessary in each case. Many of the lessons I 
discuss in this section will be specific to Ghana. Nonetheless, what this 
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brief overview shows is that quite a few countries may not be burdened in 
the way the institutional thesis suggests. 
 Ghana does not suffer from poor institutional quality, like so many 
of its West African neighbours. Looking at the fs/QCA data for 
institutional quality that formed the basis of the previous chapter’s 
analysis, Ghana scores a very respectable 0.8. This means that it is almost 
fully within the set of well-governed countries. It is, of course, important 
to keep in mind that even a perfect score of 1 does not mean that a country 
is well-governed by European standards. Even the worst-run countries in 
Western Europe would be considered fully within the set of well-governed 
countries on this scale, even if, say, Italy would only just make it on the 
list. Despite its decent institutional score, however, it scores 0.0 for GDP 
growth. Its position has improved in recent years. While the initial 
measurements used in the previous chapter were from 2005 due to the 
specific dataset used, the World Bank today estimates their GNI per capita 
at $1,590, as of 2014,52 which would give them a score of 0.2 in the fs/QCA 
data. They have improved even further on a slightly larger timescale. In 
the decades immediately following independence, Ghana was widely 
regarded as an economic basket-case, with inflation reaching 122% in 
1983. One of the effects of the IMF’s structural adjustment programmes 
was to steady the economy and reduce inflation to a more manageable 10% 
in 1992, setting Ghana up for subsequent decades of stable GDP growth 
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from then onwards.53 But they are still relatively poor given the apparent 
quality of their institutional apparatus. 
 By contrast, other countries scoring 0.8 for institutional quality 
include Bahrain (with a GDP of $14,833, measured in PPP), Brazil 
($5,513), Kuwait ($38,313), Malaysia ($6,104), Namibia ($3,879), South 
Africa ($5,673), Trinidad and Tobago ($14,437), and United Arab Emirates 
($24,238). 54  Some countries rank slightly higher while still paltry 
performers on a global scale, while others fare significantly better. Of 
course, no one claims that institutional quality is the sole explanation in 
every case, and there are many obvious reasons why some of these 
countries are so much richer than others. Bahrain, Kuwait and United 
Arab Emirates, for instance, boast natural resources that would make most 
other countries envious. Nonetheless it is striking how far further down 
Ghana is. 
 But while the general trajectory of the Ghanaian economy seems to 
be headed upwards, Jasper Ayelazuno nonetheless warns that “Ghana lags 
far behind most countries in Asia and Latin America in other important 
development indicators: human development, basic needs, modernization, 
and industrialisation.” 55  While the macro-economic indicators look 
impressive, this growth has yet to translate into significant improvements 
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in well-being for the majority of the population, who still cannot afford 
basic necessities like food, health care or clean water.56 
 In terms of disease and overall health environment Ghana has, so 
far, been able to avoid the HIV/Aids pandemic that has swept through 
many African countries. The infection rate has remained reasonably stable 
at 3.6% 57  in recent years, thanks to concerted government efforts to 
contain the spread. More recently, the Ebola outbreak that brought much 
of West Africa’s health infrastructure to its knees in recent years bypassed 
Ghana completely. But vast swathes of the country suffer from malaria, for 
which it scored 0.0 in the previous chapter’s fs/QCA analysis, meaning 
Ghana is fully within the subset of malaria-infected countries. As for 
average years of schooling it scored 0.6. Ghana also scored 0.2 for ethnic 
homogeneity, although as I argued previously, it is very difficult to infer 
any general trends from that fact. 
 The next sections go over three possible areas where there is a 
likelihood that aid will be able to have an effect: Governance capacity, 
health and malaria prevention, and infrastructure and industrialisation. I 
am not a development expert and will not be able to say with authority that 
development aid will be successful in these cases. Nonetheless, they seem 
to me to collectively provide a strong counterpoint to the internationalists’ 
general aid pessimism. I discuss the implications for the internationalist 
duty of development more generally in Section 6.6. 
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6.5.1 Governmental capacity 
 
 By improving government capacity and skills through training and 
the increasing of competency, the possible spill-over effects include an 
improved bureaucracy and better tax collection. This, in turn, means 
better accountability to citizens. Here the international community has an 
important role to play. Khan notes that at least for the case of Bangladesh, 
NGOs were vital to ensuring that aid was allocated and spent in ways that 
served the interests of the broader classes of society. Although it was not 
entirely unproblematic, as from the outset they had to deal with questions 
over their legitimacy as representatives of the poor,58 there is nonetheless 
a potential for external bodies to play a similar role in Ghana. 
 Foreign development aid made up 35% of Ghana’s state budget in 
2009. Although this share is considerably lower than, for instance, 
Uganda’s (85%) or Sierra Leone’s (105%), it is clear that Ghana is highly 
dependent on foreign assistance in its day-to-day operations.59 But the aid 
is currently extremely volatile. This is especially problematic because the 
volatility seemingly has nothing to do with internal developments within 
Ghana, and all to do with the moods of international donors. Aid volatility 
is a major disruptor of growth, and the effect on Ghana’s macroeconomic 
stability is therefore likely to be negative. This is hardly surprising. 
Lindsay Whitfield argues that relations between donors and Ghana are not 
characterised by a partnership model, which would have been ideal, but 
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that the two too often engage in a struggle for influence even when 
decisions should have been in the hands of local policy makers.60 
 Nonetheless, Ghana is today largely seen as one of the best governed 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1992 it has had regular, fairly 
contested multi-party democratic elections, making it widely regarded as 
“the beacon of democratic accomplishment in Africa.”61 National elections 
have been held every four years, and have twice resulted in power 
changing hands peacefully with the losing incumbent accepting defeat, 
something of a rarity in many African democracies. The experience of 
Ghana highlights one important way that the international community can 
help shore up good governance where the will is already there. The success 
of Ghanaian elections as a fair and transparent exercise has largely been 
down to Ghana’s Electoral Commission, the independent governing body 
that oversees voter registration, voting and vote counting, which enjoys 
widespread respect among the citizenry. But because the government have 
been unable to fund it on their own, 40% of the Electoral Commission’s 
funding has come from foreign donors, without which the elections would 
likely have been compromised and the results contested. This example 
thus makes clear the importance of foreign commitment. Accountability 
and transparency in governance is vital, yes, but also very expensive. When 
the Commission counts on donor money to fund elections, Ghanaian 
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democracy itself is, to some extent, vulnerable to international donor 
fatigue and to shifting priorities within the donor community.62 
  Briggs argues that this volatility has harmful effects for democracy 
as well: 
 
This is a serious and unacknowledged political effect of 
foreign aid, and it adds further emphasis to the argument that 
donors should coordinate their aid to reduce volatility. While 
it is possible that donors intentionally change their aid levels 
to reward or punish incumbents, it is more likely that aid 
volatility, caused by poor coordination and donors’ inability 
to stick to spending targets, exerts a modest but measurable 
force on voting patterns in African democracies.63 
 
 Democracy in Ghana is, on a whole, a success story. Since 
democratisation in 1992 the international community has played an 
important stabilising part in developing good democratic institutions. But, 
Whitfield says, in the future citizens and domestic political actors must 
have a greater say in the process. That means improving accountability 
between donors and citizens.64 A good place to start would be to greatly 
reduce the volatility of Ghana’s aid budgets, making Ghanaians sure of 
being able to adequately fund their governance and democratic 
infrastructure. 
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6.5.2 Health 
 
 By far the biggest health challenge Ghana faces is malaria, which is 
ubiquitous throughout every region in the country. According to the World 
Health Organization there were over 1.6 million cases of malaria in 2013, 
from which 2506 deaths were reported. Approximately US$100 million 
was spent on malaria prevention in 2013, and although the vast majority of 
that money is provided by the international donor community, it is subject 
to large fluctuations every year. The WHO’s models suggest that 70% of 
the population have access to insecticide-treated bed nets, although a 
2008 survey showed that actual use was substantially lower than 
predicted.65 
 Malaria, in particular, can have a devastating effect not only on 
economic prosperity, but on human well-being as well. Workers take more 
days off work due to illness, and school children miss more schooldays, 
lowering the quality of their education. But on top of that, when people 
have the constant threat of contracting malaria hanging over them, it 
causes them to respond in ways that damage economic prosperity. They 
might drop out of school, be unable to save up money, or be held back 
from moving to parts of the country where work is easier to come by. It can 
also have long-term effects, as multiple infections could cause cognitive 
and learning disabilities, as well as physical impairments.66 It is extremely 
difficult to calculate the full economic impact of this disease, in large part 
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because it relies on estimates about what choices people would have made 
without the disease. Nonetheless, Sachs and Malaney estimate that the loss 
to Ghana, measured in percent of GDP, is approximately 18%.67 
 There is no guarantee that improving action against malaria is going 
to have a marked effect on Ghana’s GDP. There is reason to believe, 
however, that it would contribute strongly not only to economic growth 
but also to human development. Purdy et al. argue that if the funding 
needed to combat malaria effectively were actually available, the economic 
gains would be worth US$208.6 billion, on top of a wide range of social 
and human benefits that do not feature in such economic calculations.68 
Moreover, it could free up money to spend on other aspects of the health 
budget or, for instance, education. Given that the Roll Back Malaria 
foundation estimates that the global funding currently needed for malaria 
prevention is only just over US$5.1 billion, with $2.3 billion of that going 
to Africa, the potential payoffs are enormous. 69 But regardless of the 
economic benefits of an improved health sector, being able to live a 
healthy life surely counts as one of the prerequisites for a minimally decent 
life. Of course there is always a risk with such large-scale intervention. It is 
possible that efforts to improve the health sector, even if not intended to 
have any impact on any other area, may end up making things worse. This 
is something everyone involved must be vigilant about. But so long as the 
economy as a whole does not suffer markedly from the intervention it is 
not immediately clear that, say, an increase in corruption is in itself 
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enough to render it indefensible. It should not be a requirement of support 
for the healthcare sector that it also provide positive outcomes for the 
economy as a whole. And given the potentially huge scale of the benefits of 
malaria eradication, it may well be a chance worth taking. 
 
6.5.3 Infrastructure and industry 
 
 Ghana’s infrastructure is currently more advanced than the dismal 
average of African countries, with most roads generally being in good 
condition, and most people both in rural and urban areas being connected 
to water and electricity networks, and even phone signal. Nonetheless, 
power cuts are still frequent, power is expensive, and the water networks 
lose upwards of 50% of the water before it reaches the consumers. On top 
of that, while the road network is reasonably extensive throughout the 
country it links poorly with neighbouring countries, holding back the 
poorest regions, furthest from the coast, and meaning that the ports in the 
south do not have enough capacity for export to grow without creating 
bottlenecks. All in all, to bring the network up to the standard necessary to 
harness the country’s full economic potential, an investment of 20% of 
annual GDP would be needed, something far beyond the country’s current 
capacity.70 
 As Collier argues, improving transport links can be a very effective 
way for countries to escape poverty. This is especially true for landlocked 
countries, but it also applies to inland areas such as Ghana’s northern 
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regions, hundreds of miles from the global access-granting coastline to the 
south. In the 1990s there was a belief in the international community that 
private finance would fund infrastructure developments, and they have 
only recently woken up to the need for coordinated action.71 
 Highlighting a general global trend for exporters of raw materials to 
systematically fall behind exporters of finished products, and pointing to 
the success of Malaysia and Korea following their expansion of 
manufacturing industries, Ayalazuno suggests that Ghana must take an 
active role in its industrialisation. This does not necessarily mean state-
owned factories but, similar to South Korea in the early years, financing 
the start-up capital for crucial industries, imposing performance and 
quality standards, and enhancing the “technological capabilities” of the 
industrial sector through the educational sector.72 
 Ghana would be well-placed to expand into the global market, with 
the majority of the population living near the coast, and industrial centres 
having easy access to global shipping routes. The rewards of such a policy 
are potentially high, but so are the risks. At least in the initial phases, 
Ayolazuno argues, Ghana must be allowed to protect some of its industries 
from foreign competition, as South Korea did, before getting enough 
experience and economies of scale to be competitive.73 This jars with 
current international trade laws which emphasise a neo-liberal open 
market policy. One way that developed countries would be able to discard 
their duty of development towards Ghana, then, could be to allow them to 
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protect their industries for the time it would take to get off the ground, and 
to prevent dumping of subsidised Western goods on their local markets, at 
prices they cannot compete with. But a second, more direct way the duty of 
development could be performed would be to assist the Ghanaian 
government in funding the industries and helping set up the necessary 
legal and support frameworks for starting up an industrial base of their 
own. 
 There are, of course, limits to what development aid and other 
forms of external help can do. But what the example of Ghana shows – 
even if only discussed briefly – is that there is reason to believe that we 
have not yet reached that limit when it comes to countries that are poor 
not because of excessively bad governance or civil strife. This is a lesson 
that by no means applies universally in the developed world, but 
potentially to several countries that are currently stable but poor, and to 
future post-conflict cases.  
 
6.6 Broader lessons for the duty of development 
 
 Many of the basic goods, or basic requirements for an “expanded” 
minimally decent living I discussed in Chapter 3, have largely been secured 
for a significant portion of Ghana’s population. These include physical 
integrity, basic food, drink and shelter. Many Ghanaians have access to 
those goods, more so than in most other African countries.74 In other areas 
it is less clear that basic needs are covered. Basic healthcare is guaranteed 
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to a larger extent than in most other African countries, but there are still 
obvious gaps, most notably in protection against malaria. In addition, 
education is arguably lacking for a large portion of the population. 
 In Chapter 3 I argued that while internationalists generally accept 
the rights found in Articles 3-18 of the UDHR as universal they must, at an 
absolute minimum, also accept the rights enshrined in Articles 25, 26 and 
29 as well. They are the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of yourself and your family, the right to an 
education, and the right to only be subjected to laws that are consistent 
with equal respect and recognition for everyone. There is presently no 
reason to suspect that in Ghana’s case the latter of those rights is at risk. 
However, the other two are insecure for a substantial part of the 
population. And for the remainder of the Articles, 3-18, several of those 
are in short supply as well. 
 It may be that following through on the developed world’s 
responsibilities towards Ghana in the ways I laid out above would put us 
beyond what was strictly required by the expanded duty of development. 
But securing these rights in the long-term will likely require a higher level 
of security than if we were only interested in the situation here and now. 
The closer you are to the edge of what can be considered a minimally 
decent life, the greater the risk of falling back into unacceptable poverty 
and insecurity. Those on the bottom rung of the ladder are much more 
exposed to the vagaries of the weather – both the metaphorical and the 
actual – in the form of economic ups and downs. 
 Given that, as Rawls says, “the representatives of people will want to 
preserve the independence of their own society and its equality in relation 
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to others,”75 the cut-off point for the duty towards burdened societies must 
be one that allows them to preserve their vital institutions across some 
degree of variation in circumstances. If there is one thing the recent global 
financial crisis has made clear, it is that no one is completely safe from 
market volatility. Moreover, in troubled times you cannot necessarily rely 
on the society of peoples to come to the rescue. 
 The approach I am proposing here calls for the duty of development 
to take many forms. Risse argues specifically that the duty of development 
is one of institution building (other than in cases of natural disasters or 
other emergencies). 76  Nonetheless I do not think my proposals are 
incompatible in principle with what Risse says. Recall that his argument in 
favour of institution building is primarily empirical. We have a duty of 
institution building, where possible, not because there is anything 
intrinsically more valuable about them from a moral point of view, but 
because it is through them that the distinctively human life is best secured. 
Institutions, then, are a means to an end. Although our duty is to 
humanity as a whole, where a “state is wealthy enough and satisfies its 
obligations under the stronger principles that apply only within states, the 
human rights of its citizens will automatically be satisfied.”77 Institutions, 
Risse argues, are not only the most important factor in ensuring that a 
state is able to promote its citizens’ interests, it is of singular importance. 
But if what I have argued in this and the preceding chapter is correct, 
institutions are not the only game in town. Although it seems clear that 
                                                   
75 Rawls, LP, 115. 
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they are extremely important to development, other factors play a part as 
well. Risse’s philosophical framework may therefore be correct even if the 
empirical underpinnings are misguided. Therefore, if you find Risse’s 
argument about the relevant moral limits to the duty of development 
persuasive, there will be no reason for you to object to that duty not being 
narrowly confined to institutions, given what I have discussed in these last 
two chapters. 
 The general principle still applies that the better a position we are in 
to help, the more demanding our duty to help will be. There is no 
obligation to pour money into a black hole, and in many troubled spots in 
the world there is still relatively little the developed world can do other 
than provide humanitarian emergency relief. Where we can do more is in 
places where the institutions are already reasonably robust, even if the 
population as a whole, or at least the majority, live in absolute poverty. 
Nonetheless, these people are still likely to be less destitute than those 
suffering under despotic regimes, in conditions of civil war, or in areas 
under no government control. One potential consequence of this proposal, 
therefore, is that we might find ourselves giving more money to countries 
that seem to be doing a lot better than others. Ghana is not anywhere near 
as poor as the Central African Republic, but if there is not much that can 
be done apart from emergency aid, it makes no sense to be spending 
money there. This would likely be very controversial, as there is a tendency 
among the public to assume that aid should be prioritised for the world’s 
absolute poorest. But while it will be difficult to create the necessary donor 
consensus to give more assistance to the less poor developing countries, 
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these are precisely the conditions where aid is more likely to have long-
term positive effects.78 
 While it is potentially disconcerting to note that development aid 
has the effect of shoring up the incumbent in democratic elections, from an 
internationalist perspective our concern should primarily be with the 
knock-on effects, i.e. whether this use of public money for patronage has a 
negative effect on rule of law, the business environment, education or 
healthcare, and so on. But as for the isolated effect on elections there is 
less reason to consider it a serious argument against development 
assistance. 
 This is, first, because these effects are felt regardless of where the 
money comes from. Any source of national revenue, whether from aid, 
taxes or natural resources can potentially be used to woo important voter 
demographics or shore up support among important players. As we have 
seen, even remittances may have that effect, by allowing governments to 
divert funding from otherwise essential services. Moreover, this effect is 
not unheard of in developed countries either, where incumbent 
governments will naturally seek to shape and time their policies to put 
them in the best possible position to win the next election, and where 
“voter handouts” to certain demographics are often an accepted part of the 
game. 
 And second, with the exception of Blake, internationalists generally 
agree that democratic governance is not an important feature of a well-
governed society. Where development aid therefore serves to make 
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democratically elected governments more secure in office, this is not in 
itself something that an internationalist should be concerned with, 
provided that the overall benefit of the aid is there. 
 In this chapter I have painted a generally positive image of aid, 
highlighting research which suggests that, although at times limited, aid 
has the potential in certain circumstances to do a tremendous amount of 
good. But it would be remiss of me not to point out that this is a contested 
conclusion. While I have sketched out some prominent criticisms of aid 
there is virtually no aspect of my account that could not be equally be 
criticised by drawing on academics and practitioners who have reached 
different conclusions, by looking at different cases or interpreting the 
numbers in different ways. While I do believe that my conclusions are 
valid, nothing is watertight when it comes to development economics. 
 But as mentioned earlier, we cannot set the bar so high that only 
complete certainty about the effect of our spending on development aid at 
every step will be enough to assign a moral duty of development to the 
world’s richest societies. Having sketched out a plausible scenario in which 
increased aid levels can have a sustained positive effect, the burden of 
proof must be with those who would continue to maintain that the 
theoretical duty of development assistance still does not have enough 
empirical bite to be a binding obligation in the real world. 
 These interventions should, of course, be coupled with an increased 
effort to independently examine their effectiveness in delivering their 
stated outcomes. (Indeed, one potentially important part of fulfilling the 
duty of development, which I do not discuss in this thesis, is the duty to 
research aid effectiveness in general.) As Wenar points out, the deck is 
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currently stacked against this kind of research. American humanitarian 
aid, for instance, is regrettably bound up with the needs of the US 
agricultural industry to offload excess production, with little concern for 
whether this is the best way of providing humanitarian assistance 
(compared, for instance, with buying grain from neighbouring countries, 
boosting their production in the process). Nor do aid agencies always have 
a strong incentive to check their own effectiveness, as funding for projects 
often does not hinge on it, but rather on other political goals.79 
 But while it is extremely important to do everything you can to build 
accountability into every step of the process, these concerns do not by 
themselves provide a compelling argument against a duty of development 
assistance. While they may be crucial in highlighting why aid fails when it 
does, they would only work as an argument that aid cannot work if it could 
be proven that it would be impossible to build accountability into the 
process. It does arguably highlight the importance of what Wenar calls 
“the four major checking mechanisms of bureaucratic organizations. These 
four mechanisms are democratic politics, regulatory oversight, press 
scrutiny, and academic review.”80 Of those, internationalists of course 
contend that democracy cannot be a requirement of a society, nor can it be 
imposed from the outside. But at least some form of accountability 
towards the citizenry and regulatory oversight normally associated with 
democracy must be built into any decent governmental structure. 
Moreover, Collier agrees that freedom of the press seems to be particularly 
                                                   
79 Leif Wenar, “What We Owe To Distant Others,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 2, 
no. 3 (2003): 295. 
80 Ibid., 296. 
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important, especially to prevent the kinds of political patronage, 
underinvestment, and vanity projects that plague resource-rich 
countries.81 But there is no particular reason to think that they cannot be 
built into the process. 
 More generally, the research highlighted in this chapter points to 
some general guidelines in development. The first is that even in the 
grandest schemes it is essential to think local implementation into the 
plan. Without the necessary infrastructure at the ground level, too many 
development schemes never move beyond the capital city, or they falter 
once the donors leave and the provisions for maintenance and 
accountability have not been put in place. 
 Second, accountability must be built into the process at every step. 
While accountability to donors is extremely important, so is accountability 
to the citizens and local stakeholders, arguably even more so. 
 Third, we should be less afraid of waste. More specifically, we 
should be seriously concerned with schemes that have unintended 
consequences, which end up doing more harm than good in the long run. 
But given that the benefits of successful programmes can be exponential 
and most programmes that fail tend to simply do no good rather than 
actively doing harm, it is not clear that the failure of any one assistance 
programme is as devastating an indictment as critics sometimes like to 
imagine. Projects that simply fail to do as much good as expected provide 
important learning opportunities, and guide us that little bit closer 
towards figuring out what actually does work. 
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 And finally, Hudson and Mosley suggest that in order to reduce the 
volatility of aid resulting from funds being diverted to disaster areas, a 
global disaster relief fund should be set up, and paid into regularly by the 
world’s richest donors. This would further have the advantage of speeding 
up disaster responses.82 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I have tried to make the duty of development more 
concrete by discussing real examples of the work that is currently being 
done, and could be done, in specific situations. This follows on from 
Chapter 5 in which I argued that the institutional thesis misrepresents the 
way in which institutions are important, and that rather than being a 
catch-all indicator of a country’s ability to become well-ordered, good 
institutions are simply one of a series of necessary preconditions for 
development. This chapter goes further in discussing how the duty of 
development can be carried out. 
 In Section 6.2 I started off by highlighting how internationalists are 
more often than not sceptical about the effectiveness of development 
assistance, arguing that we should be careful not to overestimate the 
developed world’s ability to implement the duty of development in many 
cases. Consequently, the duty is diminished in practice. While they are 
right to be wary of unwarranted optimism about aid’s effectiveness, 
Section 6.3 nonetheless showed their scepticism to be excessive, through a 
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survey of the literature in development studies, which suggested that aid 
can in fact be effective under the right circumstances, that aid can in some 
cases be more beneficial than other sources of government revenues such 
as natural resource extraction, and that remittances, supposedly less 
disruptive than aid, suffer from many of the same problems. Aid surely has 
its own problems, but on balance it seems that the benefits can be great 
while the downsides are in many cases manageable. Section 6.4 continued 
this line of enquiry, exploring in more detail the specific question of what 
role institutions play. It found that the quality of institutions put a limit on 
how much outside assistance a country is able to effectively absorb but, 
pointing to the examples of Taiwan and South Korea in particular, that 
limit may in certain situations be very high indeed. More generally, I 
suggested that some countries may not currently be close to the limit of 
what they can absorb. 
 The next section, 6.5, discussed one such example, from many 
potential cases. Ghana, I argued, has a strong governmental capacity, yet 
scores low for development in general. I highlighted three areas in 
particular where a concerted effort from the donor community has good 
chances of being successful: In governmental capacity, especially in 
relation to continuing to hold free and fair elections; in health, especially 
malaria eradication; and in infrastructure and industry, particularly 
connecting the inland regions to the coastal regions. Finally, Section 6.6 
connected the discussion to the internationalist duty of development, 
arguing that the society of peoples have a duty to assist countries like 
Ghana, all the more so because it is in large part a duty that we can 
discharge at present. 
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 This chapter closes the empirical discussion of the thesis. This and 
the previous chapter argued that the empirical practical reasons 
internationalists give to be sceptical about the scope and scale of the duty 
of development were not as convincing as they looked at first sight. 
However, the questions of how a world order in which such a duty is even 
necessary came about, and what types of reparations for past injustices 
may be owed, were left aside. But, of course, they cannot be ignored if we 
want a full picture of duties to burdened societies. Chapter 7 will address 
them next. 
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Chapter 7 – Background Conditions, 
Historic Injustice, and Fairness 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 Up until now my argument has centred on what negative duties the 
governments in the society of peoples have to prevent harm to non-
citizens, and what positive duties exist to bring about the conditions for a 
minimally decent life among non-compatriots. But in either case, I have 
gone along with the simplifying assumption that these are non-corrective 
duties. My concern has been how and to what extent, given the inequality 
that exists between societies on this planet, the wealthiest many have a 
duty towards the poorest few. But the questions of how that poverty came 
about in the first place, and whether the events that led to where we are 
now constitute an injustice in their own right, have been put to the side. 
These questions will take centre stage in this chapter, where I will, 
however briefly and tentatively, give an account of the role that history 
should play in a coherent internationalist account of duties towards non-
compatriots. 
 In broad strokes, the history of the last 500 years, since colonialism 
first took off in the late 15th century, has been one of grave injustice, 
requiring some form of compensation. My goal in this chapter is not, 
however, to discuss a duty of rectification as such. From giving a brief 
historical and philosophical overview of the reasons we have to believe 
that such a duty exists, I move on to a narrower question, namely: What 
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does this history of harm mean for the duty of development? My 
conclusion will be that the duty of development, a permanent feature of 
the law of peoples, should be supplemented with a temporary duty to bring 
about the necessary background conditions for the law of peoples to take 
effect, through redistribution beyond what duties to burdened societies 
would require. This is a one-time only obligation, and once we are satisfied 
that the background conditions have been met, events may run their 
course in accordance with the principles governing the society of peoples 
from then on. 
 I must make clear, however, that I do not claim that this duty exists. 
Rather, I argue that, (a) there is a contradiction in the law of peoples that 
must necessarily be resolved, and (b) a temporary duty of redistribution is 
one way of doing that. 
 Another way could be to introduce a redistributive principle directly 
into the law of peoples instead, which cosmopolitans would no doubt find 
more appealing.1 But the advantage of my proposal is that it resolves the 
contradiction without fundamentally altering the nature of the law of 
peoples, making it more palatable to those who find Rawls’s international 
theory convincing on the whole. 
                                                   
1 Cosmopolitans say that there already exists a global structure, which internationalists 
deny. To counter, Miriam Ronzoni has suggested that rather than ask whether a global 
structure exists, we should ask whether the conditions are there to require, as a matter of 
justice, that a global structure be developed. She argues that “background justice 
problems are possible at the supranational level, and […] if they arise, they require the 
establishment of appropriate supranational institutions” (Miriam Ronzoni, “The Global 
Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent Account,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 37, no. 3 (2009): 231). It could be argued, then, that my argument 
suggests that problem of  background justice exist. For my purposes in this chapter, 
however, this line of argument can be put to the side. First, because it is outside the 
scope of what I am trying to accomplish in this thesis. And second, because, as the 
chapter will make clear, I not suggesting that the law of peoples itself produces 
background justice problems, only that uncompensated historic injustices do. 
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 My argument proceeds in the following way. In Section 7.2 I 
establish that the history of the world is characterised by pervasive 
injustice. I then sketch two reasons why you might disagree with that 
conclusion. The first is that history of globalisation is in fact not one of 
injustice, while the second is that although the past may have been 
characterised by deep injustice, the global order that exists today is still far 
superior to what it was 200 years ago. 
 In Section 7.3 I move to Rawls’s law of peoples, outlining the 
contradiction in his argument, namely that his theory is simultaneously 
supposed to represent an ideal of peoples as they might be, and be 
applicable to the world as it currently is. With the global order shaped by 
historical injustice, applying non-distributive principles to it would simply 
entrench that injustice, undermining its claim to fairness. At this point I 
introduce the temporary redistributive principle, designed to bring the 
global state of affairs up to the point where the principles of the law of 
peoples can be relied upon to produce fair outcomes. 
 Sections 7.4 and 7.5 justify this duty from two different angles. The 
first is the fairness-based approach, based on a liberal understanding of 
the international sphere. It argues that the duty must be fulfilled in order 
for the resulting transactions between parties in the society of peoples to 
be fair. The second is the justice-based approach, which argues that the 
global sphere is best characterised by libertarian principles. The duty is 
therefore owed as a matter of justice, due to the past having been 
characterised by a large-scale theft of resources. 
 The chapter then moves away from an overtly Rawlsian framework, 
with Section 7.6 showing that the same duty follows naturally from 
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Richard Miller’s account of “quasi-cosmopolitanism”. While he is 
primarily interested in moral debts accrued from US imperialism, the 
principles apply universally. I argue that they do so not only in the sense 
that almost all developed countries will owe them, but also that, other than 
perhaps the most recent large-scale injustices, it makes more sense to 
think of the duty in terms of a global, shared duty rather than a bilateral or 
multilateral one between victim and perpetrator. 
 Finally, in Section 7.7 I ask what a reasonable starting point for the 
law of peoples would look like, and by implication what the temporary 
duty requires. This must necessarily be a sketch, and I leave much open for 
discussion. Section 7.8 concludes. 
 
7.2 Does the global order need to be rectified? 
 
 Yes, it does. 
 To Pogge, it is clear that global inequality as it looks today maps all 
too neatly on to global inequality as it looked when the European colonial 
powers controlled large swathes of the world. Through their treatment of 
the colonies, “trading their people like cattle, destroying their political 
institutions and cultures, and taking their natural resources,”2 they opened 
up an ever widening wealth gap between the world’s richest and poorest, 
not just in terms of income but also education, healthcare, infrastructure 
and political organisation. “The relevant historical crimes were so 
horrendous, so diverse, and so consequential that no historical entitlement 
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Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 7 – Background Conditions, Historic Injustice… 
290 of 373 
conception could credibly support the conclusion that our common history 
was sufficiently benign to justify even the radical inequalities in starting 
positions we are witnessing today.”3 
 Apart from the physical and psychological harm caused by acts of 
theft, destruction or violence by the colonial powers, the history of the 
world is also one of failing to treat all members of a political community as 
equals.4 This inequality has manifested itself in many different ways, and 
its ripple effects felt long after the end of colonialism. Many of the 
challenges facing the least developed countries have their roots in other 
places. With a particularly disease-prone environment, largely unfertile 
land and long distances to the coast, some parts of Africa might always 
have struggled to develop. That does not mean that these obstacles are 
insurmountable – conditions in the US Midwest, for instance, are similar 
in many respects. But as Sachs points out, overcoming them requires a 
kind of government initiative that Africa was largely denied at the time. 
Whereas in India the British-built railway network was extensive, so as to 
facilitate the export of cotton to factories in Britain, most colonial-era 
railways in Africa only went from gold mines or other natural resources 
extraction sites to the coast, bypassing most of the native populations 
entirely.5 
 Among internationalists, R. Miller is a welcome if all-too-rare 
proponent of the idea that the global order does harm the poor, even if he 
claims it does so in a very different way from Pogge. Starting from the 
                                                   
3 Ibid. 
4 Lea Ypi, “What’s Wrong With Colonialism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41, no. 2 
(2013): 158–91. 
5 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet (London: Allen 
Lane, 2008), 227–228. 
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(rather thin) premise that if countries met the responsibilities he sets out, 
global poverty would be greatly reduced (meaning the global order is not 
unjust simply because it is harmful but because countries do not live up to 
their responsibilities within that order), he says that the harm consists in 
taking advantage of the desperation of the poorest, which is a form of 
exploitation. As such, he emphasises relational responsibilities brought 
about through interaction between the parties. These can be much more 
demanding than negative duties not to make people worse off, which is a 
very low standard. But they are also substantially different6 from a blanket 
positive duty to bring about better conditions under any circumstances.7 
 But a “striking feature of globalization” is precisely the way 
developed countries take advantage of the poor, for instance through 
manufacturing in least developed counties under conditions that would 
have been unacceptable at home. While often the people working in these 
conditions find their lives improved by, for instance, working for a 
European clothing conglomerate in Bangladesh, it is only because the 
situations they come from were so much worse. 8  Similarly, global 
institutions are arranged to ensure that the wealthiest hold the greatest 
bargaining power, enabling them to push their desired policies through. It 
is not enough for defenders of these institutions to say that the global 
trade it facilitates benefits everyone. If the benefits accrue 
disproportionately to the top, that is a form of exploitation in and of itself.9 
                                                   
6 In R. Miller’s view, at least. As I argue later, it is difficult to sustain his distinction 
between exploitation committed by individual actors in the international system, and 
systemic exploitation enabled by that system itself. 
7 Miller, Globalizing Justice, 59. 
8 Ibid., 63–69. 
9 Ibid., 69–77. 
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 Suppose you wanted to argue the opposite: That the global order is 
not in need of rectifying. (Note that this is a different question from the 
one Risse asks – how does the global order harm the poor?10 – and also 
different from asking, has the global order historically caused harm?) The 
history of the world is full of grave injustices committed at virtually every 
stage of human development. Many of them were carried out by, and 
arguably contributed to the fortunes of, those who wield economic, 
political and military power in the world today, against those who still 
linger in the bottom tier of global power as I write this. Still, some have 
tried to swim against the current of overwhelming historical evidence. 
How would you go about doing that, and how convincing would your 
argument be? 
 For simplicity’s sake I will think of strategies for evaluating the 
importance of history for our conception of justice in two ways, which I 
will call historical and counter-factual. In the first strand, the global order 
is just because the historical events that shaped it were in themselves just. 
That is, while no one would seriously deny that atrocities took place, taken 
as a whole the main events that shaped the distribution of wealth and 
power relations today were equitable. Niall Ferguson famously pursues 
this line of argument, extolling the virtues of the British Empire as a 
modernising force in the world. While he does not deny, for instance, that 
severe acts of violence were committed in the name of British imperialism, 
the benefits of being part of the empire greatly outweighed its costs. Today 
India, a British colony until 1947, benefits from, among many other things, 
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an extensive railway network, a full set of democratic structures, a justice 
system in the common law tradition, the abolition of the caste system 
which largely took place at the behest of the British, and team sports, 
especially cricket.11 All in all, far from dragging India down, Britain’s 
presence there pulled them up and set them up for developing into a 
modern and prosperous nation, even if that transition is not yet complete. 
Against that backdrop, presumably, tragedies like the famine that struck 
Bengal in 1943, killing approximately three million people, 12  deeply 
regrettable though they are, are more than amply compensated for by 
being part of the British Empire to begin with. 
 This line of argument is, suffice to say, thoroughly unconvincing. 
First, even if we accept the premise that former British colonies benefit 
from the institutions that were left behind, there is no reason to assume 
that they could not have happened without accompanying injustices. If the 
Bengal famine or the Amritsar Massacre had been indispensible parts of 
the necessary process for bringing about positive development, 
deliberately aimed at helping to bring about the best possible outcomes for 
native Indians, without any regard for the attainment of British strategic 
interests, perhaps then the acts could be excused even if the victims would 
still need compensation. But that is some stretch. And second, Ypi points 
out that the harm in colonialism lies not solely in the harm committed 
against groups and individuals, however serious they may be by 
                                                   
11 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Penguin, 
2004). On the final point, at least, I am sympathetic to Ferguson: Cricket is by far the 
greatest sport ever invented. 
12 Amartya Sen, “Starvation and Exchange Entitlements: A General Approach and Its 
Application to the Great Bengal Famine,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 1, no. 1 
(1977): 35–36. 
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themselves. Rather, the act of subjugating another people to your own will, 
and denying them “equal and reciprocal terms of cooperation” is in itself a 
grave injustice.13 In this case the fact that beneficial institutions were left 
behind is neither here nor there; what matters is that the subjugation 
constituted the harm in itself. 
 I will not dwell on this line of argument any further, in no small part 
because, thanks to its sheer implausibility, very few people would actually 
make it. I mention it only to contrast it with a more subtle approach, less 
straightforward to argue against. The counter-factual argument holds that 
although the events that shaped the main contours of modern-day wealth 
and power-relations may have been unjust in many ways, the end 
distribution is still better than what it was before globalisation took off. 
 Risse is a strong proponent of this idea: 
 
Statistics hardly show unambiguously that the global order 
harms the poor. While indeed, 1.2 billion people in 1998 lived 
below the poverty line of $1.08 PPP 1993 per day, currently a 
smaller share of the world population lives in misery than 
ever before, as measured in terms of any standard 
development indicator. The progress made over the last two 
hundred years is miraculous. In 1820, 75 percent of the world 
population lived on less than $1 a day (appropriately 
adjusted). Today, in Europe, almost nobody does; in China 
less than 20 percent do, in South Asia around 40 percent; and 
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altogether slightly more than 20 percent do. The share of 
people living on less than $1 a day fell from 42 percent in 
1950 to 17 percent in 1992. Historically, almost everybody 
was poor. That is no longer true.14 
 
 While there is no doubt that much about the past was deeply unjust, 
that is not in itself enough to show that the world order that we currently 
live in is unjust also.15 This contention hinges on what Risse calls the 
feasible alternatives thesis: That there is an alternative global order which, 
as the name implies, would have been feasible to implement, and which 
would have left the global poor much better off today. He takes umbrage 
with proponents’ (mainly Pogge’s) claim that an alternate order is feasible; 
this objection is mainly grounded in the institutional thesis, that the 
primary source of development is sound institutions. Given that Pogge’s 
alternative world order primarily differs from the current one in its more 
demanding redistributive aims it follows that, if the institution thesis is 
right, this would not be an effective way of improving the global order.16 In 
Chapter 5 I gave strong reasons to doubt that the institutional thesis holds 
up to the extent Risse assumes, while in Chapter 6 I offered some ways in 
which targeted increases in redistribution could have a positive effect. 
Still, the central premise stands with regards to the most basic claim: 200 
years of industrialisation has coincided with a staggering reduction of 
global poverty. 
                                                   
14 Risse, On Global Justice, 295, his italics. 
15 Risse, “How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?,” 354. 
16 Ibid., 371–373. 
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 As I mentioned at the outset, this is not meant to be a thorough 
review of the global order. It is a brief overview to illustrate some concepts 
that become important as the chapter progresses. Broadly speaking, R. 
Miller’s understanding of how the global order causes harm (or, rather, 
how actors within it, specifically the US, cause harm) represents an 
important move away from ideal theory, understood as the difference 
between end-state and transitional theory, as in whether we evaluate 
institutions as they are, or as they might be under ideal circumstances.17 
The question here is whether the lessons apply globally and multilaterally, 
or on a binary basis. I return to this question in Section 7.6. 
 Risse here represents a way of arguing that is more directly 
premised on Rawls.18 While Rawls himself said extremely little about what 
does or does not make the global order just, I take Risse’s view to be, if not 
a reasonable guess of what Rawls would have agreed to, then at least 
consistent with his views. As such, the sections coming up, from 7.3 
through to 7.5, work as a continuous argument. First I show why Rawls is 
wrong to assume that the principles for the law of peoples can be agreed 
without reference to the global order, then I argue for a temporary duty to 
correct for the effects of historical injustice. At this point Risse’s objection 
becomes relevant again: I argue that this duty can be justified on a liberal 
reading, and a libertarian one. But on the liberal reading, proving that the 
duty exists would depend on rejecting the feasible alternatives thesis, thus 
introducing a further step into the process. On the libertarian reading, 
however, the feasible alternatives thesis is a moot point. 
                                                   
17 See, for instance, Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory.” 
18 Risse admits as much. “How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?,” 358, fn. 
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7.3 The contradiction in the law of peoples 
 
 Rawls conceives of the original position for the international sphere 
as analogous to, and an extension of, the domestic original position in A 
Theory of Justice. In that book he briefly19 sketches the next step, namely 
that the societies who have just agreed to their domestic principles must 
now meet to agree the principles for handling conflicts between them. The 
ones he discusses bear a close resemblance to what would later form the 
law of peoples.20 In this sketch, “[i]ndependent peoples organized as states 
have certain fundamental equal rights. The principle is analogous to the 
equal rights of citizens in a constitutional regime.” 21  In the domestic 
sphere, ensuring that outcomes are just makes it “necessary to set the 
social and economic process within the surroundings of suitable political 
and legal institutions. Without an appropriate scheme of these background 
institutions the outcome of the distributive process will not be just.”22 This 
means fair equality of opportunity, equality of education and access to 
markets, and a guaranteed social minimum through a redistributive 
scheme.23 Yet there is no analogous case for most of these provisions in the 
international sphere. How can that be? 
 In the global original position, the peoples do not know their 
relative size, strength and wealth, but in addition to knowing that they 
                                                   
19 In fact, the section (Rawls, TJ, 331–335.) is mainly about the right to conscientiously 
object to military service. 
20 Pogge says that the source from which Rawls draws his international principles, The 
Law of Nations by James Brierly – “This work contains all that we need here,” (Ibid., 
332, fn.) – already represented an outmoded model of international society by the time 
Rawls published A Theory of Justice in 1973 (Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 244–246).  
21 Rawls, TJ, 332. 
22 Ibid., 243. 
23 Ibid. 
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have some sort of comprehensive doctrine, they know the necessary facts 
about the world in which they operate. Presumably, then, they know that 
there will be countries whose wealth exceeds that of any other society in 
human history, and conversely that there will be countries so poor that 
their citizens suffer from chronic malnutrition in large numbers.24 They 
will further know that this poverty comes on the back of centuries of 
systematic exploitation by the world’s richest. Would they still affirm a set 
of non-distributive principles? I think not. Either they would affirm 
distributive principles right off the bat, even if they were less extensive 
than in the domestic case, or they would agree on a temporary principle to 
bring the starting conditions for the law of peoples up to scratch. 
 So how does Rawls end up endorsing non-distributive principles? 
My guess is that he overlooks an apparent contradiction in how the realism 
(in the sense of practical applicability) of his project is laid out. At one 
point he says, “we view people as they are […] and the Law of Peoples as it 
might be, that is, how it would be in a reasonably just Society of just and 
decent Peoples.”25 Yet almost immediately after he says it “may be applied 
to ongoing cooperative political arrangements and relations between 
                                                   
24 The law of peoples is designed to apply between decent liberal or hierarchical regimes. 
Outlaw states, benevolent absolutists and burdened societies are therefore not parties to 
this agreement. Pogge, however, points out that the criterion chosen must nonetheless 
apply to everyone. Even if authoritarian regimes do not sign up to it, it still remains the 
criterion by which we would judge their actions. For instance, he suggests, when Chile 
descended into totalitarianism in the 1970s the international community did not 
suddenly evaluate their actions by different standards, given that they were no longer a 
decent liberal people (Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 266–267). The same must be true for 
burdened societies. They are not currently parties to the original position. However, 
given that they desire, with the help of decent peoples, to be included in the law of 
peoples, it follows that the terms must be acceptable to them as burdened societies, not 
merely that they will be acceptable to them when they become decent peoples. The 
relationship between decent peoples and burdened societies must be characterized by 
justice. So the second original position should be imagined to contain burdened societies 
as well, in order to ensure that their compliance can be reasonably expected. 
25 Rawls, LP, 17. 
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people.”26 The second statement in particular is telling, as a lot of the 
defences of Rawls rely on ignoring or downplaying this statement. For 
instance, Reidy says that “Rawls has always insisted on approaching 
fundamental issues in normative political philosophy from a point of view 
that takes persons not as they are under existing conditions, but as they 
might be, given the empirical limits of human psychology, biology, and the 
like, under conditions that might reasonably be hoped for.”27 And Freeman 
claims that the “problem with Pogge’s contention that the Law of Peoples 
does nothing to alleviate current global injustice is that, like so many 
criticisms of Rawls, it ignores the fact that the Law of Peoples is drawn up 
for the ideal case of well-ordered societies and peoples.” 28  But, 
presumably, an ideal case that is applicable to the current political reality? 
I do not want to cast a vote on what Rawls’s intentions were, but purely on 
the basis of what he wrote it would seem the nays have it. 
 In the first step, then, the law of peoples articulate the law as it 
might be, given some irrefutable facts about peoples. This is something he 
carries over from the first original position.29 But this conception is in 
itself problematic, as it takes certain facts about states as a given and 
treats them as immutable, similar to some basic facts about human nature. 
I covered this objection in Chapter 1. 
                                                   
26 Ibid. 
27 David A. Reidy, “Rawls on International Justice: A Defense,” Political Theory 32, no. 3 
(2004): 300. Upon re-reading the section I found scribbled in the margins a years-old 
comment reading, “Justice for Superman?” 
28 Samuel Freeman, “Distributive Justice and The Law of Peoples,” in Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, ed. Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006), 251. 
29 “The reasonably just Society of well-ordered Peoples is realistic in the same ways as a 
liberal or decent domestic society.” Ibid. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 7 – Background Conditions, Historic Injustice… 
300 of 373 
 In the second step, however, Rawls suggests that the law of peoples 
is immediately applicable to the world as it is, to the on-going co-operative 
political arrangements that currently exist. In doing so, he skirts over the 
question of whether the background conditions in place are sufficiently 
just for the outcomes that result from the principles to, ipso facto, be just. 
 This is not a problem in the domestic sphere, where the question of 
inherited conditions never really pops up. Here the original position is 
imagined as a purely hypothetical scenario rather than, as in the tradition 
of Locke and Hobbes, one set in an imagined past. Representatives stand 
behind the veil of ignorance, and therefore know nothing about their own 
unique positions in society, coming together to establish first principles for 
the founding of society.30 Moreover, it is a discussion that can be entered 
into at any point, to evaluate the present state of society and ask to what 
extent this is what would have been decided behind the veil of ignorance. 
The background conditions in domestic society are therefore guaranteed to 
be just because they are determined by the original position. 
 But while The Law of Peoples is not historical, it is not a-historical 
either. The second original position does not take place in an imagined 
past, but nor is it purely hypothetical; it takes place here and now. The 
background conditions are therefore already given. This is in part due to 
the fact that domestic societies have already been formed in the first 
original position, their principles having been decided on without 
reference to their effects on other societies and their citizens. But it is also 
because they are applied not at the founding moment for international 
                                                   
30 Rawls, LP, 10–15. 
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politics, but at a time when human civilization is already some 10,000 
years old, and the contours of international trade and politics as we know 
them today have already been in place for at least 500 years, arguably 
longer. 
 Yet throughout, Rawls treats peoples as fiercely individualistic, 
never pausing to consider the role that interactions between them could 
have not just in terms of the traditional domains of international relations 
– trade, diplomacy, conflicts between parties pursuing their own rational 
interests – but also as constitutive of these societies, shaping their internal 
make-up as democratic or authoritarian regimes, or determining their 
place in the pecking order of global power structures. 
 So while the law of peoples marks a welcome break with traditional 
international relations in characterising states as reasonable rather than 
rational,31 the relationship between states is shaped by an out-dated logic. 
 For this, Rawls has received widespread criticism. Buchanan is 
particularly scathing in his critique, chastising Rawls for offering “no 
support for his sweeping generalisation that good government ensures that 
a society can provide ‘a decent and worthwhile life’ for all its citizens,”32 
given that he gives no thought to the way negotiations take place within 
the parameters of the global basic structure and the unequal power 
relations that characterise it.33 Beitz, too, is unconvinced that actors with 
wildly unequal resource shares can be expected to share equally in the 
benefits of a global political structure that “offers them no more than the 
                                                   
31 Ibid., 28. 
32 Allen Buchanan, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World,” 
Ethics 110, no. 4 (2000): 707. 
33 Ibid., 706–707. 
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formal equality of symmetrical voting rules.”34 In Pogge’s summation, the 
“current law of nations is a complete failure in this regard [securing fair 
background conditions] because it is entirely insensitive to such 
differentials in bargaining power.”35 
 Rawls’s defenders will argue that his critics demand too much of 
him. The principles of justice express the limits of moral permissibility, 
not a complete blueprint for global politics. Rawls makes no mistake that 
his principles require peoples to be fair-minded.36 
 So while the fact that the wealthiest countries in the world are able 
to impose unfavourable terms on the poorest is without a doubt as 
regrettable as it is obvious, there is no reason to expect the same kind of 
wholesale corruption to rule the roost in the society of peoples. According 
to Freeman, this is simply an unwarranted assumption given Rawls’s ideal 
theory framework. Far from using the law of peoples’ lack of distributive 
principles as a pretext for exploiting the poor, well-ordered peoples would 
respect each other and interact in accordance with principles of fairness.37 
 Moreover, Rawls would in fact have been sensitive to the historical 
baggage that nations bring with them into the society of peoples: 
 
As Rawls maintains in the case of social justice, the transition 
principles that apply to the non-ideal case to bring about a 
well-ordered society often must go beyond the principles of 
justice, and by implication beyond the Law of Peoples, to 
                                                   
34 Beitz, “Rawls’s LP,” 693. 
35 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 249. 
36 Reidy, “Rawls on International Justice,” 305. 
37 Freeman, “Distributive Justice,” 250. 
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establish remedial conditions that would not be appropriate 
in a well-ordered society. So just as Rawls might have 
supposed as a provisional measure preferential treatment of 
minorities, though it infringes fair equality of opportunity, in 
order to remedy generations of pernicious discrimination, so 
too he could have supported as a temporary measure a global 
distribution principle, to rectify the history of exploitation, 
expropriation, and gross violation of human rights endured 
by burdened peoples around the world.38 
 
 The problem, of course, is not just that Rawls’s ideal theory is too 
removed from reality, as his critics point out. It also seems too far a stretch 
to reconcile it with his own conception of realistic utopia which, as I said 
earlier, can be applied to the world as it is. Rawls therefore seems to fail in 
applying the basic maxim of taking “people[s] as they are, and laws as they 
can be.” 39 In focusing so narrowly on whether states or societies are 
desirable in their ideal form instead of asking whether such entities do or 
even can exist, Ypi suggests, they lack any solid normative grounds for 
dealing with circumstances where justice is so far from being realised, as 
with global poverty.40 
 It is therefore regrettable that Freeman only devotes a small section 
of a chapter to addressing this crucial question, because it is a very 
important idea that deserves more attention. In giving it more serious 
                                                   
38 Ibid., 251. Freeman says the same, almost verbatim, in Freeman, Rawls, 452. There is 
no more detail on the proposal to be found there, however. 
39 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, quoted in Ypi, “Ideal and Non-Ideal,” 536. 
40 Ibid., 540, 543. 
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thought, I am not suggesting that there is a duty to implement a temporary 
global distributive principle. That would commit me to the internationalist 
framework as a whole, which I remain non-committal about for the 
purposes of this thesis. But I will argue that in order to defend the basic 
premise of the law of peoples, such a duty ought to be part of the package 
of principles guiding it. I will show that this temporary duty can be 
defended on two accounts, the first of which I will call the fairness-based 
account, and the second being the justice-based account. Each will be 
persuasive depending on whether you understand the internationalist view 
of the global system as being fundamentally characterised by a liberal 
conception of justice, as in the former account, or a libertarian conception 
of justice, as in the latter. In the liberal conception the duty is owed 
because it is a necessary precondition for the fair and equal treatment of 
peoples. In the libertarian conception it is owed as a matter of justice, 
because societies are properly41 understood as self-owning peoples, and 
consequently the historical process by which the present global order came 
about constitutes theft of resources for which compensation must be paid. 
 
7.4 A fairness-based reason 
 
 To ensure that the principles guaranteed by the global original 
position are fair, it is not enough to say that transactions between the 
parties take place in the spirit in which they were intended. But nor is it 
                                                   
41 “Properly” here should be understood as the standard libertarian cop-out, as in “you 
only disagree with me because you fail to properly understand what 
liberty/coercion/property/etc. really means.” For examples, see every libertarian blog in 
the history of the Internet. 
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sufficient by itself to say that there is nothing in the second original 
position to prevent the oligarchic hoarding by the rest, as Pogge does,42 to 
show that it can never be just. To do that you would have to demonstrate 
that either (a) the very concept of well-ordered peoples, both capable of 
and motivated to conduct(ing) their foreign relations in strict accordance 
with the law of peoples, is a pipe-dream, or (b) that the duty of 
development will be chronically incapable of rectifying the imbalances that 
occur naturally as a result of countries’ inability to take advantage of the 
full benefits of good domestic institutions and global trade. Neither of 
those assertions seem implausible to me, but it is not my goal to cast a 
verdict on either in this thesis. 
 The Law of Peoples’ proponents more often than not see the law of 
peoples through the same liberal prism as they do the domestic sphere, 
even if the conclusions they draw are rather different. Even the inclusion 
of decent peoples who do not subscribe to the full list of liberal principles 
domestically, in particular democracy, are included in the society of 
peoples on liberal grounds: Refusing to tolerate decent peoples for failing 
to meet a set of principles that includes diversity of comprehensive values 
would be “nothing short of manifest hypocrisy.”43 
 One area where Rawlsians and their critics tend to disagree is that 
of what kinds of examples are most valuable in illustrating the liberal 
principles at work. Where critics have used the fact of global poverty to 
elucidate their points, Rawls himself relies on two examples of interactions 
between two decent, and probably liberal, well-ordered societies. In the 
                                                   
42 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 254–255. 
43 Reidy, “Rawls on International Justice,” 298. 
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first case, one decides to industrialise while the other decides not to. In the 
second case, one implements equal justice and opportunities for women, 
resulting in the population growth rate slowly grinding to zero. The other 
society freely chooses (with the full consent of its female population) to 
retain traditional gender patterns, leaving population growth rates high. 
After several years, in both cases the former society is now twice as 
wealthy as the second. Yet we would clearly reject any claims for 
redistribution from one to the other as being unfair on the wealthier 
people, whose wealth is a result of their choices, and who did nothing to 
prevent the other society from developing.44 Whilst sympathetic to Rawls’s 
overall argument, Martin nonetheless concedes that this is a weak point in 
The Law of Peoples. Instead of focusing on the philosophically easy case of 
two decent peoples, Rawls should have been asking what was significant 
about societies that had only just been lifted out of burdenedness, or about 
relations between states where one is still burdened and the other is trying 
to lift it up into well-orderedness.45 This choice is especially odd since the 
section in which Rawls discusses these cases is about relations between 
well-ordered societies and the other kinds.46 
 So how do we incorporate that question into Rawls’s framework, 
and what are the consequences of doing so? I think the basic argument can 
be summed up in five key stages. 
 First, in the law of peoples, societies do not need to cooperate. This, 
Reidy points out, is not to say that not doing so will be cheap, but simply 
                                                   
44 Rawls, LP, 117–118. 
45 Rex Martin, “Rawls on International Distributive Economic Justice: Taking a Closer 
Look,” in Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, ed. Rex Martin and David A. 
Reidy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 237. 
46 Martin makes a similar point. Ibid. 
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that, unlike for individuals in the domestic sphere, it is a viable option.47 
Societies are not dependent on each other the way human beings are, and 
as self-contained units do not strictly speaking need to interact with each 
other for their own survival’s sake. But where cooperation does take place 
it should nonetheless be guided by fair principles. 
 Second, by design, the eight principles that make up the law of 
peoples guarantee those fair terms of cooperation. 
 Third, while the law of peoples does not concern itself with 
differences in bargaining power, they are nonetheless assumed to be fair so 
long as they have come about under fair terms of cooperation. 
 Here a small clarification might be in order. The third step might 
look a tad too libertarian for comfort, but that need not be the case. After 
all, the libertarian principle of justice in acquisition (of which more later) 
is a pre-societal, natural right that government(s) cannot override. In 
liberalism, by contrast, the principles that govern acquisitions are decided 
by the people(s) collectively. The peoples behind the veil of ignorance 
could have agreed on redistributive principles, but agreed instead that fair 
terms of cooperation were sufficient. But although the outcome may be 
similar, the process matters greatly in itself. It is through this agreement, 
rather than natural rights, that the principle draws its force. 
 Fourth, historically the power differentials between societies have 
not come about by fair means.48 The effects of that power distribution are 
therefore unjust. (It does not, however, automatically follow that the 
                                                   
47 Reidy, “Rawls on International Justice,” 303. 
48 Risse, of course, disagrees with this. Against his objection, which is empirical in 
nature, the narrative power of the fairness-based account seems limited, as you would 
instead have to object to his empirical claim directly. But that is not the case with the 
justice-based account, as I will get to shortly. 
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power distribution itself is unjust. That has implications for what can be 
demanded in compensation, as I will return to in the final part of the 
chapter.) 
 Fifth, where some are disadvantaged by differences in bargaining 
power that have come about by unjust means, and where others have 
improved their bargaining power by unjust means, those differences would 
result in unfair terms of cooperation, even if that would not have been the 
case if the differences had come about through repeated iterations of fair 
principles. 
 Fairness therefore requires that advantages gained by injustices in 
the past must be eliminated. This, however, is a separate issue from 
whether these injustices thereby require direct compensation. There will 
generally be strong reasons to think that they will, but it does not follow 
automatically. That is, however, outside the limited scope of this thesis. 
 Of course, once and if the differences become vast enough that one 
of the parties’ status as well-ordered becomes threatened, the question of 
how the differences came about becomes much less important. Assuming 
that this would be impossible given the constraints imposed by the law of 
peoples, or assuming that the threshold for well-orderedness is set low 
enough, this might never become an issue. Still, Pogge argues that it 
almost certainly will, outlining extensive reasons why the conditions 
secured by the law of peoples can never prevent the hoarding of resources 
by the richest against the poorest.49 While the duty of development might 
seem to be a stop against this kind of exploitation, it is not a duty to 
                                                   
49 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 254–255. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 7 – Background Conditions, Historic Injustice… 
309 of 373 
correct the system, but rather to compensate for its effects. The system 
itself remains in place throughout. 
 I will not comment directly on this claim, but given the nature of 
this thesis it will have to be assumed that the basic idea of the second 
original position is at least capable of delivering a just international 
sphere. But that clearly does not mean that it currently does so. 
 
7.5 Historic injustice in acquisition 
 
 A second reason for concluding that there must be a duty to sort out 
the initial distributive imbalance in the international system comes from 
what would at first appear to be an unlikely source. The libertarian 
framework that Nozick advocates is typically seen as the counter to Rawls’s 
liberalism; nonetheless its treatment of justice in acquisition helps us shed 
light on the question, for two important reasons. 
 First, here at least there is a surprising degree of overlap between 
Rawls and Nozick’s conceptions of justice in the transfer of property, 
especially with regards to the methodological assumptions underpinning 
them both. 
 And second, Shmuel Nili suggests that as far as the international is 
concerned, Rawls and Nozick are not only closer than you would assume, 
they are fundamentally and necessarily entwined. Internationalists 
including Blake, Wenar and Rawls himself, he says, are actually 
Rawlzickian – that is, while they reject libertarianism in the domestic 
sphere, they endorse libertarian tenets in the international sphere. 
Moreover, he says, this is not simply an accident but rather an essential 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 7 – Background Conditions, Historic Injustice… 
310 of 373 
feature of the theory.50 Nili argues that the societies that have constituted 
themselves in the domestic original position must necessarily see 
themselves as self-owning peoples, which has profound implications for 
what kind of distributive ethics hold. Domestically the libertarian 
interpretation of ownership and consequent dismissal of egalitarian 
policies must be rejected because society does not, as they claim, regulate 
the transfer of property held prior to redistribution. That is, when the 
government taxes your income it does not take a proportion of what 
originally belonged to you. Rather, the principles that govern society 
determine how much income you should be able to enjoy, relative to the 
state, and only once that has been decided can the resulting post-tax 
income be said to truly be your property. But this can only be the case if 
society as a whole is able to claim original ownership of the full value of 
goods to be distributed. Otherwise how can it claim the authority to do 
so? 51  Societies must therefore be original, first owners of their own 
property.52 
 The implications for the international sphere are quite significant: 
“There is no overall state of affairs to be brought about, no right end-state 
that is distinct from the simple aggregation of specific agents who each 
avoid actions that are morally wrong. The duties of self-owners, then, are 
                                                   
50 Shmuel Nili, “Rawlzickian Global Politics,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 21, no. 
4 (2013): 473–474. 
51 Ibid., 486. 
52 Of course if there were a global state then it would be the original owner of all 
resources, and it would be impossible to consider each state’s share of resources 
independently. 
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agent-oriented rather than outcome-oriented.”53 In other words, only the 
process matters from the point of view of justice. 
 In highlighting Nili’s interpretation I make no claim about its 
validity. Nor do I offer any external endorsement or rejection of the 
Rawlzickian argument. My use of it is strictly limited to the specific point I 
am making here, and I do not rely on a libertarian interpretation for any 
other part of my argument in the thesis. It is, moreover, worth also 
pointing out that the Rawlzickian thesis does not offer an explanation for 
duties towards developing countries. Just as Nozick considers “moral 
horrors” grounds for suspending libertarian principles, at least 
temporarily, so the moral horror of extreme global poverty may justify 
some deviation from strict libertarian principles.54 But given my insistence 
throughout this thesis that the duties towards burdened societies is greater 
than most assume – and even given internationalism’s focus on the 
orderliness of political institutions rather than weighing and contrasting 
the various forms of human misery – it is not clear that all cases of 
burdenedness, especially at the cusp of well-orderedness, constitute a 
moral horror. 
 Still, by relying on a theory that falls so far from the framework of 
the rest of the thesis it serves to triangulate the argument: If you accept a 
libertarian account of responsibilities in general, here is a powerful reason 
to still believe the international system requires redistributing. 
 And as will soon become clear, Risse’s contention that the lack of 
feasible alternatives justifies the world order fares particularly badly 
                                                   
53 Nili, “Rawlzickian Global Politics,” 477. 
54 Ibid., 493–494. 
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against the Rawlzickian objection. While for instance, on a cosmopolitan 
account the correctness of Risse’s claim hinges on larger empirical and 
epistemological objections – that the global poor are in fact worse off, that 
he measures the current state of affairs against the wrong set of 
counterfactual assumptions, or that his concept of harm is wrong – on the 
Rawlzickian account the global order is unjust not because people today 
suffer harm as a result of it, but because the historical trajectory that led to 
where we are includes injustices on a grand scale. 
 Rawls’s treatment of international distributive justice seems to 
share some features of Nozick’s principle of justice in acquisition. At least, 
it articulates some ideas largely consistent with it. The principle of justice 
in acquisition is: 
 
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the 
principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the 
principle of justice in transfers, from someone else entitled to 
that holding, is entitled to the holding. 
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) 
applications of 1 and 2.55 
 
 The same logic animates the relationship between peoples in the law 
of peoples, at least so far as ideal theory is concerned. Obviously there are 
some glaring differences. For a start, decent peoples are motivated to act 
                                                   
55 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 151. 
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in certain ways, which puts limits on the forms that “just acquisitions” can 
take. Another obvious difference is that there are some, limited, 
distributive principles in play when it comes to fulfilling duties to 
burdened societies. But that should not concern us too much at this point: 
Nozick, too, admits that the state may claim the contributions from its 
citizens that are necessary to uphold the “night-watchman state”,56 which 
is not directly justified by the principle of justice in acquisition. 
 Rawls’s version of international justice is, in effect, agent-oriented 
as well. It best resembles a case of pure procedural justice, like Nozick 
outlines. It is the procedure rather than the outcome that determines 
whether a distribution is just, and as such, what matters is not who got 
what but how they got it. But the catch, of course, is that it becomes 
impossible to determine the justice of a situation from its distributive 
outcomes. “The just result must actually be carried out; for in these cases 
there is no independent criterion by reference to which a definite outcome 
can be known to be just.”57 
 The implications for the claim that the global order does not harm 
the poor are clear. Recall that Risse’s main claim is not that the history of 
globalisation is not riddled with injustices, but rather that on the whole the 
world is a much better place to live than it was 200 years ago. It is the 
distribution that matters, then. And the current world order is not unjust 
compared with an alternative, counterfactual scenario in which the events 
that led to injustices in the real world had not existed. 
                                                   
56 Ibid., 26–27. 
57 Rawls, TJ, 75. 
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 If the end distribution matters to your conception of justice, Risse is 
probably right to say that Pogge has failed to prove that the global order is 
unjust simply by virtue of the fact that 20% of the world’s population is 
poor, when that represents a quarter of the proportion that lived in 
poverty at the outset of the industrial revolution. 
 But on Rawlzickian terms it is not the distribution that is unjust, but 
the procedure. In our history of colonial and Cold War violence and 
subjugation, the procedure did undoubtedly include violations of even the 
basest of conceptions of moral decency. We are therefore forced to 
conclude that the current distribution of resources is unjust, even if a just 
procedure could have led us to the exact same result. 
 Bringing this logic to bear on some thought experiments and 
alternative historical scenarios, we could end up with some intuitively 
uncomfortable conclusions, at least from a more liberal point of view. 
 On the one hand you could imagine a scenario in which 
globalisation never took off, or European explorers treated the inhabitants 
of the New World with the same respect for their property and personhood 
as they would their own. But for whatever reason, perhaps due to much 
slower technological advances, the vast majority of the world remained 
abjectly poor. This would be a completely just world nonetheless. 
 But on the other, you could also imagine a world with much lower 
levels of inequality than in the real world, and zero extreme poverty to 
boot, perhaps due to remarkable advances in technology that had been 
brought about independently of any effort to reduce poverty and 
inequality. This scenario is perfectly compatible with grave injustices 
committed in the past. And redressing them could require vast transfers, 
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perhaps even from the poorest to the richest, depending on subsequent 
developments, making the world more unjust from an outcome-oriented 
standpoint. 
 But of course, there is only one world, and only one global order. 
Philosophical investigations of this kind should ideally be conducted 
within the limits of realistic possibilities. When it comes to the kinds of 
historical global orders we have to evaluate, that list is very limited indeed. 
 But if justice requires returning what was taken, how do you go 
about determining who owes what to whom? We are talking centuries of 
exploitation, and even if we set a cut-off of, say, injustices committed only 
within the last 100 years, there is no clear way to determine what 
consequences the harms have subsequently had through the generations. 
Nor is there any mechanism for saying that the injustices have been 
superseded58 by more recent events. 
 Nozick himself has few answers to this problem, preferring instead 
to mostly just acknowledge the dilemma via a list of casuistic questions 
involving duties to descendants and counterfactuals, concluding that “I do 
not know of a thorough or theoretically sophisticated treatment of such 
issues.”59 One possible solution he does suggest is that we make some 
estimate of what would have happened, or at least what could plausibly 
have occurred, in place of the injustice. Here Nozick could arguably be 
interpreted to broadly imply what I am arguing in the case of the 
background conditions to the law of peoples. If it is possible to draw up 
more than one description of a fair distribution (which seems almost 
                                                   
58 Jeremy Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice,” Ethics 103, no. 1 (1992): 4–28. 
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guaranteed to be true), it may be possible in this situation that some sort 
of egalitarian principle could be applied here.60 This is a one-time measure 
only. A line must be drawn, in order to arrive at an initially just 
distribution of holdings. Once we are satisfied that this has been done as 
well as it can be given the circumstances (some injustices may be 
impossible to ever fully compensate for), we can then begin meticulously 
applying the principle of justice in acquisition, and everything that follows 
from it will be just. 
 There, in effect, we see the problem with the second original 
position. Just possession requires two things: First, the rules that govern 
the acquisition must be fair. On the Rawlsian internationalist account, the 
second law of peoples takes care of that. But second, in Nozickean terms 
the original owner must have a valid title to the goods in order for both the 
holding and the transfer to be just. 
 The law of peoples effectively imposes its rules on the current world 
order, refusing any redistributive efforts and thus in effect drawing a line 
under anything that happened prior to its adoption. In failing to ensure 
that the background conditions are fair, the second part of justice in 
acquisition is not fulfilled. 
 
7.6 Miller and quasi-cosmopolitanism 
 
 Sometimes when I write about international duties I have to gently 
remind myself that internationalism is not The Law of Peoples, and not all 
                                                   
60 Ibid., 153. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Chapter 7 – Background Conditions, Historic Injustice… 
317 of 373 
internationalists cling tightly to Rawls’s framework, or use it at all. For 
some, it is simply a starting point from which the argument can develop in 
any direction. Others may criticise Rawls’s line of enquiry even if they 
share the conclusions he reaches. Others again do not rely on him at all. 
What The Law of Peoples does, rather, is arrive at a set of conclusions 
about the nature of international responsibility that all internationalists 
broadly share. The internationalist journey of philosophical enquiry is 
characterised by its destination – qualified statism with international 
duties – and its means of transport – the Anglo-American philosophical 
tradition – but not necessarily by the route it takes. 
 A lot of this may be practical, of course. By the time The Law of 
Peoples was published Rawls had retired, and he died a short while later. 
Undoubtedly he would have had a lot to add to his theory, and a lot to say 
to his critics, had he been able to. But equally, perhaps fewer people would 
have been prepared to claim as readily as they do that their theory follows 
directly from Rawls, had they known more than the broad strokes. 
 Richard Miller is, broadly speaking, one of the third group.61 He 
argues quite forcefully that under certain conditions, which are largely the 
result of “American empire” (or, I suppose, empire more generally), the US 
has acquired a unique duty towards certain countries. These are not 
exclusive to countries where the US actively imposed a duty of care 
 He is specifically concerned about American excesses post-WWII, 
when the US decided, following an inter-war period of introversion and 
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reclusiveness from international affairs, that it did want to be a global 
power after all. That, of course, marks a neat demarcation for his 
particular project: Examining the role the US has had in the world and the 
responsibilities that follow directly from it. But it should not be taken to 
mean that there is anything universally important about that specific cut-
off point. For the United Kingdom and other European colonial powers, 
the end of WWII does not provide anywhere near as neat a temporal 
boundary, and we would have to consider events long before that to get an 
accurate picture of their responsibilities.62 
 There are three types of imperial excess, two of which result in 
greater (and hitherto unmet) responsibilities than the ones justified by 
purely Rawlsian principles. They are “the shaping of the course of 
development through structural adjustment and similar uses of economic 
needs, the propping up of repressive client regimes, and the exercise of 
destructive power, both direct and sponsored.”63 
 In the first instance, steering development, the US have influenced 
least developed countries to form themselves in the American image. 
Privatisation, open markets, fiscal conservatism, and support for free trade 
across borders have all been encouraged, while state-led development has 
been discouraged. Through international organisations like the World 
Bank and the IMF, these preferences have been imposed by force, through 
the threat to withhold loans and aid if not implemented. 
                                                   
62 The US were not adverse to a bit of colonial expansion themselves, controlling the 
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 Of course the opposite also holds true, as some countries have been 
eager to adopt these policies out of their own ideological convictions, or 
have felt enticed by Western promises of rewards for compliance, rather 
than threats. But although willingness to adopt reform matters in terms of 
domestic responsibilities, it does not change the responsibility of the 
outside adjusters.64 
 In this instance, R. Miller argues, the first duty is to ensure good 
outcomes. The only legitimate goal of the intervention is economic 
improvement, and the intervening party had better be confident that it will 
work. If it does not, there is an additional duty to renew the offer of aid on 
“appropriately altered terms.”65 Of course, as I discussed in Chapter 4, 
Miller agrees that we have a duty to help people more generally, if their 
most basic needs cannot legitimately be expected to be met by the state in 
which they live. This duty is limited by the need not to encroach on the 
self-respect of the people on the receiving end of your intervention. In that 
chapter I found his characterisation of self-respect and the value of self-
determination too narrow and constricting. But were R. Miller to take my 
points on board, that would only change the point at which this duty was 
discharged. The existence of the duty does not change either way. 
 The second instance concerns client regimes, where a foreign 
government either imposes or supports a regime to the extent that it 
answers, directly or indirectly, to your needs even when they conflict with 
the needs of their own people. R. Miller suggests Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel or 
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The Democratic Republic of the Congo as examples of American client 
regimes, with Chad or Ivory Coast being French ones.66 
 Here, the duty is to take equal responsibility for the failings of its 
client regimes. The present government should therefore be compared not 
with any regime operating independently from its benefactor, but rather 
with an imagined one operating with the same resources that the client 
relationship gives it access to, but always acting in the best interests of its 
people.67 So if a country invades another, perhaps for morally righteous 
reasons (to dispose of a dictator, or prevent it from sliding into a 
devastating civil war), the fact that the situation would have been far worse 
without the intervention will in no way excuse the invading power acting 
in ways that put their own immediate interests ahead of those of the 
vanquished. 
 The final case is imperial repair. Here, “imperial” need not imply the 
existence of a formal empire. Whenever the US has engaged in destruction 
abroad or caused it to happen there is a duty of aid relative to the damage 
done. It does not matter whether the destruction was justified. Even when 
it was done for as a necessary last resort, the duty remains the same.68 
 Of those three duties, then, the last two create considerably larger 
duties than what the internationalist account normally prescribes under 
ideal theory circumstances. For the US, R. Miller argues that “the normal 
interactions of American elites and the American electorate are bound to 
give rise to vast and morally unjustified harms, including vast harms of 
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unjustified violence, so long as the American empire endures.”69 Justice 
therefore has extremely wide-reaching implications for the way the 
American political class and electorate can legitimately arrange their 
priorities for the foreseeable future. 
   Having outlined R. Miller’s argument, which I find convincing on 
the whole (keeping in mind my objections outlined in Chapter 4), my next 
task is to link it to the background conditions for the law of peoples I 
discussed earlier. R. Miller has outlined an argument for the case of the 
United States specifically. It specifies a responsibility of redress for past 
harms that exists outside the framework for international justice under 
ideal circumstances, and whose implications for the countries on which the 
duty falls are considerably more severe. Moreover, unlike ideal theory 
questions of justice, these requirements are limited to what in effect 
amounts to reparations for past injustices. Assuming that the duty-bearer’s 
foreign policy is guided by a proper concern for international justice, they 
will therefore eventually have been fulfilled, and stop being applicable. 
 For the purposes of his project, R. Miller is only concerned with 
proving that the US has these duties. But if it can be shown that virtually 
every developed country in the world (those that would make up Rawls’s 
society of peoples) have these duties by virtue of their own history of 
interacting with the world, we have essentially arrived at the same 
conclusion I argued for earlier in this chapter; namely that, just as when it 
comes to The Law of Peoples, there must be a very demanding corrective 
duty to bring about the condition of all people in the world to the level 
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required by justice. We have, however, reached it without making use of 
Rawls’s framework, giving further reason to support the conclusion we 
reached, even if imagined a-historical thought experiments are not your 
philosophical cup of tea. 
 On Miller’s account, the US have a unique responsibility where they 
were directly involved in the devastation or collateral damage left in their 
wake. So the US owe a special duty to Iraq and Afghanistan because of the 
wars in the early 2000s. Prior to that, they bought themselves a special 
responsibility in Vietnam, Grenada and Chile following, respectively, the 
war, the invasion in the early 1980s, and the CIA’s involvement in the 
violent overthrow of the democratically elected Salvador Allende in 1973, 
and subsequent instalment of Augusto Pinochet’s military regime. They 
also owe a special duty towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as 
they were intimately involved both with helping the brutal dictator Mobuto 
Sese Seko to power in 1971, and with propping him up throughout the rest 
of the Cold War .70 
 Similarly, then, the United Kingdom would have a unique 
responsibility with regard to their old colonies, as would France, Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, and so on. While the nature of these 
responsibilities might be unclear at this point, there can be little doubt 
that the duties are owed. 
 It should be immediately obvious that the many of these duties will 
overlap in terms of who owes them. Both the US and the UK have been 
heavily involved in Iraq since 2003, for instance, as have Australia, 
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Denmark, Poland and many others. For propping up Sese Seko, 
undermining democracy and assassinating the democratically elected 
president Patrice Lumumba deep in the forests of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, the US must share the dubious honour with Belgium.  The 
list goes on. 
 But in making my argument about the interconnectedness of past 
injustices, I will discuss our colonial legacy in particular, as that is, I think, 
the most important case of shared responsibility. Between 1492 and the 
1960s nearly all of the world outside Europe was carved up and divided 
between the major powers. In some cases, millions were ruled by just a few 
thousand colonial administrators. Other countries were settled by 
immigrants from the mother country, who have almost completely 
replaced the indigenous population. These powers agreed on formal 
recognition of each other’s possessions or, as was more frequently the case 
in East Asia, their “spheres of influence”, taking for granted the inability of 
these countries to take care of their own affairs.71 They relied on the social 
and legal structures both at the state and international level to secure their 
claims to foreign lands. Colonialism was a legal system, the legitimacy of 
which was bestowed upon it, to various degrees, by all the developed 
world. Colonies were permanent legal and political entities governed by a 
system of legislation, military force, and a shared perception of legality. If 
any particular territory was held by a Western power, others contributed 
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to its servitude by recognising it as such, trading with them and, in the 
case of neighbouring powers, helping maintain their borders.72 
 The legality of colonialism is particularly important to 
understanding shared responsibility. As Catherine Lu observes, most of 
our thinking about everyday moral decisions assumes some kind of moral 
baseline against which our acts can be compared. This baseline is often 
rooted in law, which is assumed to be a reflection of our shared 
understanding of what ethical action entails. But with colonialism, the 
moral baseline of the time was that the actions were acceptable, a view 
that was supported by international legal norms and conventions.73 
 It was for this reason that up until 2004, Germany refused to 
apologise for the Herero massacre in present-day Namibia in 1904, which 
killed 60,000 people, three-quarters of the Herero population. They 
argued that, as the actions were legal at the time, there was nothing to 
apologise for. They eventually did admit that their actions were wrong 
from a moral point of view, but continue to reject any legal responsibility.74 
The harm of these systems consisted in “the creation and upholding of a 
political association that denies its members equal and reciprocal terms of 
cooperation,”75 and everyone who created and upheld the system must 
share in the blame. 
 The picture of colonialism varies a lot across the world. Some 
territories were controlled with only a few thousand colonial 
administrators. Of those, some at least paid lip-service to the “civilising 
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mission”, while others ruled through terror and brutal oppression. Others, 
like Australia and New Zealand, were taken over almost completely by 
European settlers, displacing the local populations. In others still, like 
Brazil, descendants of settlers, indigenous peoples and slaves all make up 
significant proportions of the population. 76  So it is not always 
straightforward to determine who was a victim and who was a benefactor 
of colonialism. There are some borderline cases, and within them different 
factions have experienced colonialism very differently. Is Brazil on the 
whole a victim of colonialism, or did they benefit from it? Or, put another 
way, does the international community have a duty to compensate Brazil 
for the harm it caused, or do the descendants of slaves and indigenous 
peoples have a claim against white Brazilians in whose name the colonial 
state, and later the independent country, committed grave injustices? 
 How do we apportion that blame? Tyler Cowen argues that precisely 
because it is so difficult to determine who is actually owed what, as the 
passing of time makes counterfactuals more and more unreliable, we 
should disregard all but a very limited list of claims. Restitution claims will 
therefore be very limited in practice.77 Others argue that the passage of 
time is not as devastating to claims as Cowen would suggest. To Daniel 
Butt, each failure to compensate for past injustices constituted an injustice 
it itself, meaning that present generations are directly implicated in 
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colonial injustices, not merely by association with their forebears.78 And 
Robert Goodin suggests that asking the inheritors of stolen property to 
compensate the descendants of the original owners need not imply any 
guilt on their part, arguing that disgorging the spoils of past injustices is a 
viable option for reparations.79 
 But another possible model I will suggest is, in most ways, identical 
to the extended, temporary duty of reparations that followed from the 
Rawlsian premise earlier in the chapter. In this model, I treat the 
developed world, as a whole, as a reasonably accurate proxy for the former 
colonial powers (and perpetrators of injustices during the Cold War), and 
the least developed countries as a proxy for the victims of colonialism.80 
 In this model, the developed world (a) accepts a responsibility for 
colonialism as a whole, and acknowledges that colonialism itself, not just 
the individual harms of the past, was an injustice. And (2) they accept a 
demanding duty of helping the poorest develop to the extent needed, and 
that they are able to do so without sacrificing anything of significant moral 
value to themselves. Respective to each least developed country, the duty 
is discharged when they have reached the level that signifies that the 
Rawlsian temporary duty has been fulfilled, which I discuss in the next 
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section. This duty differs from a rectificatory duty in three ways: First, 
rather than accept responsibility for particular actions or for injustices 
committed against particular individuals or peoples in particular 
countries, the developed countries accept a shared responsibility for the 
past as a whole. Second, the duty is to compensate for the past as a whole, 
and is thus not directly linked to individual injustices. And third, the 
victims’ claims are made not only against the perpetrator directly, but can 
in principle be made against anyone who benefited from colonialism. 
 Broadly speaking, this extended, temporary duty corresponds 
(accurately enough) with the second and third of R. Miller’s cases, client 
regimes and imperial repair (for me to continue my analogy.) Colonies 
were a form of client regimes of their mother countries, and imperial 
actions seem obviously to require imperial repair. Still, the analogy is 
slightly complicated by the fact that R. Miller uses the US as his example, 
the actions of which lend themselves better to the exception than the rule 
of the model I sketched. Given that so many actions were clearly carried 
out by the US alone, and in recent years too, it would be preposterous to 
suggest that we all share equally in the blame. Similarly, the US may have 
been the instigators of the Iraq War, but more than 30 known and named 
countries signed on in various capacities; some, like the UK and Australia, 
displaying as much zeal as their American brothers in arms. But in this 
case we still would not claim that the responsibility for the war and its 
aftermath does not rest directly with those countries and their leaders at 
the time, many of whom are still important public figures to this day. Even 
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if the international community stood by and let it happen. We all 
destroyed Iraq in a way, but we all know who destroyed it the most.81 
 But going further back in time the picture becomes more muddled. 
Partly, this is a result of the legal interconnectedness of colonialism: Not 
an exceptional measure justified on grounds of moral urgency, as with 
many wars, but as the standard mode of action, normalised and accepted 
by all those involved. But it is also due to the fact of the passing of time 
complicating the picture of who owes what to whom, making a neat 
division of guilt between perpetrators untenable. 
 Does that mean we should simply give up? R. Miller suggests not. 
There must be a discount rate of obligations over time as, for instance, 
Spain are no longer under obligation to compensate descendants of the 
Jews and Muslims that were expelled in 1492. But setting the time limit 
too soon would also be unacceptable, not least because it would create 
incentives for perpetrators to simply bide their time until the statute of 
limitations kicked in. In the end, he suggests, about two generations seems 
right.82 
 For the most part, colonialism ended about 50 years ago, meaning it 
falls comfortably within R. Miller’s suggested time limit. A duty is 
therefore owed for establishing client regimes (but failing to exercise that 
power as would an ideal ruler with the best interests of the people in 
mind), and of imperial repair (including for the harm of violating a 
people’s self-determination). 
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 I do not claim that the temporary duty of development follows 
inexorably from the duty to client regimes and of imperial repair. I argue 
simply that it is a possible way of discharging it. Moreover, given the 
interlinked nature of global historical injustices, it makes sense to think of 
the duty in the way I do. Given that this duty also follows from more 
overtly Rawlsian premises, it gives us strong reasons to believe that it 
exists. 
 
7.7 What would a reasonable starting point look like? 
 
 My goal here is not to provide a laundry list of actions mandated by 
justice. But the list I come up with will provide some idea of what a world 
in which the globally powerful take responsibility for the past might look 
like. It will not, I suspect, be necessary to implement every single one; 
some clearly carry more weight than others. And in other cases I suspect 
the globally powerless will take satisfaction in seeing something done to 
acknowledge the harms suffered in the past. 
 First, however, you might reasonably ask, if these duties truly are 
extensive duties of justice, what distinguishes this proposal from the more 
statist versions of cosmopolitanism? After all, cosmopolitans also 
emphasise redistributive efforts as part of a global moral theory, even if 
they could be discharged within a framework that retains the state as its 
main unit of organisation.83 You might object, then, that what I am really 
proposing here is that internationalists ought to sign up to the statist 
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cosmopolitan account of global justice. It would seem that if my account of 
the harms of colonialism and other historic injustices is correct, and the 
duties associated with compensating for it as extensive as I have laid out in 
this chapter, what is unique about the internationalist account of global 
justice is what renders it unsuitable to provide a compelling answer to 
historic injustice. 
 To this charge I offer two replies. The first is to emphasise that the 
extended duty of justice outlined in this chapter is temporary. The 
preceding chapters outlined the extent of the internationalist duty of 
development circumstances of fair background conditions. This chapter 
has highlighted how applying the principles of global cooperation laid out 
by internationalists may cause unfair outcomes when applied to a world 
with a history of injustice, even if the principles themselves are fair. When 
the unjust consequences of that history of injustice have been properly 
mitigated, however, only the (relatively) less demanding duties outlined in 
the previous chapters apply. 
 The second reply, closely linked with the first, is that this extended 
duty is of a different nature from the one the previous chapters outlined. 
The duty discussed in previous chapters is not rectificatory, but is owed 
because of internationalists’ commitment to their particular conception of 
global justice. The developed countries have a duty to alleviate poverty and 
help burdened societies develop, and to promote and protect human rights 
where violations occur, irrespective of whether they have played any role 
in bringing them about. I have argued that this duty, while more extensive 
than what internationalists themselves tend to promote, is nonetheless not 
as encompassing as many cosmopolitans would claim. Moreover, it does 
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not fundamentally alter the division of the domestic and international into 
separate spheres of justice. It only makes the case that extra-state duties 
are more encompassing than previously assumed. Statist cosmopolitans 
argue that the most effective way of achieving cosmopolitan goals of justice 
is to work within the state system. This is because they emphasise the 
importance of compliance, and note that most people feel a strong sense of 
belonging to national political communities. The cosmopolitan goal of 
treating all persons as equal units of moral worth84 does not require the 
state for any moral reasons, but may nonetheless be compatible with its 
existence as a practical matter.85 
 Internationalists, by contrast, emphasise the distinctiveness of the 
state as a moral and political community. In emphasising the temporary 
nature of the special extended duty I have argued for here, I also maintain 
the distinction between the domestic and international sphere of justice. 
 What are the limits of this duty, then? In terms of the end-goal, the 
duty is to bring about a reasonable starting point for the law of peoples to 
take effect. To that end, there may be some cases where it is clear what the 
injustice was, what the consequences were, who committed it, and against 
whom. In such a scenario you could reasonably assign both blame and 
remedial responsibilities. In most cases, however, some kind of global 
distributive measure is justified. 
 In general, we want to avoid arbitrariness. Your right to 
compensation should not depend on whether the injustices you suffered 
were systemic or at the hands of clearly identifiable aggressors, or whether 
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the entity by which you were harmed still exists as a legal body or has the 
ability to pay. If they did, we would arbitrarily be prioritising a particular 
category of harm over others. The principles that underlie the duty must 
therefore be universal in nature. 
 The duty is limited by practicality and feasibility. Of course, 
throughout this thesis, especially Chapters 5 and 6, I have argued that the 
limits of feasibility that internationalists assume are set too low. There is, I 
suggested, more that can realistically be done to help the world’s poorest 
than they claim. I could be wrong about that, and if I were wrong, the 
consequences would naturally be that both the duty of development and 
any temporary but more extensive duty would be that much less 
demanding. 
 But I also pointed out that there seems to be some truth to the 
central claim about institutions: Although in many cases poverty and lack 
of development happen in countries with reasonably good institutions, it is 
nonetheless the case that bad institutions are a virtual guarantee of 
poverty. Increased levels of foreign aid would be very unlikely to have a 
positive effect on them. As for opening up global organisations to become 
more democratic and make trade terms more beneficial for the poorest, 
you might argue that that would provide a powerful incentive for countries 
to shape up their act and establish the institutions necessary to take full 
advantage of those opportunities. But on the other hand, in many cases 
despotic and corrupt regimes are more than capable of trading on the 
international markets under current rules, especially when it comes to oil 
and other natural resources. Nor is it obvious in such cases how increased 
market access would provide any real incentive to improve institutional 
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structures, when from the point of view of those in power it is the lack of 
such structures that enable them to maintain power in the first place. It 
might provide more of an incentive, but unless it would tip the scales, little 
would likely change. 
 What about the level at which duties are discharged? One possibility 
would be to simply say that the duty here is to fulfil the duty of 
development to burdened societies. But of course, the very point is that the 
duty of development by itself does nothing to correct for past injustices. It 
exists within a perfectly just system, which is not what we currently live in. 
While I do not think that the existence of burdened societies at the starting 
point for the law of peoples is incompatible with justice, for instance due 
to extremely poor political management, likely coupled with a very 
unfavourable geography, on the whole it seems likely that the majority of 
the world’s current burdened societies are so poor at least partly on 
account of global injustices. 
 One key area (and one with the most agreement, it seems) is 
reforming institutions such as the UN, The World Bank and the IMF to 
give more power to the poorer countries. But at least for a time, this would 
have to hit not just on a power-balance between the richest and the 
poorest. Ask yourself, rather, what a fair balance of interest between them 
would be in an ideal scenario. Under a temporary duty of rectification, the 
interests of the poorest would have to be given more weight than that. 
 In general, R. Miller suggests, reforming domestic institutions is 
likely to be more effective than transferring aid. Given limits on aid 
effectiveness, lowering trade barriers in particular could be an effective 
way of incentivising change without undue interference in domestic 
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affairs, something he takes extremely seriously. 86 “Everywhere, people 
properly87 prefer to get ahead by their own efforts and, if they need help, 
properly prefer it from those to whom they are bound by symmetrical ties 
of family and civic obligation. This preference should be reflected in the 
choice of means to help them.”88 For reasons I discussed extensively in 
Chapter 4, I find this focus on self-help unwarranted and unnecessarily 
limiting. It seems to me highly unlikely that people are as fixated on 
national self-reliance as R. Miller suggests. People, even within societies 
with a strong sense of patriotic pride, are ultimately more likely to value 
the well-being and security of themselves, their family and their local 
community than they are some vague notions of national self-reliance. But 
even so, national self-reliance may have instrumental value, increasing 
economic opportunities for citizens. 
 Risse, too, highlights the importance of reforming international 
organisations (the WTO in particular, but also the World Bank). 
Unsurprisingly, he thinks they should focus on institution building, given 
the institutional thesis. As things stand, however, those organisations are 
largely the tools of the wealthiest since, although they are formally 
democratic, many of the negotiations take place in smaller forums that 
leave the poorest shut out from the decision making process. Rich 
countries enjoy permanent delegation staffed with many highly qualified 
lawyers and skilled negotiators, and many of the poorest simply lack the 
                                                   
86 Miller, Globalizing Justice, 218–219. 
87 There is that word again. See footnote 41 of this chapter. 
88 Miller, Globalizing Justice, 221. 
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manpower to compete.89 Key changes, then, would include making respect 
for human rights a condition of membership, and making the 
organisations accountable not primarily to those who pay most of the bill, 
as things currently stand, but to those most affected by their decisions.90 
 While these changes are important, however, they are not by 
themselves sufficient. These changes focus on ensuring that the richest 
and most powerful countries do not enjoy undue influence and use it to 
push their agendas through at the expense of the poorest. While that is an 
important aim it itself, and would do a lot to improve on the current 
reality, it is not enough. Given what I have argued throughout this chapter, 
it is not just the effects of these differences in power on the workings of 
global institutions that are unjust – they are unjust themselves. 
 To change that, international organisations likely need 
redistributive principles. Whether they need to be permanent is something 
I leave open for now, but at least until the starting conditions for the law of 
peoples have been met they are necessary. I leave the question of how that 
should be done to the side for now, though. Although they are likely to 
involve direct financial transfers to some degree, there is no reason to 
assume that that will be the primary means. Some global institutions in 
particular, such as the WTO, are probably better tasked with guarding fair 
principles of global trade. One redistributive principle in this vein could be 
that trade should be arranged to disproportionately favour the weaker 
party. 
 
                                                   
89 Risse, On Global Justice, 350–353. 
90 Ibid., 358. 
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7.8 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has claimed that the current global system is in need of 
serious rectification as a matter of justice. I have argued that the Rawlsian 
internationalist must necessarily accept a principle to overcome that 
injustice before the principles for the law of peoples in ideal conditions can 
come into effect, lest they leave a devastating gap in the theory. 
 The temporary but more extensive duty of development I proposed 
does that. This duty follows from both a fairness-based account of the 
international system, and a justice-based account. Hence, whether you see 
the international sphere as characterised by liberal or libertarian 
principles of justice, the duty to overcome historic injustice follows. 
 Outside of an overtly Rawlsian framework, the same duty can be 
justified with more direct reference to the need to compensate for past 
injustices. Taking R. Miller’s view of compensation for imperial excess as a 
starting point, I showed that while he is right to assign these 
responsibilities, his focus on bilateral relationships is insufficient when it 
comes to overcoming the damaging impact of colonialism. Instead, a duty 
similar to the one that follows from the Rawlsian framework can be argued 
for. 
 Finally, the sketch of how these responsibilities can be discharged is 
far too short to give the topic the respect it deserves. But I have tried to 
outline in the broadest possible strokes what the duty will look like in 
practice. That could (and probably should) be a lengthy tome in its own 
right. 
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Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
 It has been my argument throughout this thesis that the duty of 
development towards what Rawls calls burdened societies1 is greater than 
is generally assumed. This is not so because, as cosmopolitans claim, 
internationalists are mistaken about the fundamental nature of global 
justice, and about what triggers egalitarian distributive duties at home and 
globally. At least, that has not been my argument here. Rather, it has been 
that by the internal logic of internationalist thought, the duty of assistance 
to the world’s least developed countries ought to take a more prominent 
role in the framework than it currently does, and societies that wish to 
exist by the spirit and principles of the law of peoples (or similar 
international principles) ought to take these duties more seriously. 
 Of course, internationalism is not a monolithic structure. The 
internationalists I have discussed in this thesis display a very wide range of 
views, many of which contradict and clash with each other. In making my 
argument I have, on the whole though not exclusively, tended to focus on 
the authors whose views stand in starkest contrast with my own. There is 
no doubt that some of my arguments would be readily accepted by some 
professed internationalists even as they would vigorously deny other 
aspects, and vice versa. Rawlsians who believe that in The Law of Peoples 
Rawls is primarily concerned with justice for individuals will probably find 
                                                   
1 Rawls, LP, 37. 
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my arguments in Chapter 3 less of a challenge to their views than those 
who argued that he mainly cares about the justice and stability of societies. 
Similarly, while some, most notably Risse, 2  would deny that history 
provides a compelling reason for transfers of some form from the global 
rich to the global poor, my argument with Richard Miller on that topic was 
rather different: Not about the scope of the duties, to atone for and repair 
past (quasi-)imperial aggressions,3 but instead about their range. That is, 
the guilty parties responsible for repair effectively includes the whole 
Western world. Finally, in one instance I sympathised with a more 
conservative principle, in arguing that while Blake may be right to argue 
that there is a duty to promote democracy4, prudential concerns may make 
it permissible not to do so in many cases. 
 My point is that this research has tried to capture the breadth and 
diversity of the internationalist position on duties to burdened societies. It 
has not elevated any one author to the role of the single authoritative 
voice, but recognised the wide variety of research avenues taken in the 16 
years since The Law of Peoples was published, while drawing out their 
commonalities. 
 The remainder of the conclusion is organised as follows: Next, in 
Section 8.2, I retrace the steps of the argument I have made in the thesis. 
As I said in the introduction, it can roughly be divided into three parts. 
While Chapters 1 and 2 placed the argument in its proper context, 
Chapters 3 and 4 comprised the first part, challenging the normative 
                                                   
2 Risse, On Global Justice, 295. 
3 Miller, National Responsibility, 147–180. 
4 Blake, Justice and FP, 113. 
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assumptions underpinning the internationalist duty of development. 
Chapters 5 and 6 comprised the second part, challenging the empirical 
assumptions behind it. Finally, Chapter 7 made up the third part. Here, the 
historical context of colonialism and Western global dominance was 
brought in. As such, it bridged normative and empirical questions to wrap 
up the argument. 
 The remainder of the conclusion will defend the value and research 
relevance of the thesis in Section 8.3, while 8.4 will outline some avenues 
of further research. Finally, Section 8.5 briefly sums up. 
 
8.2 Chapter reviews 
 
 Chapter 1 served to put the discussion about the internationalist 
duty of development in its proper context. Starting with A Theory of 
Justice it traced the idea that Rawls’s theory, when transposed to the 
international sphere, would require a substantial reworking of the 
international order, through the works of Britain Barry, Charles Beitz and 
Thomas Pogge in particular. 
 But Rawls confounded them by proposing a much more limited 
vision of global duties and rules of interaction in The Law of Peoples. It 
was idealistic in describing the participants in global society as peoples, 
distinct from Westphalian states in their lack of complete sovereignty and 
their reasonableness as opposed to mere rationality,5 but held the broad 
outlines of the global system that currently exists in place. These peoples 
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affirm eight principles for interaction which bear a great deal of 
resemblance to the global system. While Rawls’s global framework was 
largely met with intense criticism, especially at the outset, the intervening 
years have seen plenty of defences of Rawls, as well as articulations of 
similar internationalist frameworks. Locating the unique normative 
significance of the state in its coerciveness,6 its non-voluntariness,7 or the 
reciprocal nature of its membership8 – or a combination of all three which 
are mutually reinforcing,9 they reached the similar conclusion that duties 
to non-members are limited in the same ways Rawls claims. 
 It was against this background that I asked what, specifically, the 
duties towards burdened societies are. Burdened societies are non-
aggressive members of the world’s least developed countries, who lack the 
conditions necessary to become well-ordered societies. 10  While 
internationalists argue that there is a duty of justice to assist these 
countries, it is severely limited. On the whole, the duty is only to help 
bring countries up to the level of membership in the society of peoples, or 
in another formulation to ensure a minimally decent life to non-
compatriots. This duty is further limited by concerns for toleration and of 
prudence. A particular concern that stood out was that the duty is 
constrained by the empirical claim that the key determinant of wealth was 
the quality of institutions – what Risse calls the institutional thesis.11 
                                                   
6 Nagel, “Global Justice,” 128–129; Blake, “Distributive Justice,” 279. 
7 Sangiovanni, “Global Justice,” 10–12. 
8 Miller, “Reasonable Partiality towards Compatriots”; Miller, “Rawls and Global 
Justice,” 471–472. 
9 Risse, On Global Justice, 45–47. 
10 Rawls, LP, 108. 
11 Risse, “How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?,” 355. 
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 This then set the stage for the central question to be answered in the 
remainder of the thesis: If the duty towards burdened societies is limited 
in the way internationalists claim, what does that actually entail?	
 
 Following an outline of the methodology in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 
opened the first, normative, part of the argument. The question I asked 
here was what the maximum theoretical extent of the duty of development 
assistance could be. I did so by first working out what Rawls believes the 
duty to entail, and found that although it remains unclear whether he was 
committed to the needs of all individuals in a burdened society, or simply 
enough to make it stable, some factors were clear: These include securing 
human rights and meeting basic needs. 12  Human rights, to 
internationalists, are a very limited list. Because of their universality, 
covering all of humanity as a whole, this must necessarily be as minimal as 
possible. This is because internationalists emphasise the practice-
dependence of human rights,13 meaning that rights must be enforceable. 
 This leaves only the most basic needs protected by human rights. 
But what basic needs count? Only the most essential ones, as the aim is to 
“set a minimum standard separating the tolerable from the intolerable.”14 
This, to internationalists, include the provisions set out in Articles 3-18 in 
the UDHR, which cover the right to life and liberty and prohibition from 
vindictive or arbitrary uses of legal force by official bodies, freedom of 
movement and a right to marriage and family life, the right to own 
                                                   
12 Rawls, LP, 111–116. 
13 Sangiovanni, “Justice and the Priority of Politics,” 17. 
14 Miller, National Responsibility, 166. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Conclusion 
342 of 373 
property and to practice your religion.15 But through a reading of the 
literature on basic needs, I argued that while internationalists do not need 
to sign up to all the articles of the UDHR, they ought to accept at least 
three more: The right to a standard of living adequate for a person’s health 
and well-being, the right to an education, and the right only to be 
subjected to laws that ensure the rights and freedoms of everyone.16 
 Not all global duties are necessarily grounded in human rights, and 
the chapter also considered two other possible grounds: Common 
ownership of the Earth, and rights derived from the liberal world order. 
Common ownership of the Earth stipulates that the Earth’s population are 
co-owners of the planet’s resources, and therefore have a right to be able to 
meet their basic needs. This specifically means that governments cannot 
prevent people from meeting their basic needs using natural resources.17 
But, I argued, even something as basic as water would struggle to be 
accepted as a basic right on this account. For the vast majority of the seven 
billion people on the planet who do not live near clean natural sources of 
water, even something this essential has to all intents and purposes 
become a social rather than a natural right. So common ownership is not 
an appealing framework. Rights derived from a liberal world order seemed 
a little more promising, focusing on the right of peoples to live in 
rationally autonomous states.18 One key difference is Blake’s insistence 
that democracy is a right, at least in principle.19 What is perhaps most 
interesting about rights derived form a liberal world order is that it is not 
                                                   
15 UN General Assembly, “UDHR,” Articles 3–18. 
16 Ibid., Articles 25, 26, 29. 
17 Risse, On Global Justice, 136. 
18 Blake, Justice and FP, 82. 
19 Ibid., 113. 
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constrained by the same justificatory minimalism as Rawls’s account, and 
therefore has the potential to be more far-reaching. Regardless of what 
principle you sign up to, however, I argued that to truly have these rights it 
is not enough to have them now, you must also be reasonably sure of 
having them in the future. This gives us good reasons to include wider-
reaching measures in areas such as education and healthcare than we 
would otherwise have thought necessary to secure our basic needs. 
 
 Having discussed the maximum extent of the duty of assistance, 
Chapter 4 asked how that duty could come into conflict with local duties. 
Internationalists generally think that the two do not come into conflict, as 
global duties always take lexical priority to egalitarian duties of domestic 
justice. But this chapter highlighted two important areas where the two 
could potentially be in conflict, as the internationalists’ strict priority of 
one over the other relied on an oversimplification. The first reason is that a 
country either is or is not a burdened society, with no middle ground. 
Rawls therefore ignores other options, such as a country having good 
institutions but still being abjectly poor, or having the cultural traditions 
but lacking the institutions to be well-ordered. This matters greatly 
because many countries in the world do in fact seem to have some of the 
things well-ordered peoples do, but not others. What is our moral duty to 
these countries? The answer to that question has enormous consequences 
for millions of people. Blake, I strongly suggested, gets the answer wrong. 
He constructs a highly stylised thought experiment involving a trade deal 
between two fictional countries, Syldavia and Borduria, which effectively 
gives license to the richer party to enact punitive measures for the poorer, 
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so long as they do not fall below the threshold for autonomous 
functioning.20 But Blake’s conclusion is only plausible if we assume that 
the countries are monolithic creatures with no internal variation. Once we 
acknowledge that policies will hit some parts of the population much 
harder than others Blake’s argument looks a lot more troubling. A second 
simplification was of a very different nature, but equally important. 
Richard Miller suggests that we should be very concerned to preserve the 
self-respect and self-determination of the countries we assist, which puts 
very strict limits on how much we can give. Specifically, anything above 
what is minimally required would be wrong. 21  But while Miller is 
absolutely right to worry about other nations’ self-respect and self-
determination, he makes the mistake of universalising a particular 
Western, liberal conception of them. When we acknowledge that different 
societies have different ideas of what these things mean to them, it also 
becomes clear that our justified concern for their self-respect does not 
necessarily commit us to capping assistance at the extremely low level 
Miller suggests. 
 
 Chapter 5 moved into more empirical territory. As we saw in the 
first chapter, the institutional thesis plays an important role in 
internationalism, arguing that there is a limit on what outside assistance 
can accomplish. This is because the main thing that determines 
development is the quality of institutions, and they are extremely difficult 
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to change from the outside.22 But is it true that the quality of institutions is 
as all-important as they claim? I argued that although they are in fact 
incredibly important, they are important in a very different way from what 
the institutional thesis suggests. Institutions are necessary for 
development, but they are not by themselves sufficient to bring it about. I 
started out by suggesting that the empirical work used by Risse and Rawls 
to defend the thesis suffered from flaws, in terms of what they measured 
and how institutions were defined. I also suggested several other measures 
that are likely to influence development. These were then put to the test in 
a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, testing five causal variables, 
including institutions, and one outcome variable, development as 
measured in GNI per capita. The other four causal variables were malaria 
prevalence, ethnic fractionalisation, years of schooling and life expectancy 
as a proxy for overall health. Instead of focusing on relations between 
variables, the fs/QCA analysis asks whether the causal variables are 
necessary or sufficient by themselves or in combination to produce the 
outcome. The analysis suggested that while institutions were indeed 
necessary for development, so were all the other variables apart from ethic 
fractionalisation. Moreover, while there were several pathways to low 
growth (many of which included good institutions), only one pathway 
seemed to consistently lead to development, indicating it was sufficient for 
the outcome. High scores in all variables apart from fractionalisation 
seemed the only sure-fire way to development. 
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 These results have significant normative consequences. They 
suggest that in a small but significant number of cases the institutional 
thesis may not be a particularly important concern. A burdened society 
may already have good institutions, but fail to graduate to well-
orderedness for other reasons. In this case the duty of development is not 
constrained by the institutional thesis. 
 
 That is not to say that development assistance will be easy, or that 
good results are in any way guaranteed. Indeed, internationalists tend to 
be very sceptical that aid will work in general, with complexity on the 
ground, lack of knowledge, special interests and great power politics 
colluding to make it ineffective.23 But Chapter 6 argued that this view, 
while not outright mistaken, is nonetheless overstated. There are in fact 
many ways that development aid has been proven to work effectively, with 
the return on investment from aid being modest but predominantly 
positive. At the same time many of the negatives of aid broadly fall into 
two categories. A problem such as aid volatility, which prevents 
programmes and government budgets running smoothly, is largely a self-
inflicted one. It is not intrinsic to aid, but would be solved if rich 
governments pledged more regular flows. Other negatives, such as aid 
flows lowering governance quality, are harder to solve. But the effects are 
not great enough to make aid ineffective on the whole, and remittances 
and natural resource income are not immune from the effect either. 
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 The chapter then suggested that Ghana is a prime example of a 
country that would benefit from sustained increases in assistance, and 
where the international duty of development is clearly owed. Ghana is a 
well-governed country which suffers from a poor disease environment in 
particular, as well as a relatively unfavourable geography, especially for the 
regions in the north of the country. The institutional thesis is not a 
constraint here. Nonetheless, I argued, one way in which Ghana could be 
assisted would be by improving their governmental capacity and ensure 
that the elections they have held regularly and fairly since 1992 remain so. 
Other avenues for assistance included improving health care facilities, 
especially to combat malaria, and improving the infrastructure and 
industry of the country. 
 This discussion has implications for the internationalist duty of 
development. I argued that the duty must take many different forms, and 
where the institutional constraint does not apply the duty is 
correspondingly greater. One important consequence is that there may 
actually be a greater duty to support those burdened societies that are 
relatively well-off (while still being burdened) compared to those in abject 
poverty, if the problems they face are ones that outside help will likely not 
fix. 
 
 The final part of the thesis sought to bring together normative and 
empirical elements of the discussion to ask, in Chapter 7, how the history 
of the world, of colonialism and exploitation of the poorest countries by 
the richest, should influence the duty of development assistance. First it 
showed that there is a need to rectify the harms the global order has 
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caused in the past. Two possible defences were considered and dismissed: 
that the global order was in fact not harmful as a whole or, slightly more 
plausibly but still untenable, that although the global order was unjust in 
the past, the distribution that resulted from it has nonetheless left 
everyone far better off than they would have before. Both, I argued, fail to 
hold up. 
 But what consequence does that have for the duty of development? 
There is an inherent contradiction in The Law of Peoples when Rawls 
simultaneously suggests that his theory represents an ideal scenario of 
well-ordered peoples in a just society of peoples, yet at the same time 
suggests that the law of peoples can be applied to the world as it is.24 But 
both of those claims cannot be true at the same time, considering the 
history of exploitation that led us to where we are now. A plausible way of 
overcoming this problem, I suggest, would be to allow the peoples in the 
international original position to choose a temporary extended duty of 
development, greater than the duty Rawls suggests, to bring all societies 
up to a level playing field. This temporary duty can be justified whether 
you believe that the global system is characterised by a liberal conception 
of justice, or by a libertarian one. 
 Outside of the overtly Rawlsian framework, Richard Miller laid out a 
progressive theory of compensation for imperial excess. The first, to 
ensure that when assistance does happen it should ensure good outcomes, 
is a natural part of the duty of development more generally. The second is 
client regimes, where a foreign power effectively takes control of another 
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country. Here there is a duty to govern in the best interests of the people. 
Finally, the duty of imperial repair demands that destruction abroad, even 
for a justified cause, must be compensated proportionally to the damage.25 
While Miller’s outline of global duties seems plausible in terms of its 
scope, however, it does not go far enough in its range. Given that 
colonialism was a legal system and a mode of understanding shared by all 
of the Western world, all must to some extent be held accountable for the 
harm that colonialism did. The duty, therefore, should apply as a general 
duty of repair for past harms, shared collectively by the West. 
 
 The arguments I have made in this thesis work together as a 
criticism and expansion of the internationalist duty of development, to 
form a coherent vision of a greater, more demanding duty of assistance to 
burdened societies. But they are not dependent on each other. You may 
share or adopt my point of view of any of the three parts of the argument 
(or, indeed, most of their sub-parts) without having to accept any of the 
other. By design, these arguments leave the broader contours of the 
internationalist argument untouched. Nothing I have argued commits 
anyone to move away from internationalism in order to accept them. 
 
8.3 Research impact and relevance 
 
 Rawlsian internationalism, as we saw in the first chapter, has been 
met with its fair share of criticism. But while I am generally sympathetic to 
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many of these views, and personally find that the internationalist duty as a 
whole is somewhat lacking in parts, that has not been the argument of my 
thesis. Rather, it has a deliberate argumentative strategy to hold the basic 
tenets of internationalism fixed, while examining the duty of development 
within that framework. It is a topic of much debate within the literature 
whether the cosmopolitan account, or one of its many forms, is better able 
to account for that duty, or even present a more coherent account of global 
justice on the whole. Internationalists argue that cosmopolitanism 
represents a vision of global society that bears little resemblance to the 
world as it currently is. By contrast, they say, internationalism maps on 
reasonably closely to what the world currently looks like.  Not to say that it 
is a perfect match – well-ordered peoples are not like states, and the 
implicit assumption that peoples are monolithic nation-states is not 
helpful either. Still, it is possible to ask what existing states can do to act 
more in the spirit of well-ordered peoples, given the existing global 
structure. Whatever the merit of either the internationalist or 
cosmopolitan position, it seems clear that the state inspires loyalties that 
cannot easily be explained away. “[J]ust from a causal inspection of 
newspapers it seems that the number of people willing to make significant 
sacrifices for preserving their community’s self-determination is large 
enough to justify the claim that patriotism is not simply the product of an 
old-fashioned, nostalgic mind.”26 
 Keeping the basic features of internationalism static while asking, 
“what are our duties to burdened societies?” we are therefore able to gain 
                                                   
26 Ypi, “Statist Cosmopolitanism,” 54. 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Conclusion 
351 of 373 
valuable insight into how the current rich of the world ought to act. I have 
argued that there is a duty of development that is more wide-reaching and 
demanding than internationalists assume. That is not to say that what I 
have presented in this thesis is the maximum extent of what is owed to the 
world’s poor. In keeping internationalism fixed I am not committing 
myself to rejecting cosmopolitanism, quasi-cosmopolitanism, or any other 
theories of global justice. But my conclusions follow from the internal logic 
of internationalism. Given the theory’s (imperfect) compatibility with the 
current global system, and prevalent mode of thinking about global justice 
in the West, they are things citizens can demand their governments do 
now. 
 This project is relevant for another reason. In bringing empirical 
research to bear on a normative argument, discussing several examples 
from the real world, it makes the conclusions more directly accessible and 
relevant to policy-makers and implementers. This particular field is, by 
far, not the worst sinner, and some – most notably Mathias Risse, Thomas 
Pogge and Richard Miller – make extensive use of empirical research. Still, 
this thesis is a contribution to that development, with the hope that more 
of the research in future will be firmly anchored in facts about the world, 
rather than abstract concepts and contrived thought experiments that bear 
little resemblance with the world in which we live. These have their place, 
but I am happy to contribute to tipping the balance. 
 
 
 
Duties to Burdened Societies: Conclusion 
352 of 373 
8.4 Avenues of further research 
 
 Even for a thesis of 95,000 words or so, you quickly realise the 
restrictions you have to work under – both in terms of what is feasible to 
do within the time and with the resources allotted to you, and in terms of 
how much you can actually discuss within the word limits. As part of the 
process some difficult decisions have had to be made, and other avenues of 
research, which did not fit into this particular project, have presented 
themselves. To end the thesis, what follows here is a list of potential 
directions that further research on the Rawlsian internationalist duty of 
development could take. 
 First, it would be fascinating to expand the fs/QCA in Chapter 5, in 
two ways. First, as a better way to gauge causality, one possible option 
would be to repeat the experiment for different time periods, for instance 
in ten year intervals. By doing this it would be possible to see in what order 
improvements tend to take place in: For instance, if improvements in 
institutional quality tend to happen before, during, or after a rise in GNI 
per capita. It would also be possible to suggest whether improvements in 
the causal variables tend to occur simultaneously or if there is an 
identifiable pattern of some variables following others. However, this 
study would face two obstacles. The first gives reason to be cautious in 
selecting the variables, and is a persistent problem in all types of statistical 
analysis: What looks like a causal pattern between two variables may in 
fact be a third one (which is not part of the study) exercising its influence 
over both of them. The second problem is potentially more devastating for 
this project: The further back in time you go, the harder it is to find 
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reliable and complete data sets for all your variables. The further back in 
the archives you go, the more holes your sets will likely have. Depending 
on the variables in question, supplementing with other datasets may be 
relatively straightforward, or the methodological differences in their data 
gathering may make it impossible to do so. 
 Another way would be to conduct a two-step approach that delves 
into other possible relevant variables that had to be omitted in the single-
step fs/QCA analysis used here. I briefly discussed this step in Chapter 2. 
For instance, in the first step geographical factors such as proximity to the 
equator, access to global shipping routes, or distance from regional and 
global centres of power could have been analysed as remote factors, with 
proximate factors depending on the pathways identified. 
 Second, my discussion of international institutions and, specifically, 
how they would need to be reformed to comply with the law of peoples, has 
only been a sketch. Internationalists do seem to be in agreement that 
global structures are in some need of reform, though the scale and exact 
nature of the reform is debated. For instance, Blake suggests that focusing 
primarily on making those institutions more robust, to better promote 
global justice within a first-order site of justice, would be “utopian 
thinking in the pejorative sense.”27 Insisting on that kind of institutional 
change, he says, offers us no guidance on how to get there. But to counter 
that view, Andrew Walton has suggested that Rawlsian internationalism 
would, in fact, require international organisations to be reordered 
                                                   
27 Blake, Justice and FP, 112. 
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substantially.28 This despite the claim by most cosmopolitans that Rawls is 
far too conservative about the global system. But it is not easy to 
disentangle the need to reform the system in order to comply with the law 
of peoples (or similar principles) in general, and what reforms are 
necessary specifically to live up to the duty of development. Sorting that 
out in a detailed and systematic fashion would have been too big a task for 
this thesis (and arguably a thesis topic in its own right), but it would be a 
fascinating and rewarding area to delve into in future. 
 Finally, further research should illuminate how climate change fits 
into the Rawlsian internationalist duty of justice. Is there a duty in 
general, within the law of peoples, to prevent and mitigate the effects of 
climate change? And – particularly relevant for my project – is there (only) 
a duty of justice to compensate burdened societies for the harm caused by 
climate change, or (also) to help them develop in ways that do not put the 
planet further at risk? If so, how would that limit be defined? How would 
the duty be shared between societies clearly in the subset of well-ordered 
peoples, and those closer to the lower limit? 
 Caney argues that climate change is an immediate threat to human 
rights, both in the short and long term. A rise of 2.5 degrees in average 
global temperatures could subject millions to precisely the kinds of human 
rights violations internationalists care deeply about: Hunger, malnutrition, 
diseases, polluted air and water.29 Yet Stephen Gardiner suggests that 
Rawls’s thinking on the topic is extremely limited, and that coming up with 
                                                   
28 Andrew Walton, “Global Democracy in a Society of Peoples,” Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 18, no. 6 (2015): 577–98. 
29 Simon Caney, “Human Rights, Climate Change, and Discounting,” Environmental 
Politics 17, no. 4 (2008): 538. 
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an answer to climate change may be difficult given the internationalist 
account of the importance of territorial integrity and self-determination.30 
That is a challenge that is worth taking up. 
 This thesis is perhaps, too, guilty of “treat[ing] environmental issues 
as minor secondary issues, an afterthought at best.”31 But future research 
could make a contribution to justice and climate change in this area, and 
satisfy my own curiosity. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
 There have been tremendous improvements in global poverty rates 
in the past few decades. Where, according to the World Bank, in 1990 37% 
of the world’s population lived in extreme poverty, by 2012 that number 
had dropped to 12.7%. That amounts to just under 900 million people.32 
That is an achievement that the world can justifiably be proud of, and it 
might suggest that the current world order is fine. But while the reductions 
have been remarkable, they have also been unequal. Most of the 
improvements have come in East Asia, where extreme poverty stood at 
80% in 1981 and just 7.2% in 2012. In sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, 
poverty stood at 42.6% in 2012.33 
 This strongly suggests that the current world order will not be able 
to lift everyone out of poverty. Where other factors conspire to make the 
                                                   
30 Stephen M. Gardiner, “Rawls and Climate Change: Does Rawlsian Political Philosophy 
Pass the Global Test?,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 
14, no. 2 (2011): 125–51. 
31 Ibid., 130. 
32 World Bank, “Overview.” 
33 Ibid. 
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normal workings of the market insufficient, there is a duty of the world’s 
richest countries to make a concerted effort to help the remaining 900 
million out of poverty, and towards a morally acceptable existence. This 
thesis has painted a picture of what that duty looks like. 
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Appendix 
 
 The original and calibrated scores for each of the 102 cases featured 
in the fs/QCA analysis in Chapter 5 can be found in the charts on the 
following pages. For each variable, the first column indicates the original, 
uncalibrated score, the second is the calibrated one. The abbreviations are 
as follows: 
 
 MAL – Malaria prevalence.1 
 ETH – Ethnic fractionalisation.2 
 EXP – Life expectancy.3 
 SCH – Average years of schooling.4 
 INS – Institutional quality.5 
 GNI – GNI per capita.6 
 QCA – Calibrated QCA score for the given variable. 
                                                   
1 Sachs, “Institutions Don’t Rule.” 
2 Alesina et al., “Fractionalization.” 
3 World Bank, “Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (years).” 
4 Barro and Lee, “A New Data Set.” Additional data from United Nations Development 
Programme, “Mean Years of Schooling (of Adults) (years).” 
5 World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” 
6 World Bank, “GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (current US$).” 
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Case name MAL QCA ETH QCA EXP QCA SCH QCA INS QCA GNI QCA 
Afghanistan 0.06 0.8 0.77 0.2 59.60 0.4 3.2 0.2 -1.76 0 $253(4) 0 
Algeria 0.00 1 0.34 0.8 70.62 0.6 6.8 0.6 -0.86 0.4 $3,067(7) 0.4 
Angola 1.00 0 0.79 0.2 50.65 0.2 4.7(1) 0.4 -1.01 0.2 $2,208 0.2 
Bangladesh 0.18 0.6 0.09 0 69.49 0.6 4.8 0.4 -0.85 0.4 $587 0 
Benin 1.00 0 0.79 0.2 58.75 0.2 3.2 0.2 -0.30 0.6 $546 0 
Bhutan 0.46 0.4 0.61 0.4 67.00 0.4 2.3 0.2 0.10 0.8 $1,696 0.2 
Bolivia 0.01 1 0.74 0.2 66.32 0.4 9.2 0.8 -0.55 0.4 $1,122 0.2 
Botswana 0.36 0.4 0.41 0.6 46.44 0 8.8 0.8 0.67 1 $5,902 0.6 
Brazil 0.03 1 0.54 0.4 73.08 0.8 7.2 0.6 0.11 0.8 $5,513 0.6 
Burkina Faso 1.00 0 0.74 0.2 55.01 0.2 1.3(1) 0 -0.28 0.6 $457 0 
Burundi 1.00 0 0.30 0.8 52.62 0.2 2.7 0.2 -1.17 0.2 $150 0 
Cambodia 1.00 0 0.21 0.8 70.64 0.6 4.0 0.4 -0.86 0.4 $575 0 
Cameroon 1.00 0 0.86 0 53.69 0.2 5.9 0.4 -0.91 0.4 $919 0 
Central African Rep. 1.00 0 0.83 0 48.10 0 3.5 0.4 -1.30 0.2 $385(6) 0 
Chad 0.99 0 0.86 0 49.77 0 1.5(1) 0 -1.37 0.2 $427(4) 0 
China 0.02 1 0.15 0 74.89 0.8 7.5 0.6 -0.56 0.4 $2,857 0.4 
Colombia 0.26 0.6 0.60 0.4 73.37 0.8 7.3 0.6 -0.37 0.6 $3,765 0.4 
Congo, D. Rep. of 1.00 0 0.87 0 48.99 0 3.1 0.2 -1.67 0 $141 0 
Congo, Rep. of 1.00 0 0.87 0 57.20 0.2 6.1 0.6 -1.03 0.2 $1,381 0.2 
Costa Rica 0.00 1 0.24 0.8 79.28 1 8.4 0.8 0.61 1 $5,250 0.6 
Cote d'Ivoire 1.00 0 0.82 0 49.68 0 4.3 0.4 -1.20 0.2 $894(6) 0 
Cuba 0.00 1 0.59 0.4 78.72 1 10.2 1 -0.59 0.4 $4,841 0.6 
Djibouti 1.00 0 0.80 0.2 60.29 0.4 3.8(1) 0.4 -0.61 0.4 $999(4) 0 
Dominican Republic 0.00 1 0.43 0.6 72.79 0.8 6.9 0.6 -0.41 0.6 $4,623 0.6 
Ecuador 0.20 0.6 0.66 0.2 75.65 1 7.6 0.6 -0.80 0.4 $3,194 0.4 
Egypt 0.00 1 0.18 0 70.45 0.6 6.4 0.6 -0.54 0.4 $1,521 0.2 
El Salvador 0.00 1 0.20 0 71.63 0.8 7.5 0.6 -0.10 0.6 $2,877 0.4 
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Case name MAL QCA ETH QCA EXP QCA SCH QCA INS QCA GNI QCA 
Equatorial Guinea 1 0 0.35 0.8 51.53 0.2 5.4(1) 0.4 -1.24 0.2 $9,249 0.8 
Eritrea 0.76 0 0.65 0.2 61.19 0.4 3.4(1) 0.2 -1.40 0.2 $182 0 
Ethiopia 0.58 0.2 0.72 0.2 61.47 0.4 2.2(1) 0.2 -0.94 0.4 $228 0 
Gabon 1.00 0 0.77 0.2 62.29 0.4 7.4 0.6 -0.54 0.4 $5,527 0.6 
Gambia, The 1.00 0 0.79 0.2 58.13 0.2 2.8 0.2 -0.52 0.4 $452 0 
Ghana 1.00 0 0.67 0.2 60.60 0.4 7.0 0.6 0.10 0.8 $496(4) 0 
Guatemala 0.02 1 0.51 0.4 71.00 0.6 4.1 0.4 -0.59 0.4 $2,203 0.2 
Guinea 1.00 0 0.74 0.2 55.30 0.2 1.6(1) 0 -1.26 0.2 $278(4) 0 
Guinea-Bissau 1.00 0 0.81 0 53.56 0.2 2.3(1) 0.2 -1.02 0.2 $395(4) 0 
Guyana 0.51 0.4 0.62 0.4 65.70 0.4 8.6 0.8 -0.35 0.6 $1,057(4) 0.2 
Haiti 1.00 0 0.10 0 61.87 0.4 4.9 0.4 -1.16 0.2 $433 0 
Honduras 0.10 0.8 0.19 0 72.85 0.8 6.5 0.6 -0.61 0.4 $1,456 0.2 
India 0.33 0.6 0.42 0.6 65.69 0.4 4.4 0.4 -0.29 0.6 $1,023 0 
Indonesia 0.45 0.4 0.74 0.2 70.17 0.6 5.5 0.4 -0.48 0.6 $1,526 0.2 
Iran 0.12 0.8 0.67 0.2 73.13 0.8 7.8 0.6 -1.22 0.2 $3,023(6) 0.4 
Iraq 0.03 1 0.37 0.6 68.83 0.6 5.6 0.4 -1.42 0.2 $1,199(4) 0.2 
Jamaica 0.00 1 0.41 0.6 72.85 0.8 9.5 0.8 -0.06 0.6 $3,927(4) 0.4 
Jordan 0.00 1 0.59 0.4 73.44 0.8 8.6 0.8 -0.08 0.6 $2,818 0.4 
Kenya 0.84 0 0.86 0 59.55 0.4 6.3 0.6 -0.66 0.4 $572 0 
Korea, DPR of 0.00 1 0.04 0 68.90 0.6 (2) 1 -1.59 0 (3) 0 
Korea, Rep. of 0.00 1 0.00 1 80.57 1 11.7 1 0.76 1 $20,650 1 
Kuwait 0.00 1 0.66 0.2 74.16 0.8 6.1 0.6 0.21 0.8 $38,313(4) 1 
Laos 1.00 0 0.51 0.4 66.90 0.4 4.6 0.4 -0.98 0.4 $588 0 
Lebanon 0.00 1 0.13 0 79.25 1 7.9(1) 0.8 -0.62 0.4 $6,813 0.6 
Lesotho 0.00 1 0.26 0.8 47.48 0 5.8 0.4 -0.12 0.6 $1,050 0.2 
Liberia 1.00 0 0.91 0 59.43 0.4 3.9 0.4 -0.76 0.4 $197 0 
Libya 0.00 1 0.79 0.2 74.79 0.8 7.5 0.6 -1.07 0.2 $7,815(4) 0.6 
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Case name MAL QCA ETH QCA EXP QCA SCH QCA INS QCA GNI QCA 
Madagascar 1.00 0 0.88 0 63.35 0.4 5.2(1) 0.4 -0.75 0.4 $279(7) 0 
Malawi 1.00 0 0.67 0.2 53.47 0.2 4.2 0.4 -0.29 0.6 $214 0 
Malaysia 0.25 0.6 0.59 0.4 74.50 0.8 9.5 0.8 0.34 0.8 $6,104 0.6 
Mali 0.99 0 0.69 0.2 53.77 0.2 1.5 0 -0.41 0.6 $453(5) 0 
Mauritania 0.85 0 0.62 0.4 61.02 0.4 3.7 0.4 -0.89 0.4 $767 0 
Mauritius 0.00 1 0.46 0.6 72.97 0.8 7.2 0.6 0.77 1 $6,177 0.6 
Mexico 0.04 1 0.54 0.4 76.69 1 8.5 0.8 -0.19 0.6 $8,030 0.6 
Mongolia 0.00 1 0.37 0.6 66.89 0.4 8.3 0.8 -0.21 0.6 $1,141 0.2 
Morocco 0.00 1 0.48 0.6 70.17 0.6 4.4 0.4 -0.27 0.6 $2,293 0.2 
Mozambique 1.00 0 0.69 0.2 49.14 0 1.2 0 -0.27 0.6 $378 0 
Myanmar 0.72 0 0.51 0.4 64.58 0.4 4.0 0.4 -1.74 0 (3) 0 
Namibia 0.62 0.2 0.63 0.4 62.48 0.4 6.2 0.6 0.32 0.8 $3,880 0.4 
Nepal 0.16 0.8 0.66 0.2 67.10 0.4 3.2 0.2 -0.89 0.4 $379 0 
Nicaragua 0.10 0.8 0.48 0.6 73.80 0.8 5.8 0.4 -0.64 0.4 $1,210 0.2 
Niger 0.98 0 0.65 0.2 56.99 0.2 1.4 0 -0.70 0.4 $258(4) 0 
Nigeria 1.00 0 0.85 0 51.29 0.2(1) 5.2 0.4 -1.17 0.2 $909 0 
Oman 0.87 0 0.44 0.6 76.05 1(1) 5.5 0.4 0.23 0.8 $11,847(4) 0.8 
Pakistan 0.49 0.4 0.71 0.2 66.13 0.4 4.9 0.4 -1.11 0.2 $776 0 
Panama 0.03 1 0.55 0.4 76.95 1 9.4 0.8 0.08 0.8 $6,625 0.6 
Papua New Guinea 0.59 0.2 0.27 0.8 62.01 0.4 3.9 0.4 -0.70 0.4 $743(4) 0 
Paraguay 0.00 1 0.17 0 72.03 0.8 7.7 0.6 -0.64 0.4 $1,613 0.2 
Peru 0.03 1 0.66 0.2 73.91 0.8 8.5 0.8 -0.25 0.6 $3,541 0.4 
Philippines 0.75 0 0.24 0.8 68.23 0.6 8.7 0.8 -0.55 0.4 $1,407 0.2 
Qatar 0.00 1 0.75 0.2 78.15 1 7.3 0.6 0.71 1 (2) 1 
Rwanda 1.00 0 0.32 0.8 62.21 0.4 3.3 0.2 -0.26 0.6 $350 0 
Saudi Arabia 0.09 0.8 0.18 0 75.08 1 7.8 0.6 -0.24 0.6 $13,540(4) 1 
Senegal 1.00 0 0.69 0.2 62.84 0.4 4.4 0.4 -0.44 0.6 $792 0 
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Case name MAL QCA ETH QCA EXP QCA SCH QCA INS QCA GNI QCA 
Sierra Leone 1.00 0 0.82 0 44.84 0 2.9 0.2 -0.68 0.4 $363 0 
Singapore 0.00 1 0.39 0.6 81.54 1 8.8 0.8 1.48 1 $33,231 1 
Somalia 1.00 0 0.81 0 54.02 0.2 (3) 0 -2.33 0 (3) 0 
South Africa 0.02 1 0.75 0.2 54.39 0.2 8.2 0.8 0.25 0.8 $5.673 0.6 
Sri Lanka 0.18 0.6 0.42 0.6 73.76 0.8 10.8 1 -0.38 0.6 $1,590 0.2 
Sudan 0.98 0 0.71 0.2 61.48 0.4 3.1 0.2 -1.61 0 $725(5) 0 
Suriname 0.19 0.6 0.73 0.2 70.34 0.6 7.2(1) 0.6 -0.15 0.6 $3,510(4) 0.4 
Swaziland 0.10 0.8 0.06 0 48.35 0 7.1 0.6 -0.51 0.4 $2,280 0.2 
Syria 0.19 0.6 0.54 0.4 74.87 0.8 4.9 0.4 -0.92 0.4 $1,648 0.2 
Tanzania 1.00 0 0.74 0.2 59.18 0.4 5.1 0.4 -0.36 0.6 $445 0 
Thailand 0.42 0.4 0.63 0.4 73.81 0.8 6.6 0.6 -0.34 0.6 $3,023 0.4 
Togo 1.00 0 0.71 0.2 55.47 0.2 4.9 0.4 -0.89 0.4 $349 0 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.00 1 0.65 0.4 69.60 0.6 9.3 0.8 0.10 0.8 $14,437(6) 1 
Tunisia 0.00 1 0.04 0 74.60 0.8 6.5 0.6 -0.20 0.6 $3,619 0.4 
Turkey 0.00 1 0.32 0.8 74.21 0.8 6.5 0.6 -0.05 0.6 $7,757 0.6 
Uganda 1.00 0 0.93 0 57.30 0.2 4.7 0.4 -0.58 0.4 $361 0 
United Arab Emirates 0.01 1 0.63 0.4 76.60 1 8.9 0.8 0.40 0.8 $24,239 1 
Venezuela 0.00 1 0.50 0.6 74.17 0.8 6.2 0.6 -1.28 0.2 $5,905 0.6 
Vietnam 0.72 0 0.24 0.8 75.31 1 5.5 0.4 -0.57 0.4 $866 0 
Zambia 1.00 0 0.78 0.2 54.53 0.2 6.5 0.6 -0.36 0.6 $649 0 
Zimbabwe 0.62 0.2 0.39 0.6 53.59 0.2 7.3 0.6 -1.54 0 $380 0 
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 Notes to the appendix: 
 
 (1) Data from the United Nations Development Programme. 
 (2) Data not available – estimated to be very high. 
 (3) Data not available – estimated to be very low. 
 (4) Data from 2005. 
 (5) Data from 2007. 
 (6) Data from 2008. 
 (7) Data from 2009. 
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